Crippled State Department Public Diplomacy Must be Restructured
Introduction: Recent overseas polls show that support for the United States is continues low and that our once high credibility is badly tarnished. American values are misunderstood and we seem to have lost the moorings by which we were formerly judged and envied. Public diplomacy (PD ) which is not public relations is based on dialogue, listening, learning and then intelligent discussion and hopefully, persuasion. We have allowed our outreach instrument of PD to loose effectiveness. Best practices of the former USIA have been set aside. Restructuring the instrument within State is essential.
Summary: Public Diplomacy (PD), a key instrument of foreign policy, can promote a favorable climate of public opinion in important countries if it is credible, flexible, adequately resourced and proactive. Disagreement with US foreign policy, actions and military engagements hurts is severely with overseas audiences. Yet a robust PD activity can build credibility in individual countries and continued support for the essence of America. Most PD discussion today ignores a basic obstacle which is the fragmented PD structure within State. Today, due to its illogical configuration, it is far from being an effective instrument of foreign affairs. Some field initiatives are acted upon by Washington PD components while others may languish or depend on the fading “old boy network” for response. Reallocation of resources is slow or not acted upon.
Communication with country audiences, both field-driven and Washington-driven, must be supported by a Washington process that is clearly defined and responsive, providing up-and-down linkage to the field from the Under Secretary for PD & PA (R) to the PAOs and may involve International Information Programs (IIP) and Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). Five Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R) have been critically hobbled by the PD organization although the penultimate one tweaked it somewhat but did not address the core problem. The latest one has made little impact.
Foreign policy control and PD input should remain in the regional bureaus and be responsive to their requirements while overseeing policy application to PD activities. Recognizing this, recommended restructuring includes establishing an A/S for Field PD-Coordinator along with adequate geographic, executive, administrative staffs. This position would answer to the Under Secretary -R- to oversee and coordinate the PD process related to the field. A new geographic staff, largely drawn from the existing PD units in the regional bureaus, would possess country expertise and advise on and provide support to all programming - what will work, cultural barriers, etc. The “nuts and bolts” of PD program support would fall to these new “desk” officers removing this responsibility from the regional bureaus. One or more senior PD officers would remain in each regional bureau to provide policy coordination and input. R through the new A/S should have input into PD training, assignments and field programs.
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PAO evaluations, now done by chiefs of missions, should have contributions by the new A/S input from the PD officer(s) in the regional bureaus. End Summary
Public Diplomacy (PD), appropriately funded and pulsed by a synergy of components directed by experienced PD officers, can be a powerful and important instrument in gaining understanding if not support for America’s objectives, domestic and foreign. To be effective, PD should be proactive in activity planning, nimble, and flexible with its resources. It must avoid getting mired in State’s hierarchical, reactive environment but shaped by individual country objectives – herein is an oil and water cultural contrast. PD leadership must be acutely tuned to and supportive of PD initiatives, both field and Washington, and provide overall guidance, direction and resource support.
Core philosophy of effective PD is based on communication dialogue (not
monologue) with foreign opinion leaders. (This is a major difference between PD and PR.) Listening and learning (in the local language) followed by convincing discussion are essential. The climate of public opinion can only be influenced if the PD conveyors in the field have achieved credibility. Field posts are essential to our communication..
PD Field posts and PAOs are directed by the US ambassadors while supplied with policy guidance from Washington as they were by USIA. To be successful, support from Washington for field initiatives must be rapid and coordinated with appropriate PD components in the Department. All PD officers in the field and in Washington should have a clear understanding of which Washington offices and officers are responsible for supporting each field program. All must have an open channel to the top PD leadership in the Department. Geographic and country expertise must be instantly available to advise PD leadership (R) which initiatives will work and won’t work and to make program recommendations. Adjusting resources and budget re-allocations must become more flexible and faster in application.
Several self-imposed conditions now restrict successful PD.
Funding and outreach. Current funding and outreach of PD field programs severely limit effectiveness of our PD efforts country by country and especially in the crucial geographic areas spotlighted in the aftermath of 9/11. Shortage of resources to re-open high tech libraries/information centers, branch posts, pursue other outreach programs and restore appropriate country levels of PD personnel prove crippling. Even if budgets and PD personnel are significantly increased, there is wide recognition that the machinery of our current PD operations within the State Department requires transformation. President Bush and Congressional leaders have asked, “Why are our messages not convincing?” Central to this problem is the PD structure within State.
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Foreign Policy. Assistant secretaries in the regional bureaus must control policy
in their areas. This is a given. PD activities both in Washington and the
field lead from this policy and should be positioned to contribute to policy creation and application. When USIA was merged into State, it was expected that by placing the former “Area Offices” of USIA into the regional bureaus, policy and geographic
expertise would meld into efficient support for field initiatives and strengthen Washington-driven initiatives. Unfortunately, this expectation did not materialize appropriately, even after more than eight years of effort and experience.
In 1999, Congress assigned overall PD responsibility to a new position, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R). However, this mandate did not provide corresponding specific authority to manage all PD within the Department and PD field operations. R encounters obstacles to effective PD support which include (a) chain of command down to and up from the field and (b) “authority” to support that responsibility. R lacks authority over most PD personnel, resources and field programs.
1. PD field initiatives are sent to the Department for support and program guidance. Frequently, the communications end up in the regional bureaus and may or may not be assigned to the PD officers in those bureaus for action. Sometimes those field
requests are lost in the bureaucracy. Or after being vetted by a “DAS,” who may or may not know genuine PD, those field requests are specifically assigned to the PD officers within the regional bureaus who work to support them but must resort to the “old boy network” of former USIA colleagues in other PD components to fulfill them. Dealings with the PD field posts by regional PD officers are sometimes “ad hoc.” Confusion and frustration by PD officers in the field and in the regional bureaus may arise due to vague lines of responsibility. Older officers with USIA experience know that a more efficient and workable process is doable. Bottom line – Current structure limits PD effectiveness.
2. At the same time, PD officers in the regional bureaus do not control field programs (although they provide some resources) and have little authority over PD officers in the field. Direct linkage coupled with authority is not there.
3. Field PD officers have no defined and direct linkage to R who theoretically is their director. In reality they must deal and negotiate with the PD officers in the regional bureaus, the International Information Programs (IIP), the Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and other Department components. There is no overall coordinator for PD field programs.
4. R’s position as Under Secretary precludes this officer from having a geographic staff to advise what PD efforts will work in a specific cultural environment, to monitor field initiatives and to provide program suggestions. Nor does s/he have the support of executive and administrative staffs to control all PD resources with flexibility and to move them where needed even though R has been assigned PD “earmarks”
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allocations by the Congress. An effective PD activity must be able to reallocate resources rapidly throughout the system. Department hierarchy dictates that only assistant secretaries can control programs, most of the resources and be operational. Currently the geographic expertise R so obviously needs is within the regional bureaus and is not immediately responsive to R. Missing also is direct linkage (read support to and control of field operations. Some limited efforts have been made to address these shortcomings, but the basic problems remain. Efficient use of the PD instrument is sharply curtailed if R does not have the authority and direct linkage to support and guide PD programs worldwide.
Recommendations:
1. Foreign policy oversight of PD operations must be continued by the regional assistant secretaries and their bureaus. A senior PD officer within those bureaus should advise and provide input into policy creation and execution. At the same time a realignment of the regional PD personnel to the Under Secretary “R” is required. See following:
A. Establish an Assistant Secretary - (Coordinator) for PD field Operations.
This officer is the sorely needed direct linkage between field posts and R, up and down. Provide that position with sufficient staff (formerly with the bureaus) - geographic, executive, administrative - to enable the incumbent to support and coordinate PD programs initiated by the Department and the field. Assist/advise R with his/her responsibilities.
B. Within each regional bureau combine both PD and PA into an Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, headed by a senior PD officer.
Each office director would have a deputy for PA (with necessary staff) to handle PA requirements. Both PD director and PA deputy would participate in policy formulation and application under the direction of the regional A/S and DAS’s. Concomitantly, the PD office director would be responsible for coordinating policy guidance with their counterparts in the new PD geographic offices, IIP and ECA.
The above reorganization recommends transferring most of the PD geographic officers from the regional bureaus and International Organizations (IO) and forming counterpart geographic offices, each under an Area PD office director who reports to the new A/S for PD Field Operations - (Coordinator). Those officers would in fact be “PD desk officers” and relieve regional bureau PD officers from the many details of both field and Washington PD activities. They would provide the all-important “missing link” to the field and to R while providing R and other PD elements the geographic expertise now absent. The regional PD officers and deputies, representing the regional Assistant Secretaries, would oversee policy implementation with the other PD components.
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Comment: “Tinkering” with the present PD operations within State side-steps addressing the major reform required. Making a PD officer within each regional bureau a DAS for PD is not the solution. Such evades the linkage and field support issues. PD must be accepted within the Department as a valuable foreign policy instrument and make the important changes to its operation as recommended above. The eight year experiment is chugging along, once an eight cylinder machine but now operating on four. Painting the car and attaching catchy (PR) bumper stickers may seem important. That is “tweaking”. But essential to improving the engine (PD process) is to re-connect all of the vital spark plugs.
There are other areas within the Department requiring important PD leadership from R and adjustments should follow. If the Department truly wants a more effective
PD operation, it must be prepared to support R in all responsibilities. They include PD training, PD assignments, budget control and support to the A/S for PD Field Operations - (Coordinator). The first big advance to promote more effective PD in our overseas outreach is to reconnect the PD machinery within the Department of State.
Recently, even more harmful to an effective PD process is the current movement within State to embed the PD professionals into State’s desk offices. This will dilute the PD process even more.
Double-hatting a DAS within each regional bureau to oversee PD activities and answer to R will only make field support more layered The all important field posts require a clear structure in Washington to support field initiatives in all aspects of PD operations. A DAS would only have a dotted line relationship with the field posts as well as PD components in Washington. PAOs require direct connections with R via an Assistant Secretary for PD Field Operations.
Compiled and edited by:
Fred A. Coffey, Jr. /FSO (Ret.) 703-827-2254
Ambassador William Rugh /FSO (Ret.) 301-929-5141
Stan Silverman/Former Comptroller of USIA 703-536-7332
William Maurer /FSO (Ret.)703-250-1801
In consultation with many professional Foreign Service Officers and ambassadors
January 23, 2009
Comment: Kudos to these four dedicated professionals for putting this proposal "out there". As I said in the introduction to this posting, this is a necessary first step. These proposals could be put in place within a few weeks and would lead to an almost immediate and substantive improvement in how we conduct public diplomacy. But the four authors must know as I do that this initial reform must also lead to the kind of major changes--legislative changes--that I and others who study this issue have called for and which will require a bipartisan approach and well crafted language to ensure the intent of the Congress is carried out by the new operational agency and the White House coordination entity that has been proposed in "Humpty Dumpty Redux."
