Public Diplomacy & the National Security Process

From

AFFAIRS OF STATE:

THE INTERAGENCY 

AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Gabriel Marcella

Editor

December 2008

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CHAPTER 8

SEDUCED AND ABANDONED:

STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PROCESS

William P. Kiehl

Truth also needs propaganda.

—Karl Jaspers,

German philosopher

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 Strategic information is a term that cries out for

definition. Strategic information is: (1) civilian public

diplomacy currently conducted principally by the U.S.

Department of State, and by other civilian agencies

in a supporting role, e.g., the Broadcasting Board of

Governors for international broadcasting, the Agency

for International Development (AID) in civil affairs

and developmental tasks (many AID programs in

democracy building and AID training programs

have an obvious public diplomacy link or provide

opportunities for public diplomacy); and (2) military

psychological operations and peacetime information

operations with aims and methodology compatible

with civilian public diplomacy, such as Civil Affairs,

the International Military Education and Training

(IMET) program, and the expanded IMET (e-IMET)

program.

 Strategic information may also have a clandestine

component and utilize grey or black propaganda where

the source of information is either masked or falsified.

This latter form is used by intelligence agencies but is

 not used by civilian public diplomacy or peacetime

military psychological operations.

 

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DEFINED

 

 Civilian public diplomacy has evolved from its first

use in 1965 by Dean Edward Gullion of the Fletcher

School at Tufts University, when he coined the term to

refer mainly to nongovernmental actions and people-

to-people programs or what is often now termed

“citizen diplomacy.” By the 1970s, however, public

diplomacy came to mean the U.S. Government’s

informational, educational and cultural exchange

activities abroad. The classic definition of public

diplomacy is attributed to the U.S. Information Agency

and is still the preferred definition in the United States.

Accordingly, “public diplomacy seeks to promote

the national interest and the national security of the

United States through understanding, informing, and

influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue

between American citizens and institutions and their

counterparts abroad.”1

 Peacetime public diplomacy of this form was already

in use as early as 1938, when Nelson Rockefeller’s

Office of Inter-American Affairs embarked upon an

ambitious educational and cultural exchange program

with Latin America to blunt actual and potential Nazi

and fascist influence.2

 World War II and the creation of the Office of

War Information (OWI), the Voice of America (VOA),

and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) provided

broad additional means for civilian-directed public

diplomacy. At the same time, the War Department

and the uniformed services honed under British

tutorage psychological operations and other military

information operations skills.

 

THE TOYS OF WAR

 

 Following the war, as is the U.S. custom, the “toys of

war” were put aside in peacetime. In a practical sense,

this meant the demobilization and deactivation of most

of the American civilian and military capability of

waging a “war of ideas.” The Office of War Information,

which also had significant domestic information

coordination functions as well as its more documented

foreign propaganda activities, was dismantled

immediately upon the conclusion of hostilities. The

remnants of OWI’s overseas operations were deposited

in the Department of State where they remained until

1953. The Voice of America was continued, albeit with

much reduced resources.3 The OSS evolved into the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 and retained

a capability for clandestine influence measures and

black propaganda. The peacetime military placed

“psyops” and other information operations firmly on

the back burner.

 

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

 

The Beginning of the National Security Council

Process.

 

 With the passage of the National Security Act and

the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) with

Public Law 80-253 of July 26, 1947, the national security

process began in the Harry Truman administration.4

Continuing the World War II interagency cooperation

and coordination begun by the State-War-Navy

Coordinating Committee established in 1944 at the

Assistant Secretary level and at the Secretary level in

 

1945, the NSC attempted to give institutional stability

to national security policymaking. The NSC was

under the chairmanship of the President, with the

Secretaries of State and Defense as its key members.

Other original members included the Secretaries of the

Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman of the

National Security Resources Board. The President could

designate representatives of other executive agencies

to attend meetings. The CIA reported to the NSC, but

the Director of Central Intelligence was not a member;

he attended meetings as an observer and adviser. The

stated function of the NSC was to advise the President

on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military

policies relating to national security and to facilitate

interagency cooperation. This vastly significant

legislation also created the position of Secretary of

Defense, the National Military Establishment, the CIA,

and the National Security Resources Board.5 Despite

the preponderance of military members, during the

Truman administration the NSC was dominated by

the Department of State. State’s Policy Planning Staff

drafted most NSC papers for discussion, approval, and

dissemination.6

 From the beginning, strategic information was

reinvited to the table. An early National Security

Council document, NSC-4 entitled “Coordination of

Foreign Information Measures,” brought strategic

information in all of its forms to the forefront. The

document reads in part:

 

NSC 4

Washington, December 17, 1947

REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON

COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES

The Problem

1. To determine what steps are required to strengthen and

coordinate all foreign information measures of the U.S. government

in furtherance of the attainment of U.S. national objectives.

Analysis

2. The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda Campaign

directed primarily against the U.S. and is employing coordinated

psychological, political and economic measures designed to

undermine non-Communist elements in all countries. The

ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine

the prestige of the U.S. and the effectiveness of its national policy

but to weaken and divide world public opinion to a point where

effective opposition to Soviet designs is no longer attainable by

political, economic or military means. . . .

3. The U.S. is not now employing strong, coordinated information

measures to counter this propaganda campaign or to further the

attainment of its national objectives.

4. None of the existing departments or agencies of the U.S.

Government is now charged with responsibility for coordinating

foreign information measures in furtherance of the attainment of

U.S. national objectives.

Conclusions

6. The present world situation requires the immediate strengthening

and coordination of all foreign information measures of the U.S.

Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries

in a direction favorable to the attainment of it objectives and to

counteract effects of anti-U.S. propaganda.7

 

The Memorandum goes on to charge the Secretary

of State with responsibility to formulate policies and

coordinate all information measures designed to

influence attitudes in foreign countries. The Assistant

Secretary for Public Affairs was delegated to exercise

these functions for the Secretary, and he would be

assisted by an interagency staff.

 In a separate Memorandum, NSC-4-A entitled

“Psychological Operations,” the NSC notes that there

are two related but separate purposes, i.e., (1) to ensure

that all overt foreign information activities are effectively

coordinated, and (2) to initiate steps looking toward

the conduct of covert psychological operations. NSC-4

dealt with overt methods and a separate document, a

directive to the Director of Central Intelligence, dealt

with the covert operations and established formal

institutionalization of covert operations.8 Perhaps the

most famous of these forays was CIA’s covert support

to The Congress for Cultural Freedom, established in

1950 which once had offices or representatives in some

35 countries.9

 In 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board made up

of the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary

of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence was

created to coordinate a U.S. response to unconventional

Soviet tactics. The Board worked closely with the NSC in

managing both overt and covert counteroperations.10

 

The U.S. Information Agency and the National

Security Council.

 

 By 1953, psychological and influence operations

were considered sufficiently indispensable to the

conduct of foreign relations that a new entity was

created which assumed the mantle for civilian overseas

information, and cultural and educational exchanges

activities authorized under the Information and

Cultural Exchanges Act (Public Law 402 of January

27, 1948), also known as the Smith-Mundt Act. These

activities had previously been carried out by the

Department of State.11 In addition to these duties, the

new agency, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA),

was charged with responsibility for the Voice of

America, which eventually moved from its New York

studios to Washington, DC. The Dwight Eisenhower

administration, already well-disposed to what would

later come to be called “public diplomacy” as an

effective tool in the “war of ideas” against the Soviet

Union, not only brought the USIA into existence but

also codified the mission of the new agency in NSC

Document number 165/1.12 The Agency’s mission

remained virtually unchanged until its demise in

1999.

 In recent years, there has been a belated recognition

that public diplomacy is an essential element in the

conduct of foreign relations. Essential it is, but it is not

the “silver bullet” or panacea that some pundits might

claim. Indeed, no one can claim that public diplomacy

in its many forms can solve America’s relationship

problems.

 

LOCALIZED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

 

 A myth worth exploring is the notion that public

diplomacy works best when centrally planned and

focused on a single message or set of messages. Those

that believe this myth would have us believe that

nothing worthwhile in public diplomacy happens

without Washington’s direction.

 

 Anyone who has worked in public diplomacy

abroad—“in the field”—is aware of how important

on-the-ground experience and sensitivity to the local

milieu is to successful public diplomacy. Successful

public diplomacy campaigns are rarely “invented” in

Washington. Indeed, most of the “brilliant” ideas from

inside the Beltway are at best marginally successful

in an overseas context. They too often presuppose a

cookie cutter approach to the world with a one-size-

fits-all policy line to which the hapless public diplomats

abroad are expected to tow.

 If there is one concept that seems to elude the

political masters of the Washington bureaucracy, it is

that in public diplomacy it is all about context. Thus

a skilled practitioner of public diplomacy must find a

way to take the “flavor of the month” cooked up by

Washington and make it palatable to key contacts in

the host country. The public diplomacy officer must

find a way to place the message in a context that is both

understandable and reasonable (if not likeable) to the

target audience.

 Three examples of localized public diplomacy

which, in the language of the old USIA was “field

driven” public diplomacy, illustrate what is meant

by “localized” public diplomacy. The examples are

illustrative of countless public diplomacy campaigns

over the past half century that originated in the field

rather than in the Washington bureaucracy, despite

the national security systems’ jealously guarded hold

on power.

 The first takes place in communist Czechoslovakia

in the late 1970s and early 80s, the second in Finland

in the late 1980s, and the third in Thailand in the late

1990s. There is nothing inherently more profound about

these three choices versus the many other examples of

field-driven public diplomacy. They are all vignettes

from this writer’s own public diplomacy career and

thus may be verified in their authenticity.13

 

Czechoslovakia.

 In the waning days of World War II, as the Red

Army raced westward to Berlin and the Western allies

moved up the boot of Italy and across France to the

Rhine, Czechoslovakia, especially Bohemia, became

one of the last redoubts of the Nazis. Both the Russians

and the Americans moved to eliminate this potential

hold-out. General George Patton’s Third Army moved

aggressively into western Bohemia, and for a time it

appeared that he would be the first to enter Prague

and liberate that city. The communist-dominated

partisans in Prague called for the Red Army to liberate

the city, and thus Patton’s army slowed and met up

with the Red Army in the town of Rokycany just east

of Plzen (Pilsen). At the end of the war then, American

GIs occupied western and southern Bohemia, and the

Red Army occupied the remainder of the country.

As the Red Army was reluctant to leave, the GIs also

stayed on until there was a mutual withdrawal in

1946. During that interval, the American GIs and the

residents of western Bohemia seemed to have formed a

close friendship. After the war, dozens of monuments

were erected by local townspeople as tributes to their

American liberators.

 Following the Communist Party coup of February

1948, the regime wished to create the myth that

it was the Red Army alone which liberated all of

Czechoslovakia from fascism. Honoring the GIs

was actively discouraged. After crushing the Prague

Spring with a Russian-led Warsaw Pact occupation

of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the authorities took more

drastic measures. Ostensibly in “outrage” over

 the Vietnam War, local officials had many of the

monuments to American liberators removed and/or

destroyed. But the memory remained.

 In part to look into the history of the American

liberation and in part as a cover for American military

attachés’ travel to border areas and districts of military

interest, the Defense Attaché’s Office at the American

Embassy in Prague in the late 1970s began a series of

automobile trips each May to the towns in western

Bohemia liberated by the United States. A similar series

of journeys was organized in November to visit crash

sites and monuments to fallen U.S. airmen in Slovakia.

Initially only Department of Defense (DoD) personnel

made the journeys but in the early 1980s, other personnel

from the Embassy, including U.S. Ambassador Jack

Matlock joined the small motorcade to Bohemia in

May each year. The visits to the sites where markers

once stood and to the small towns and villages was

very low key and attracted almost no notice, except for

the ubiquitous Statny Tanjy Bezpechnosti (STB or State

Secret Security) detail which shadowed the Americans.

Where a monument remained, a small wreath “from

the American people” was placed on the marker.

 In May 1983, the newly arrived Public Affairs

Officer (PAO) joined the motor trips in May and

November and realized the potential that these

events might have for the United States to remind

the people of Czechoslovakia of the American role in

their liberation from the Nazis and also the enduring

interest and concern on the part of the United States

for the oppressed people of this communist state.

Beginning in 1984, the Embassy’s May and November

“wreath-layings”—as they came to be known—took

on a higher profile a and different character. All

embassy employees and their families were actively

encouraged to join the motorcades which now grew

much larger, with up to two dozen vehicles moving

in tandem through the back roads and byways of

Bohemia. The dates and times of the “wreath-layings”

were announced through the Czechoslovak Service of

the Voice of America (VOA)—the most widely listened-

to foreign radio station in Czechoslovakia, (known

euphemistically as “Prague Three” by most Czechs

who had two domestic networks). Radio Free Europe’s

(RFE) Czech and Slovak Services also announced

the events. The Public Affairs Office (aka The Press

and Cultural Service) was able to obtain thousands

of Czechoslovak-American crossed-flag lapel pins

from the U.S. émigré organization, the Czechoslovak

National Congress, VOA bumper stickers, lapel pins,

ballpoint pens, and other “souvenirs” for distribution

to well-wishers along the route.

 By 1986, the Press and Cultural Service was

printing special commemorative postcards by the

thousands with a photo of GIs liberating Pilsen for mass

distribution to the by now thousands of Czechs lining

the route and participating in the ceremonies at each

site. Wreaths from “the American people” were placed

in each location where there had been a monument

whether removed or not, and American Ambassador

William Luers addressed large audiences in near-fluent

Czech recalling the friendship between Americans

and the people of Czechoslovakia. The STB observers

were beside themselves. The crowds were too large to

intimidate, and the secret police filming and taping the

events were hardly a secret but were largely ignored

by the crowds who often displayed American flags and

other expressions of support. Detailed reports of the

growing crowds and their enthusiasm were broadcast

back to Czechoslovakia by the VOA and RFE.

 

 This local initiative, from the early forays into the

Bohemian countryside in the late 1970s and especially

after 1984 brought the events to the level of a major

public diplomacy program, proved to be a huge

success. The program reinforced the belief among the

people of Czechoslovakia that the United States and

the West had not abandoned them and was actively

demonstrating that fact through the series of “wreath-

layings” around the country. After the successful

Velvet Revolution in December 1989, which toppled

the communist government, the May Embassy

“wreath-layings” continued in 1990 and culminated

in an event in Pilsen at the newly restored Liberation

Monument in front of the city hall. More than 100,000

Czechs honored the American liberators of their city.

 

Finland.

 In 1638 a small band of Swedish colonists (the

majority of whom happened to be Finns, then under

the rule of the Kingdom of Sweden) founded New

Sweden on the Delaware River, south of today’s

Philadelphia. Nearly 350 years later, a rather low-key

but well-organized effort commemorated this event

in both Sweden and Finland. The two countries and

the U.S. postal authorities had approved the issuance

of stamps to mark the occasion in 1988 and various

Swedish-American and Finish-American organization

were making plans to commemorate the event on both

sides of the Atlantic.

 While studying the Finnish language and culture in

preparation for his assignment beginning in July 1987,

the future PAO learned about the 1988 anniversary,

and it triggered a series of ideas and plans to increase

the American profile in Finland and reinforce the

positive feelings for the United States that existed

there. Recalling the slogan “America’s Bicentennial

Salute to Sri Lanka” from an earlier assignment, the

PAO recognized how successful it had been to bring

all public diplomacy programs—the routine ones as

well as those created just for the event—under a single

banner as the PAO had done in Sri Lanka in 1976.

 Using this formula as a model, the incoming PAO,

in discussion with the Finnish Embassy in Washington

and the USIA and Department of State, began to

focus on 1988 as “The National Year of Friendship

with Finland.” Upon arrival in Finland, he was able

to convince Ambassador Rockwell Schnabel and

the Country Team of the value of using this event to

further U.S. public diplomacy goals in Finland. Within

a few months, an elaborate program of the National

Year of Friendship with Finland was announced and

underway. A logo for the Finnish-American Year of

Friendship was adopted by both the U.S. Embassy

and the Finnish Foreign Ministry, and soon this logo

was on everything from cultural presentations to

educational exchanges to publications and special

events. The U.S. Information Service alone listed

some 38 separate programs in honor of the “Year of

Friendship” which included an all-star program at the

prestigious Finlandia Hall featuring a video address to

the Finlandia audience (and the national TV audience)

by President Ronald Reagan on the importance of the

relationship between Finland and the United States

over the 350 years since the first Finn set foot in the

New World. The event also kicked off a 5-year $5

million dollar fund-raising campaign to increase the

number of Fulbright grantees between Finland and the

United States. The “Year of Friendship” culminated in

a visit to Finland by President Reagan, the first-ever by

a sitting U.S. president.

 

 Among the benefits of this elaborate program in

cooperation with the Finnish Government was an

increased favorability rating for the United States

as a nation and for specific U.S. foreign policies as

measured by public opinion polls. The high level of

favorability proved to be important as Finland assumed

the Presidency of the Security Council just prior to the

Gulf War and played an important and positive role

which supported U.S. positions. Shortly thereafter

Finland bought its first-ever U.S. military aircraft when

a major contract was awarded for the F-16. This era of

good feeling between the United States and Finland

continued as the Baltic states gained their freedom from

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the

Soviet Union itself disintegrated shortly thereafter.

 

Thailand.

 The Thai economy was one of the fastest growing

of the so-called Asian Tigers in the 1990s. Construction

cranes (the national bird) were seen in every direction

in Bangkok, which went from a charmingly sleazy

backwater to New York on the Chao Priya River in

less than a decade. Wooden houses were replaced

by 60-story buildings, and tropical gardens in the

capital and similar scenes could be seen in other urban

centers throughout the country. Thailand became the

Detroit of Asia as dozens of automobile brands were

manufactured there for the Asian market and auto

parts makers proliferated. But this house of cards was

built on speculation and what came to be called “crony

capitalism” with loose banking practices, slip-shod

securities laws, and massive corruption; and it was all

about to come crashing down.

 

 The U.S.-Thai relationship has had its ups and

downs in the 156-year history of diplomatic relations.

Essentially, the relationship in Thai eyes was a classic

pi-non relationship, that is, an elder brother-younger

brother relationship with the United States as the pi

and Thailand as the non. It was the pi’s responsibility to

look out for the non, to assist when needed, to protect

and to guide the non. The non’s responsibility was to

be loyal to the pi and to follow the pi’s lead. This pi-

non relationship survived the military dictatorships

in Thailand’s post-war era, the Vietnam War, and

American withdrawal from Southeast Asia and seemed

unshakeable in July 1997.

 Earlier in the year there had been “runs” on several

international currencies by hedge fund operators, the

most famous being George Soros’ run on the British

pound which netted him hundreds of millions of

dollars in profit. In July 1997 it became the Thai baht’s

turn to be attacked by currency traders, and it proved

to be the beginning of a cascade of economic troubles

that caused first the Thai baht to crumble, and then the

Thai financial system to crash, and eventually the Thai

economy to come tumbling down. A run on a country’s

currency can be overcome easily if the underlying

fundamentals of the economy are sound. But in

Thailand’s case, the fundamentals were in a shambles

thanks to the crony capitalism and corruption of the

banking and securities sectors.

 Thailand became the first of the Asian Tigers to fall,

but it soon had company. Indonesia and then South

Korea followed in Thailand’s footsteps and for many

of the same reasons. When the dust had settled, the

Thai baht went from about 24 to the dollar to about

55 to the dollar. Thousands of workers in the financial

sector were suddenly without a job when their banks

and securities firms closed their doors.

 

 This is essentially an economic story, but it relates

to public diplomacy because at its heart is the pi-non

relationship. When Thailand’s economy crashed,

it looked to the United States for help. But the U.S.

Treasury Department, looking through the framework

of economics, not public diplomacy, looked at Thailand

and saw that it basically got what it deserved for

not having its house in order. The State Department

deferred to the Treasury in all things having to do

with economics and finance. So the United States did

nothing when Thailand’s crash came. Puzzled and

resentful, the Thai saw the United States as abandoning

Thailand, and renouncing the pi-non relationship when

the going got tough.

 Newspaper editorials pointed to the United States

as the cause of Thailand’s woes. George Soros and

other western currency traders were vilified, and by

implication Western governments, especially the

United States, were seen as responsible for the collapse

throughout Asia. As if this was not bad enough, the

U.S. Government decided that things were beginning

to get out of hand in Asia and announced that it would

bail out Indonesia and South Korea with billions of

dollars in credit. This was like throwing gasoline on a

fire in Thailand. The Thai media and influential Thais

across the spectrum of society exploded in indignation.

The United States would not help Thailand but would

help Indonesia! Thailand was one of the five U.S. treaty

allies in the Pacific, it was a functioning democracy, it

was a loyal U.S. ally, and took its lead from the United

States. Indonesia was none of these things—not a

treaty ally nor even an informal ally, a dictatorship not

a democracy; and Indonesia, more often than not, was

at odds with the United States.

 A major financial decision had been made in

Washington without input from two important

 

sources—first, there was no consultation with regard

to the public diplomacy dimension of this decision in

any of the countries affected, and, second, there was

no consultation with the Embassy in Bangkok which

actually understood the situation in Thailand. Even

before this unfortunate decision was made, the PAO

had outlined a series of public diplomacy strategic and

tactical measures to explain U.S. policy to the Thai and

limit the damage to the relationship. Following the

announcement about aid for Indonesia, Ambassador

William Itoh and the Country Team met to develop an

overall strategy to cope with this near rupture of the

relationship.

 Public diplomacy was a central part of the strategy,

which also included convincing State and Treasury to

reverse course and provide an aid package for Thailand

at least proportional to the aid package proposed for

other countries. DoD was called upon through the

Defense Attaché’s Office and the Joint U.S. Military

Assistance Group to cancel an outstanding contract for

F-16 aircraft and parts which would free up hundreds

of millions of dollars for the Thai Government.

 The U.S. Information Service’s public diplomacy

strategy focused on several fronts. Because of the crash

of the Thai economy and currency, many of the 8,000

Thai students in American higher education were

suddenly without the financial means to continue

their education. For the United States, this meant well-

publicized and immediate assistance from public and

private sector sources to provide work-study and

loan opportunities for Thai and other Asian students,

and the Institute for International Education and

American higher educational institutions took the

lead. In addition, the Public Affairs Section proposed

to Washington that a special high profile scholarship

program be established for 156 students selected

by the Thai Government to attend U.S. universities

for 3 years. The 156 was linked to the 156 years of

diplomatic relations between the two countries, and

the total funding for the scholarship program provided

through Economic Assistance Funds and administered

by AID came to about $3 million. This is a tiny sum

when compared to the $4 billion in loan guarantees

provided to Thailand or the nearly $1 billion in debt

cancelled by recalling the F-16 contract, but because it

involved people, not hardware or loans, it registered

with the Thai public as real help from America. Other

smaller exchange programs were augmented too, like

the Fulbright Program and other government-funded

internships; but the 156 scholarships made the biggest

headlines.

 Determined to demonstrate that the United States

was interested in Thailand, the Embassy encouraged

as many high level visitors as possible to visit Bangkok.

For its part, the U.S. Information Service used each

of these cabinet level or equivalent visits to get the

message out that the United States was interested in

Thailand and would do whatever it could to ease the

burden during a difficult economic time. Every high

level visitor held a press conference and interviews with

Thai media, made highly visible public appearances,

and consistently expressed the deep concern of the

United States for Thailand and the Thai people. It was

a rare week in 1998 when a U.S. cabinet-level official,

congressional delegation, or senior military officer

did not visit Thailand with a full public diplomacy

program.

 Recognizing that there was a reservoir of good will

in Thailand built up over many years and reinforced by

the visit by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1996, another

key component of the public diplomacy strategy focused

on reaching out to the gatekeepers of information and

the “influencers” in the society to make the case for the

United States. The PAO arranged a series of lunches

with key editorial boards and influential columnists

to provide them with briefings on the complexities of

international finance and currency speculation. U.S.

Ambassador William Itoh, the fluent Thai-speaking

Deputy Chief of Mission Ralph Boyce, the Embassy’s

entire economic reporting section, and public

diplomacy officers were all mobilized to this effort. In

the end, it was Thai columnists, commentators, and

editorial writers who put the Asian financial debacle

in context and into the proper perspective for their

readers, listeners, and viewers.

 The United States emerged not as the villain it

appeared to be when it ignored Thailand’s crisis but

rather as the prime mover in rectifying a corrupt

and mismanaged financial system in Thailand and

in other Asian countries. This was seen as an act of

responsibility worthy of the pi. Ironically, despite their

own best efforts in aiding Thailand, it was Japan that

was blamed for the instability in the Asian financial

world because it continually postponed reforms to its

own banking and financial sector. In opinion polling

following the resolution of the financial crisis, the U.S.

favorability level was nearly identical with the high

mark it had reached immediately after the Clinton visit

in 1996.

 With this background on the reality of public

diplomacy as it works in the field, we can return to

the more complex battles for control of strategic

information within the Washington bureaucracy and

the National Security Council system.

 

THE NSC AND INFORMATION

 

 The NSC system evolved into the principal arm

of the president in forming and executing military,

international, and internal security polices in the

Eisenhower administration.14 President Eisenhower

was more comfortable with the NSC concept than was

Truman, and he created a highly structured system of

integrated policy review based on the Cutler Report.

This system was described as the “policy hill” process

wherein drafts from the agencies moved up from

the agency level through an NSC Planning Board

for review and refinement before reaching the NSC

for consideration. At that time, the NSC consisted of

five statutory members: the President, Vice President,

Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of

the Office of Defense Mobilization. Depending on the

subject matter for discussion, other Cabinet members

and advisors including the Secretary of the Treasury,

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the

Director of Central Intelligence would participate.

The President’s Special Assistant for National Security

Affairs was a facilitator of the decision making system,

oversaw the recommendations coming up and down

“the hill,” and briefed and summarized discussions but

unlike National Security Advisors from the Kennedy

administration to the present, had no substantive role

in the process.

 President Eisenhower created the Operations and

Coordinating Board (OCB) to make sure that decisions

taken by the NSC were followed-up. Meeting weekly

at the Department of State, the OCB was composed of

the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs (chair),

the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Directors of the

CIA and the new U.S. Information Agency, Special

Assistants to the President for National Security

Affairs and Security Operations Coordination. Some

40 interagency working groups reported to the OCB

which had its own staff of 24 to support the working

groups.15

 The Eisenhower NSC provided regular, fully-

staffed, interagency reviews of major national security

issues which resulted in decisions at the highest level.

Eisenhower himself was fully committed to the process

and chaired 329 of the 366 NSC meetings that took

place in his 8 years as President. While the NSC was in

charge of the policy review process, the Department of

State continued to exercise, under the strong hand of

Secretary John Foster Dulles, full control over the day-

to-day operations of foreign policy.16

 The Eisenhower NSC system was sharply

criticized, however, notably in the hearings conducted

in 1960-61 by the Senate Subcommittee on National

Policy Machinery (aka the Jackson Subcommittee),

for being inflexible, overstaffed, unable to anticipate

and react to immediate crises, and weighed down by

committees. President Kennedy strongly agreed with

the Jackson Subcommittee critique and immediately

moved to cut the NSC staff and to simplify the foreign

policymaking process, making it more intimate. The

OCB was abolished, and the NSC no longer was

required to monitor the implementation of policies.

President Kennedy also installed McGeorge Bundy as

the National Security Advisor, and the responsibilities

and authorities of the NSC Advisor grew throughout

the Kennedy years.17

 In the realm of strategic information, this redefin-

ition of the NSC and the abolition of the OCB took the

wind out of the sails of the new Director of the USIA,

the renowned CBS radio and TV newsman Edward R.

Murrow, who expected to wield considerable influence

in the new administration. Murrow was unaware of the

future diminished role of the NSC when he accepted

the USIA position and was soon outflanked by some of

his own subordinates with strong personal ties to the

White House.18

 Murrow found himself and his agency marginalized

despite the fact that he was often invited to attend NSC

meetings. The real decisionmaking lay elsewhere,

leaving Murrow more visible but less influential that

his predecessors under Eisenhower.

 The NSC met less and less frequently and some of

its activities were taken up by a more select body, the

“Standing Group.” By April 1963 the Standing Group

was reconstituted with McGeorge Bundy as its chair-

man and a membership that included the Under-

Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy

Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central

Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the

JCS, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Director

of USIA, and the Administrator of AID.19 Strategic

communications, in the form of USIA, was back at the

table at least at the operational level, but it was too late

for the seriously ill Murrow, and the Kennedy years

were nearing an end.

 Lyndon Johnson had even less faith in the NSC

process than his predecessor. He considered the NSC

to be a “leaky sieve” and preferred small intimate

groups for decisionmaking. Johnson’s relationship with

USIA and military information operations—and thus

with strategic information—was defined and shaped

almost entirely by the Vietnam War. Illustrative of the

widened role for strategic information due to the war

was Johnson’s National Security Action Memorandum,

No. 32520 which responded to the USIA Director’s

suggestions for an information strategy in Vietnam. It

reads in part:

 

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 325

TO: THE DIRECTOR, U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY

1. I have reviewed your memorandum of March 16 on the

informational and psychological warfare programs in South

Vietnam. With the exception noted in paragraph 5 [regarding Viet

Cong defectors], I hereby give my general approval to the rapid

and effective execution of the improvements you propose. This

approval is subject to review and concurrence by Ambassador

[Maxwell] Taylor . . . .

2. By copy of this memorandum I request the Secretary of Defense,

the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and

the Administrator of the Agency for International Development

to give all possible support to an intensified information and

psychological warfare program along the lines developed in your

report.

3. By copy of this memorandum, I request the Director of the

Bureau of the Budget to review with you and as necessary with

other agencies the financial implications of such an intensified

program and to make his recommendation to me as to the best

way of meeting any additional costs.

4. Meanwhile you are directed to proceed with all necessary

actions on the firm understanding that it is my fixed policy that

any worthwhile undertaking shall not be inhibited or delayed

in any way by financial restrictions. We can and will find the

resources we need for all good programs in Vietnam. [Emphasis

added]

Rarely does the strategic information function find

itself in such an enviable position with the implication

at least that there is a blank check for information and

psychological operations.

 The Richard Nixon National Security Council

process was so dominated by Henry Kissinger, first

as National Security Advisor, then as the dual-hatted

NSC Advisor and Secretary of State, that strategic

communication was a top-down decision no less

than any other, and all decisions were made without

reference to the NSC process.21 The administration paid

less and less attention to overseas strategic information

and more and more attention to domestic information

management as the Watergate crisis mounted.

 The Ford administration brought Kissinger’s deputy

Brent Scowcroft in to replace him as NSC Advisor,

bowing to congressional disapproval of having so

much foreign policy power in the hands of a single

individual. Kissinger continued as Secretary of State,

and Scowcroft managed a cordial relationship with

his former boss while instituting a more low-key NSC

coordination role.22 Strategic communication drifted as

though on auto-pilot.

 

INFORMATION BECOMES COMMUNICATION

 

 President Jimmy Carter entered office with no

particular design for strategic information but with

the plan to merge the State Department’s Cultural

Exchanges Bureau (CU) into USIA and to soften the

hard edge of “information” in the process.23 Carter

eliminated the word “information” from the foreign

policy lexicon and replaced it with “communication.”

 Thus, the USIA was augmented by the addition

of a reluctant partner (CU) to form the Educational

and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the newly named

International Communication Agency or USICA.

USIA, the propaganda agency, was no more. But in

field operations overseas, the USICA looked too much

like the USCIA for many people, an unfortunate error

of judgment on Washington’s part that caused no

end of irritation for those implementing information,

cultural, and educational programs at U.S. embassies

and consulates overseas.

 Jimmy Carter came into office determined to

eliminate the abuses of the NSC system under

Kissinger, and envisaged the role of the NSC to be

one of policy coordination and research. The structure

of the NSC was changed to ensure that the NSC

Advisor would be but one of many advisors. Carter

also reduced the staff by 50 percent, and reduced the

number of standing committees from eight to two: a

Policy Review Committee (PRC) usually chaired by

a department, most often the State Department and

the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), always

chaired by the NSC Advisor.24

 The Carter NSC has been criticized for failing to

monitor implementation of the President’s policies.

In addition, because there were no clearly developed

foreign policy principles other than arms control (the

prerogative of the SCC), the President frequently

changed his mind depending on who offered advice last.

Carter’s informality complicated the decision making

process. Often no formal records of decisions were

made, leading to indecision and embarrassment.25

 As an example of the scant regard the Carter

administration had for strategic information, when the

new President’s U.S. National Strategy was formulated

and disseminated, not so much as a carbon copy of the

document ever reached the USICA, but copies did go,

in addition to the Vice President and the Secretaries

of State and Defense, to the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget, the Director of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central

Intelligence. The Top Secret Presidential Directive/

NSC-18 set out the foreign policy priorities of the nation

and the means to achieve them.26 An examination of

the now mainly unclassified document [passages

relating to military strategy, policy, and practices are

still redacted] reveals that among the means to achieve

U.S. foreign policy priorities, there is no mention of

any method of strategic information overt or covert,

civilian or military. For Carter, strategic information

just did not exist—after all, he had eliminated the word

from the foreign policy lexicon in 1978.

 

ZENITH OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

 

 If there is any certainty in the ways of Washington,

it is that the pendulum always swings back. And

the pendulum on strategic information swung back

dramatically with the beginning of the presidency

of Ronald Reagan. It is no exaggeration to state that

the Reagan administration was the zenith of strategic

communication. Reagan, “the great communicator”

himself, knew the business of persuasion very well

indeed. He chose as his Director of the USICA—hastily

renamed the U.S. Information Agency—Charles Z.

Wick, a close Hollywood confident and family friend

with constant and instant access to the President.27

 A series of National Security Decision Directives

increased and institutionalized the access, the power,

and the scope of Wick’s agency and brought public

diplomacy not only to the table of the NSC but to the

very center of the foreign policy process. Five key NSC

documents trace the growth of strategic information

within the Reagan administration. They are NSDD 77,

NSDD 130, NSDD 186, NSDD 266, and NSDD 276. All

five of the key documents have been declassified and

are available through the Reagan Library, Simi Valley,

California.28

 In National Security Decision Directive Number 77

entitled “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative

to National Security,”29 the President states: “I have

determined that it is necessary to strengthen the

organization, planning, and coordination of the various

aspects of public diplomacy of the U.S. Government

relative to national security.” NSDD 77 established a

Special Planning Group (SPG) of the NSC under the

chairmanship of the NSC Advisor and consisting of

the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of

the USIA, the Director of AID and the Assistant to the

President for Communications. The role of the SPG was

“to be responsible for the overall planning, direction,

coordination, and monitoring of implementation of

public diplomacy activities.”30

 Four interagency standing committees reporting to

the SPG were established by NSDD 77. The committees

would receive support from the NSC staff and periodic

guidance from the SPG which would review their

activities for proper implementation of policy and to

determine resource priorities. The committees were:

 • The Public Affairs Committee: Co-chaired by the

Assistant to the President for Communications

and the Deputy Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs. The committee was

responsible for planning and coordinating U.S.

Government public affairs activities relative

to national security, e.g., major speeches on

national security and public appearances by

senior officials.

 • The International Information Committee: Chaired

by a senior representative of USIA; vice

chaired by a senior representative of the State

Department. The committee was responsible

for planning, coordinating, and implementing

international information activities in support

of U.S. policies and interests. The committee also

was empowered to make recommendations and,

as appropriate, direct the concerned agencies,

interagency groups, and working groups with

respect to information strategies in key policy

areas.

 • The International Political Committee: Chaired by a

senior representative of the Department of State;

vice-chaired by a senior representative of USIA.

The committee was responsible for planning,

coordinating, and implementing international

political activities in support of U.S. policies

and interests, including aid, training, and

organizational support for foreign governments

and private groups to encourage the growth of

democratic political institutions and practices.

 • The International Broadcasting Committee:

Chaired by a representative of the Assistant to

the President for National Security Affairs. The

committee was responsible for the planning

and coordination of international broadcasting

activities sponsored by the U. S. Government.

 The next major addition to the institutional build-

up of strategic information came with National

Security Decision Directive Number 130, “U.S.

International Information Policy.” The Directive31

calls international information an integral and vital

part of U.S. national security policy and strategy and,

along with other elements of public diplomacy, a key

strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political

and ideological trends. NSDD 130 cites a need for

sustained commitment to improving the quality and

effectiveness of U.S. international information efforts,

the level of resources devoted to them, and their

coordination with other elements of national security

policy and strategy. Of interest, the document also

calls for a greater role for international information

considerations in formulating policies.

 The document addresses in some detail an

international information strategy, including

international radio broadcasting; other international

information instruments such as publications, new

technologies, cooperation with the private sector,

overcoming barriers to communication; strategically

targeted information and communications assistance

to other nations; psychological factors in maintaining

the confidence of allied governments and in deterring

military action; and the capability by the armed forces

to have an immediate and effective use of psychological

operations in crisis and in wartime. Revitalization and

full integration of psychological operations in military

operations is declared to be an important priority for

DoD. The NSDD concludes with a series of functional

requirements related to international information

and the approval of the establishment of the Foreign

Opinion Research Advisory Group. In National

Security Decision Directive 223, “Implementing the

Geneva Exchanges Initiative,” the “softer side” of

public diplomacy became the subject of presidential

attention. This directive,32 following on the heels of the

Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Meeting in Geneva in 1986

and the Geneva Exchanges Initiative, was aimed at

enhancing bilateral cooperation at all levels; including

through educational and student exchanges, people-to-

people programs, media, and information exchanges,

and consultations.

 The President noted that he attached “high

priority to the exchanges initiative” and requested all

relevant U.S. Government agencies to give it a high

priority also and “to render every possible assistance

to implementation.” A new Interagency Group on

the President’s Geneva Exchanges Initiatives was

established, chaired by the NSC Senior Director for

European and Soviet Affairs. A new Office of the

Coordinator for the President’s U.S.-Soviet Exchanges

Initiative was established at USIA to work with USIA

and other agencies and the private sector to develop

programs in the agreed areas and work on new

initiatives. The remainder of the NSDD 223 detailed

the duties and responsibilities of the coordinator and

his relationship to existing offices and programs.

 

THE SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD

 

 The President’s Special Review Board (or the

Tower Board chaired by Senator John Tower)

submitted its Report to the President on February 26,

1987. In a nationwide address on March 4, President

Reagan announced that he endorsed the Board’s

recommendations and intended to go beyond them in

rebuilding the NSC process to repair the damage done

by the Iran-Contra Affair.

 NSDD 266 details specific steps in implementing the

Board’s recommendation and other reforms.33 Much

of the document goes beyond the scope of the current

discussion and addresses the statutory responsibilities

and membership of the NSC in some detail. The

document must be seen in the perspective of the Iran-

Contra hearings and the revelation of covert activities

undertaken by staff of the NSC. Much of the document

addresses these issues. From the perspective of strategic

information, however, the following passage in Section

I. A., “Organizing for National Security,” is relevant:

The Directors of the United States Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency and United States Information

Agency are special statutory advisors to the NSC.

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency shall be the principal advisor to the President,

the Secretary of State and the NSC on arms control and

disarmament matters. The Director of the United States

Information Agency shall be the principal advisor to

the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on

international informational, educational, and cultural

matters. [Emphasis added]

 The Directive goes on to spell out in detail the role

of the National Security Advisor, the NSC staff, the

NSC and the Interagency Process, including meetings,

the process, covert action, use of nongovernment

personnel, the intelligence process, and reporting.

Among the directives is a prohibition on conduct of

covert activities by NSC staff.

 Continuing the damage control from the Iran-

Contra Scandal, NSDD 27634 provides additional

detailed guidance on the “National Security Council

Interagency Process.” The President defines five

groupings within the NSC process, defines their

authority, membership, and prerogatives. The five are:

(1) National Security Council, (2) National Security

Planning Group (NSPG), (3) Senior Review Group

(SRG), (4) The Policy Review Group (PRG), and (5)

Other Interagency Groups. According to NSDD 276:

 

Within their respective areas of authority as set forth

in NSDD 266, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of

Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director

of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and

the Director of the USIA may approve the continuation of

existing senior interagency groups to the extent necessary

or desirable to promote an effective NSC process; by June

30, 1987, the National Security Advisor shall be notified

of those interagency groups they have determined shall

continue to function.35

 

THE POST COLD WAR CHILL

 

 In contrast to the Reagan years, President George

H. W. Bush’s NSC held itself aloof from strategic

communication. Unlike the rare Reagan-Wick personal

relationship, the President’s relationships with USIA

Director Gelb and later with Director Henry Catto were

more in the norm and not based on long-term family

friendships but on political relationships, and as such,

were more distant. Charles Wick was the last USIA

Director to enjoy instant access to the President.36

 With a strong background in international affairs,

CIA Director, UN Ambassador, Ambassador to China,

and 8 years as Vice President, George H. W. Bush made

wholesale changes to the NSC, even following the

reforms in 1987.37 President Bush’s NSD-138 provided a

new charter for the NSC, the Policy Review Group was

enlarged to a Committee, the Deputy National Security

Advisor named as chair of the Deputies Committee

and a Principals Committee screened matters for the

NSC. Eight Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs)

were formed to absorb regional and functional

responsibilities.

 Public Diplomacy was not shut out of the NSC

process as it had been under President Jimmy Carter

or marginalized to a lesser extent as in the Kennedy,

Johnson, and Nixon administrations, but in contrast

to the Eisenhower years, and especially the Reagan

administration, the influence of strategic information

was weak.39

 A blow to USIA came with the unexpected and

sudden dissolution of the USSR in 1991 after releasing its

grip on the Warsaw Pact with the end of the Berlin Wall

and the beginning of the Velvet Revolution in Prague.

The absence of “an enemy” created the absence of the

long-time rationale for American public diplomacy,

especially the robust public diplomacy of the Cold War

era. The George H. W. Bush administration decided to

take a “peace dividend” and cut the USIA budget in

each succeeding year.40

 This lack of enthusiasm for public diplomacy was

adhered to and expanded upon by the new President.

The Clinton administration preserved some key public

diplomacy programs, notably the Fulbright Academic

Exchanges in a kind of posthumous salute to Bill

Clinton’s mentor and fellow Rhoads Scholar, Senator

J. William Fulbright. But the Clinton administration

continued the sharp cuts to the overall public diplomacy

budget, especially in international information

programs which suffered near catastrophic declines.41

 By the beginning of the second Clinton term, the

indications that USIA’s days were numbered grew more

obvious. In 1998, there was an Executive-Legislative

agreement to “merge” USIA (and originally also

USAID) into the Department of State. The ostensible

rationale was that this would not only save money but

would bring public diplomacy closer to the center of

foreign policy formulation. In truth, the accommodation

worked out between Secretary Madeleine Albright

and Senator Jesse Helms was a compromise to achieve

funding for the current U.S. contribution and previous

year’s arrears to the United Nations (UN).

 The Clinton administration gained funding,

including the significant backlog in funding for the U.S.

contribution to the UN. In return, Senator Helms was

to have his long time wish fulfilled—the emasculation

of USAID‘s independence and influence in Congress

by being placed within the Department of State. USIA’s

dismemberment was simply a bonus. In the negotiations

that followed, USAID escaped confinement within

State and emerged a weakened but still independent

voice in the foreign policy establishment, but USIA,

already weakened by years of budget cuts after the Cold

War, was extinguished as an entity. (See the Foreign

Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. Public

Law 105-277.) On October 1, 1999, the Agency’s public

diplomacy personnel and functions were scattered

throughout the State Department bureaucracy, and

its largest component was shorn away entirely as the

Voice of America and the other broadcasting entities

were placed with the independent Broadcasting Board

of Governors (BBG).42

 It takes no great imagination to realize that the

dismantling of the USIA, the dissolution of its personnel

and functions with the State Department bureaucracy,

and the creation of a BBG responsible to no one (not

the Secretary of State, not even the President) is a

compound and nearly fatal blow to the ability of the

United States to project a global information strategy.

We now examine the present situation in the years

following the reorganization of the foreign affairs

agencies and what future role that strategic information

may have in the National Security Council process.

 

AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS AND REINVENTING

THE WHEEL

 In the waning days of the existence of the USIA,

the  Clinton  National  Security Council  on  April 30,

1999,  issued  a  still  classified  Presidential  Decision

Directive (PDD) 68 on International Public Information.

The directive, according to published media reports at

the time and the website of the Federation of American

Scientists, was issued to “address problems identified

during military missions in Kosovo and Haiti, when

no single U.S. agency was empowered to coordinate

U.S. efforts to sell its policies and to counteract bad

press abroad.”43 In addition, with the soon-to-be-

accomplished “merger” of USIA into the Department

of State, the existing NSC Directive, NSDD 77 issued

in the Reagan administration would be inoperative,

and PDD-68 was seen as a replacement for the Reagan

document.

 Senior officials of the Departments of State and

Defense, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury, the CIA and

the FBI, according to public sources, were designated

as members of the International Public Information

(IPI) Core Group. The Core Group was to be chaired by

the soon-to-be-created position of Under Secretary for

Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the State Depart-

ment. The IPI Core Group was to “assist efforts in de-

feating adversaries.” The U.S. intelligence community

would “play a crucial role . . . for identifying hostile

foreign propaganda and deception that targets the

U.S.” In addition, again according to public reports,

the IPI was designed to “influence foreign audiences”

in support of U.S. foreign policy and to counteract

propaganda by enemies of the United States.

Reportedly, the IPI Core Group Charter stated that:

 • IPI control over “international military

information” was intended to “influence the

emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and

ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,

organizations, groups, and individuals.”

 • “The objective of IPI is to synchronize the

informational objectives, themes, and messages

that will be projected overseas . . . to prevent

and mitigate crises and to influence foreign

audiences in ways favorable to the achievement

of U.S. foreign policy objectives.”

 • Information distributed through IPI should be

designed not “to mislead foreign audiences” and

that information programs “must be truthful.”

 • [Regarding the likelihood that foreign media

reports are reflected in American media,

information aimed at domestic audiences

should] “be coordinated, integrated, decon-

flicted and synchronized with the [IPI Core

Group] to achieve a synergistic effect for

strategic information activities.”44

One might term PDD 68 merely “reinventing the

wheel” but because the existing mechanism (NSDD-

77) was being “deconstructed” along with the USIA,

some means to coordinate strategic information had to

be found.

 The PDD 68 system likely might have worked had

it become operational. However, because the incoming

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public

Affairs, Evelyn Lieberman, was reluctant to sit down at

the same table with the intelligence community, only

one meeting of the IPI Core Group occurred during

the Clinton administration. It was left to working level

bureaucrats to attempt to coordinate their international

information activities in the absence of leadership from

above.

 

A NEW DIRECTION

 

 The George W. Bush administration’s first National

Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-1) organized the

NSC process to the desires of the new administration.

NSPD-1 replaced the system of Presidential Decision

Directive and Presidential Review Directives as an

instrument for communicating presidential decisions

about national security policies. The document listed

the NSC attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory),

the role of the Vice President presiding in the absence

of the President, the strong agenda determining role

of the Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, and the NSC’s relationship with the National

Economic Council (NEC). The directive also continued

the role of the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC)

and the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC). NSPD-1

further set out the organization of the NSC process as

follows:

Management of the development and implementation

of national security policies by multiple agencies of the

United States Government shall usually be accomplished

by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/

PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day to day

fora for interagency coordination of national security

policy.45

Six regional NSC/PCCs, chaired by an official of Under

Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank as designated by

the Secretary of State, were established. In addition,

“topical” or functional NSC/PCCs were established as

follows:

 • Democracy, Human Rights and International

Operations

 • International Development and Humanitarian

Assistance

 • Global Environment

 • International Finance

 • Transnational Economic Issues

 • Counterterrorism and National Preparedness

 • Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and

Planning

 • Arms Control

 • Proliferation, Counter proliferation, and

Homeland Defense

 • Intelligence and Counterintelligence

 • Records Access and Information Security

 There was no NSC/PCC designated for Strategic

Information, Public Diplomacy, or Foreign Information

Activities. The closest approximation was in the PCC

on Democracy, Human Rights, and International

Operations. NSPD 1 also abolished by March 1, 2001,

the existing system of Interagency Working Groups and

other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies,

and executive committees, except for those established

by statute.46 Of immediate practical concern in the

field of strategic information, the IPI Core Group was

among the casualties, and no replacement organization

or group was named. Strategic Information or Public

Diplomacy did not appear to be a high priority in the

early days of the new administration.

 Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001

(9/11), the Bush administration found itself in need

of a strategic information policy and a structure to

deal with the acknowledged crisis in American public

diplomacy. There was a general recognition that in

the absence of an agency like the USIA, there was no

central focus for public diplomacy, and the record of

the State Department in public diplomacy since the

“anschluss” which brought USIA into the Department

was generally recognized to have been a failure.47

 

GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS

 

 The solution might have been to resurrect the USIA

or create a similar agency either within or outside the

State Department as a number of reports and studies

recommended.48 Instead, the White House called forth

a White House solution by creating a new White House

Office of Global Communications (OGC) headed by

a Deputy Assistant to the President. According to

the Executive Order setting up the Office, the OGC’s

mission was

to advise the President, the heads of appropriate offices

within the Executive Office of the President and the heads

of executive departments and agencies on utilization of the

most effective means for the U.S. Government to ensure

consistency in messages that will promote the interests

of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding,

build support for and among coalition partners of the

United States, and inform international audiences.49

 Among the functions of the new Office were:

 • assessment of methods and strategies (except

for “special activities,” i.e., covert operations) to

deliver information to audiences abroad;

 • development of a strategy for disseminating

truthful, accurate and effective messages about

the United States, its government and policies,

and the American people and culture;

 • coordination of the creation of temporary teams

of communicators for short-term placement in

areas of high global interest and media attention

(however no team could be deployed without

prior consultation with the Departments of

State and Defense and prior notification to the

NSC Advisor);

 • encouragement of the use of state of the art

media and technology.

While on the surface, the Office of Global Communica-

tion appeared to be a solution of sorts for the lack of direc-

tion and leadership in the strategic communication/

public affairs arena, there were built-in flaws in the

system that would prevent the OGC from being very

effective in any of its functions. Chief among these

flaws was that the OGC was outside the NSC process

and the interagency system. The Executive Order itself

stated that “nothing in this order shall be construed to

impair or otherwise affect any function assigned by law

or by the President to the National Security Council or

to the Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs.” Further, the Executive Order noted that it

did not alter “existing authorities of any agency.”50

Given the inherent weaknesses in the structure and

authorities of the Office of Global Communications, it

surprised few observers to note the steady decline in

the OGC’s relevance and its eventual and unheralded

disappearance from the White House organization

chart in 2005.

 

FUSION

 

 Just as in the Clinton administration, for most of the

Bush administration a rough form of coordination and

cooperation among working level professionals from

the public diplomacy bureaus of the State Department

and elements of DoD, USAID, and other agencies held

the threads together while waiting for senior leaders to

decide what form an international information strategy

would take. The so-called “Fusion Team” which meets

in State Annex 44 (the former USIA Headquarters

Building) is the best example of keeping this flame alive.

While the Fusion Team has an important function no

doubt, it is no substitute for a top to bottom interagency

process on strategic information which has not been

evident since the end of the Reagan administration.

 

WHO’S IN CHARGE?

 

 The Department of State inherited public

diplomacy from the USIA and would be expected to

lead the effort on strategic information. Regrettably,

for numerous reasons outlined in the nearly 30

reports and recommendations by public and private

organizations designed to rescue public diplomacy

from its current nadir, this State Department leadership

did not materialize.51 Without going into the details of

systemic failure to utilize properly the resources of

public diplomacy inherited by the Department in this

venue, one can point to the lack of long-term, unified,

and consistent leadership over public diplomacy as

one major cause.

 A succession of short-term leaders has presided

over public diplomacy in the Department of State since

October 1999. Under Secretary Evelyn Lieberman’s

largely ineffective tenure ended with the Republican

victory in 2000. After a lengthy transition, advertising

executive Charlotte Beers was sworn in only a few

weeks after 9/11. Her tenure was tortured and brief,

and when she departed “for personal reasons,” she

was succeeded by an interim replacement, Assistant

Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Patricia

Harrison, until the administration was able to convince

Ambassador to Morocco Margaret Tutweiler to take

up the challenge. Within a few months, Tutweiler, who

arrived stating that she would stay only for a short

time, left for Wall Street and was replaced again on an

interim basis by Harrison. In a surprise appointment,

President Bush announced that his close confidant and

communications advisor, Karen Hughes, would take

up the post of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy

and Public Affairs, but the new appointment would

not be taken up for nearly 5 months due to family

commitments. Even under the best of circumstances,

with this kind of revolving door in leadership, it is

hard to imagine an effective public diplomacy strategy

being undertaken.

 To Ms. Hughes’ credit, she and her Deputy, Dina

Powell, “hit the ground running” with a series of

outreach encounters and listening tours at home and

abroad. Hughes appeared to recognize the most serious

flaw in the foreign affairs reorganization of 1998-99, i.e.,

that there is no unity of command or central authority

over public diplomacy in the Department of State. If

anything, there is even less unity in the interagency

process regarding strategic communication. Input

over assignments, resources, and administrative issues

can lead to input over policy and strategy, but in the

absence of any influence over officers in the field, an

Under Secretary is powerless to manage the program

responsibilities, and public diplomacy is a program-

intensive function. A number of alleged “fixes” were

made in the Department to strengthen Hughes’

position within the bureaucracy, including assigning

one regional deputy assistant secretary in each regional

bureau to be in charge of public diplomacy and

giving (in theory at least) the Under Secretary shared

line authority over that position with the regional

assistant secretary. Evaluation, budgeting, and other

administrative functions for State Department public

diplomacy bureaus and offices reported to the Under

Secretary rather than to individual bureau heads,

thanks to Hughes’ insistence.

 Other minor measures could be taken within

the authority of the Department to centralize the

Under Secretary’s role in public diplomacy. Still, as

numerous outside reports point out, only so much can

be done within the existing flawed structure. Hughes

apparently came to realize this and departed for the

greener pastures of the private sector in 2008. After a

lengthy Senate hold on his nomination, a new Under

Secretary, James Glassman, was sworn in with only a

few months left in the Bush administration. Glassman,

formerly with the BBG, has a keen understanding of

public diplomacy and has made an impressive start in

what is surely a lame duck role. There is little time for

the kind of dramatic change that is required to revitalize

public diplomacy no matter how valiant the effort on

Glassman’s part. Eventually perhaps, Congress will

tire of a band-aid approach to fixing public diplomacy

and decide to undo or redo the reorganization of the

foreign affairs agencies so badly botched in 1998-99. In

the meantime, America’s strategic information may be

neither strategic nor very informative.

 

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

 

 The 2005 report by the Public Diplomacy Council,

A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy, made the case that

it may be impossible to turn back the clock and recreate

the independent USIA, complete with responsibility

over international civilian broadcasting. The Council

called instead for a semi-independent agency lodged

within the State Department but with a unified chain of

command and control over overseas public diplomacy

operations.52 This would eliminate the serious flaw

which plagues the Under Secretary and would result

in a much improved performance. With the change

of administrations in Washington, however, there

may exist a brief period during which a reenergized

and independent agency for public diplomacy could

be created and be well-integrated into the national

security process as it was in the Reagan and Eisenhower

administrations.

 Importantly, the crucial role of localized public

diplomacy must be recognized. Public diplomacy must

return to its “field-driven” roots, and public diplomacy

officers in the field must have greater latitude to create

strategies within the context of the societies and cultures

in which they operate. This presupposes that adequate

resources, too, must be directed to overseas operations

and the increased staffing required. The cleverest

strategy will fail if there are too few personnel and

financial resources available for its implementation.

 It is critical to realize, as several studies have pointed

out in recent years, that the Department of State is

not the only important actor in public diplomacy or

strategic information in the U.S. Government.53 In order

to coordinate and manage the breadth of international

information and exchange programs conducted by any

new agency, State, Defense, USAID, and the more than

60 offices, bureaus, and executive departments that

already report international exchanges, training, or

information programs, the NSC or interagency process

on strategic information must be reconstituted. Indeed,

nearly half of all of the reports and studies on public

diplomacy undertaken in the past 3 years have pointed

to interagency coordination as a serious problem

that must be addressed.54 Solutions vary and include

structures within the NSC and outside it, but there is

broad agreement that the current interagency process

requires strengthening.

 Based on the history of American experimentation

with strategic information in the NSC process, there

are two periods which emerge as worthy exemplars—

the Eisenhower administration and the Reagan

administration. Both administrations had elaborate,

and perhaps to some overly bureaucratized, systems of

advice, analysis, monitoring, and execution of strategic

information programs at multiple levels from the

working level to the senior leader level. Yet, for the most

part, they worked, and for that reason alone are worth

a careful look. The criticisms of both the Eisenhower

and the Reagan NSC processes over the passage of time

seem to be not very cogent. Eisenhower’s NSC process

was not too slow and unwieldy, and if it proved to

be so—as in a period of crisis—it was by-passed. The

Reagan NSC system is too often seen through the

prism of the Iran-Contra Affair; that situation was an

aberration, not the norm, and the reforms instituted by

the Tower Board set the system straight.

 The conclusion is inescapable. Congress and the

Executive should relook at the organization of public

diplomacy/strategic communication and alter the

current flawed design to create unity of command and

clear lines of authority whether that is in a separate

agency, an agency within the State Department,

or some third variant. Because “localized public

diplomacy” has been shown to be more effective than

world-wide strategies designed inside the Beltway,

public diplomacy should be field-driven. In addition,

the Executive Branch should return to a more elaborate

and tested formula for an interagency process that

worked in both the Eisenhower and the Reagan NSCs.

 

 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

 1. Public Diplomacy Council, A Call for Action on Public

Diplomacy: A Report of the Public Diplomacy Council, 2nd ed.,

Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, 2005.

 2. Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural

Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, Dulles, VA: Potomac Books,

2005; Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign

Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950, New York: Foreign Policy

Association, 1981.

  3. Arndt; Wilson Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: the

Story of the U.S. Information Agency, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner

Publishers, 2004.

 4. Office of the Historian, Department of State, History of the

National Security Council, 1947-1997, Washington, DC: Bureau

of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State; J. Pike, “National

Security Council (NSC) Truman Administration [1947-1953],“

1999, retrieved February 21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-

hst/index.html.

 5. Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS,

and NSC, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

 6. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

 7. National Security Council, “NSC-4 Coordination of Foreign

Information Measures,” 1947, retrieved February 21, 2006, from

www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-4.html.

 8. Ibid.

 9. Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for

Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe,

New York: The Free Press, 1989.

 10. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

 11. Arndt; Dizard.

 12. Department of Political Science, University of California

at Los Angeles, The 187 serially numbered NSC documents

approved during the Eisenhower administration, arranged by

subject, retrieved February 21, 2006, from UCLA Web site www.

polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/DATA/nscjfkl1.gif.

 13. For additional details, see William P. Kiehl, Oral History

Interview, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, The Association

for Diplomatic Studies and Training: Arlington, VA, September

15, 2005, pp. 133-160, 165-220, 279-321.

 14. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

 15. Ibid.

 16. Ibid.

 17. Ibid.

 18. Arndt.

 19. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

 20. Lyndon B. Johnson, “National Security Action

Memorandum No. 325,” The White House, 1968, retrieved

February 21, 2006, from LJ Library Web site www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/

johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam.

 21. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

 22. Ibid.

 23. Arndt; Dizard.

 24. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

 25. Ibid.

 26. Jimmy Carter, U.S. National Strategy, Presidential

Directive (NSC-18,1977), The White House, retrieved February.

21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd18.pdf.

 27. Arndt; Dizard; Frank A. Ninkovich, U.S. Information

Policy and Cultural Diplomacy, Headline Series No. 308, New York:

Foreign Policy Association, 2004.

 28. Ronald W. Reagan, “Management of Public Diplomacy

Relative to National Security,” NSDD 77, 1983, retrieved

February 21, 2006, from fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd23-1966t.gif; Ronald

W. Reagan, “US international Information Policy,” NSDD 130,

1984, retrieved February 21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/

nsdd/23-2213t.gif; Ronald W. Reagan, “Implementing the Geneva

Exchanges Initiative,” NSDD 223, 1986, retrieved February

21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2781a.gif; Ronald

W. Reagan, “Implementation of the Recommendations of the

President’s Special Review Board,” NSDD 266, 1987a, retrieved

February 21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2980a.

gif; Ronald W. Reagan, “National Security Council Interagency

Process,” NSDD 276, 1987b, retrieved February 21, 2006, from

www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-3091a.gif.

 29. Reagan, NSDD 77, 1983.

 30. Ibid.

 31. Reagan, NSDD 130, 1984.

 32. Reagan, NSDD 223, 1986.

 33. Reagan, NSDD 266, 1987a.

 34. Reagan, NSDD 276, 1987b.

  35. Ibid.

 36. Charles Z. Wick, “Letter: Report of the Defense Science

Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” e-mail and

attachments to author, December 2004.

 37. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

 38. George H. W. Bush, “United States Government

International Broadcasting: National Security Directive 51, 1990,”

retrieved February 21, 2006, from The Bush Library, bushlibrary.

tamu.edu/research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2051/0001.pdf.

 39. Arndt; Dizard.

 40. Ibid.

 41. Ibid.

 42. William P. Kiehl, “Can Humpty Dumpty Be Saved?”

American Diplomacy, November 2003, retrieved February 26, 2006,

from www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org.

 43. William Clinton, “Presidential Decision Directive, PDD

68,” April 1999, retrieved February 21, 2006 from www.fas.org/irp/

offdocs/pdd-68.htm.

 44. Ibid.

 45. George W. Bush, “NSPD-1: Organization of the National

Security Council,” 2001, retrieved February 21, 2006, from www.

fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd-1.htm.

 46. Ibid.

 47. For just a few examples of the many reports and studies

which are critical of the current structure and effectiveness of public

diplomacy, see Stephen Johnson, Helle C. Dale, Patrick Cronin,

“Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization,

Coordination, and Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 08-

05-2005, 1875, pp. 1-14; U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Public

Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of

a National Communication Strategy, GAO-05-323, 2005, retrieved

February 21, 2006, from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-323;

U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State

Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, GAO-

03-951, Washington, DC: U.S. GAO, 2003; Kiehl.

 48. Susane Epstein and Lisa Mages, Public Diplomacy: a Review

of Past Recommendations, Washington, DC: Congressional Research

Service, September 2, 2005.

 49. George W. Bush, The White House, Executive Order

Establishing the Office of Global Communication, January 21,

2003, retrieved February 26, 2006 from www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2003/01/20030121-3.html.

 50. Ibid.

 51. Among the many reports and recommendations are those

contained in Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab

and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic

Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2003; J. H. Brown, “The

Purposes and Cross Purposes of American Public Diplomacy,”

American Diplomacy, September 2002, retrieved February 26, 2006

from www.publicdilomacycouncil.org; Defense Science Board, Report

of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,

Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Epstein and Mages, Bruce

Gregory, “Public Diplomacy, and Strategic Communication:

Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,” American Political

Science Association Conference on International Communication

and Conflict Washington, DC: George Washington University and

Georgetown University, August 31, 2005, pp. 1-46; Johnson, Dale,

Cronin, Jeffrey Jones, “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for

the United States,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 39, pp. 108-114;

Kiehl.

 52. Public Diplomacy Council, 2005.

 53. Defense Science Board, 2004; Gregory.

 54. Epstein and Mages.

 

 

WILLIAM P. KIEHL is founding President and Chief

Executive Officer of Public Diplomacy Worldwide.

He has taught diplomacy at the Foreign Service

Institute and was Diplomat in Residence at the U.S.

Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership

as Senior Fellow of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping

Institute. During a career of 33 years Dr. Kiehl served

as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau

of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of

State, and in numerous public diplomacy positions

at home and abroad. He has published articles on

public diplomacy and peacekeeping, and edited the

book America’s Dialogue with the World (2007). Dr. Kiehl

holds a Ph.D. in higher education management from

the University of Pennsylvania.