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    William P. Kiehl is the founder President and CEO of PD Worldwide, consultants in international public affairs, higher education management and cross-cultural understanding. He is also the Editor of the on-line journal American Diplomacy. Full bio available on: www.pdworldwide.com/bio Facebook me!

    Saturday, January 17, 2009

    Public Diplomacy & the National Security Process

    From

    AFFAIRS OF STATE:

    THE INTERAGENCY 

    AND NATIONAL SECURITY

    Gabriel Marcella

    Editor

    December 2008

    This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined

    in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101.  As such, it is in the

    public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States

    Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

    Visit our website for other free publication 

    downloads

    http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/


    CHAPTER 8

    SEDUCED AND ABANDONED:

    STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND THE

    NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PROCESS

    William P. Kiehl



    Truth also needs propaganda.

    —Karl Jaspers,

    German philosopher

     

     

     

    INTRODUCTION

     

     Strategic information is a term that cries out for

    definition. Strategic information is: (1) civilian public

    diplomacy currently conducted principally by the U.S.

    Department of State, and by other civilian agencies

    in a supporting role, e.g., the Broadcasting Board of

    Governors for international broadcasting, the Agency

    for International Development (AID) in civil affairs

    and developmental tasks (many AID programs in

    democracy building and AID training programs

    have an obvious public diplomacy link or provide

    opportunities for public diplomacy); and (2) military

    psychological operations and peacetime information

    operations with aims and methodology compatible

    with civilian public diplomacy, such as Civil Affairs,

    the International Military Education and Training

    (IMET) program, and the expanded IMET (e-IMET)

    program.

     Strategic information may also have a clandestine

    component and utilize grey or black propaganda where

    the source of information is either masked or falsified.

    This latter form is used by intelligence agencies but is

     not used by civilian public diplomacy or peacetime

    military psychological operations.

     

    PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DEFINED

     

     Civilian public diplomacy has evolved from its first

    use in 1965 by Dean Edward Gullion of the Fletcher

    School at Tufts University, when he coined the term to

    refer mainly to nongovernmental actions and people-

    to-people programs or what is often now termed

    “citizen diplomacy.” By the 1970s, however, public

    diplomacy came to mean the U.S. Government’s

    informational, educational and cultural exchange

    activities abroad. The classic definition of public

    diplomacy is attributed to the U.S. Information Agency

    and is still the preferred definition in the United States.

    Accordingly, “public diplomacy seeks to promote

    the national interest and the national security of the

    United States through understanding, informing, and

    influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue

    between American citizens and institutions and their

    counterparts abroad.”1

     Peacetime public diplomacy of this form was already

    in use as early as 1938, when Nelson Rockefeller’s

    Office of Inter-American Affairs embarked upon an

    ambitious educational and cultural exchange program

    with Latin America to blunt actual and potential Nazi

    and fascist influence.2

     World War II and the creation of the Office of

    War Information (OWI), the Voice of America (VOA),

    and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) provided

    broad additional means for civilian-directed public

    diplomacy. At the same time, the War Department

    and the uniformed services honed under British

    tutorage psychological operations and other military

    information operations skills.

     

    THE TOYS OF WAR

     

     Following the war, as is the U.S. custom, the “toys of

    war” were put aside in peacetime. In a practical sense,

    this meant the demobilization and deactivation of most

    of the American civilian and military capability of

    waging a “war of ideas.” The Office of War Information,

    which also had significant domestic information

    coordination functions as well as its more documented

    foreign propaganda activities, was dismantled

    immediately upon the conclusion of hostilities. The

    remnants of OWI’s overseas operations were deposited

    in the Department of State where they remained until

    1953. The Voice of America was continued, albeit with

    much reduced resources.3 The OSS evolved into the

    Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 and retained

    a capability for clandestine influence measures and

    black propaganda. The peacetime military placed

    “psyops” and other information operations firmly on

    the back burner.

     

    THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

     

    The Beginning of the National Security Council

    Process.

     

     With the passage of the National Security Act and

    the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) with

    Public Law 80-253 of July 26, 1947, the national security

    process began in the Harry Truman administration.4

    Continuing the World War II interagency cooperation

    and coordination begun by the State-War-Navy

    Coordinating Committee established in 1944 at the

    Assistant Secretary level and at the Secretary level in

     

    1945, the NSC attempted to give institutional stability

    to national security policymaking. The NSC was

    under the chairmanship of the President, with the

    Secretaries of State and Defense as its key members.

    Other original members included the Secretaries of the

    Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman of the

    National Security Resources Board. The President could

    designate representatives of other executive agencies

    to attend meetings. The CIA reported to the NSC, but

    the Director of Central Intelligence was not a member;

    he attended meetings as an observer and adviser. The

    stated function of the NSC was to advise the President

    on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military

    policies relating to national security and to facilitate

    interagency cooperation. This vastly significant

    legislation also created the position of Secretary of

    Defense, the National Military Establishment, the CIA,

    and the National Security Resources Board.5 Despite

    the preponderance of military members, during the

    Truman administration the NSC was dominated by

    the Department of State. State’s Policy Planning Staff

    drafted most NSC papers for discussion, approval, and

    dissemination.6

     From the beginning, strategic information was

    reinvited to the table. An early National Security

    Council document, NSC-4 entitled “Coordination of

    Foreign Information Measures,” brought strategic

    information in all of its forms to the forefront. The

    document reads in part:

     

    NSC 4

    Washington, December 17, 1947

    REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON

    COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES

    The Problem

    1. To determine what steps are required to strengthen and

    coordinate all foreign information measures of the U.S. government

    in furtherance of the attainment of U.S. national objectives.

    Analysis

    2. The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda Campaign

    directed primarily against the U.S. and is employing coordinated

    psychological, political and economic measures designed to

    undermine non-Communist elements in all countries. The

    ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine

    the prestige of the U.S. and the effectiveness of its national policy

    but to weaken and divide world public opinion to a point where

    effective opposition to Soviet designs is no longer attainable by

    political, economic or military means. . . .

    3. The U.S. is not now employing strong, coordinated information

    measures to counter this propaganda campaign or to further the

    attainment of its national objectives.

    4. None of the existing departments or agencies of the U.S.

    Government is now charged with responsibility for coordinating

    foreign information measures in furtherance of the attainment of

    U.S. national objectives.

    Conclusions

    6. The present world situation requires the immediate strengthening

    and coordination of all foreign information measures of the U.S.

    Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries

    in a direction favorable to the attainment of it objectives and to

    counteract effects of anti-U.S. propaganda.7

     

    The Memorandum goes on to charge the Secretary

    of State with responsibility to formulate policies and

    coordinate all information measures designed to

    influence attitudes in foreign countries. The Assistant

    Secretary for Public Affairs was delegated to exercise

    these functions for the Secretary, and he would be

    assisted by an interagency staff.

     In a separate Memorandum, NSC-4-A entitled

    “Psychological Operations,” the NSC notes that there

    are two related but separate purposes, i.e., (1) to ensure

    that all overt foreign information activities are effectively

    coordinated, and (2) to initiate steps looking toward

    the conduct of covert psychological operations. NSC-4

    dealt with overt methods and a separate document, a

    directive to the Director of Central Intelligence, dealt

    with the covert operations and established formal

    institutionalization of covert operations.8 Perhaps the

    most famous of these forays was CIA’s covert support

    to The Congress for Cultural Freedom, established in

    1950 which once had offices or representatives in some

    35 countries.9

     In 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board made up

    of the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary

    of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence was

    created to coordinate a U.S. response to unconventional

    Soviet tactics. The Board worked closely with the NSC in

    managing both overt and covert counteroperations.10

     

    The U.S. Information Agency and the National

    Security Council.

     

     By 1953, psychological and influence operations

    were considered sufficiently indispensable to the

    conduct of foreign relations that a new entity was

    created which assumed the mantle for civilian overseas

    information, and cultural and educational exchanges

    activities authorized under the Information and

    Cultural Exchanges Act (Public Law 402 of January

    27, 1948), also known as the Smith-Mundt Act. These

    activities had previously been carried out by the

    Department of State.11 In addition to these duties, the

    new agency, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA),

    was charged with responsibility for the Voice of

    America, which eventually moved from its New York

    studios to Washington, DC. The Dwight Eisenhower

    administration, already well-disposed to what would

    later come to be called “public diplomacy” as an

    effective tool in the “war of ideas” against the Soviet

    Union, not only brought the USIA into existence but

    also codified the mission of the new agency in NSC

    Document number 165/1.12 The Agency’s mission

    remained virtually unchanged until its demise in

    1999.

     In recent years, there has been a belated recognition

    that public diplomacy is an essential element in the

    conduct of foreign relations. Essential it is, but it is not

    the “silver bullet” or panacea that some pundits might

    claim. Indeed, no one can claim that public diplomacy

    in its many forms can solve America’s relationship

    problems.

     

    LOCALIZED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

     

     A myth worth exploring is the notion that public

    diplomacy works best when centrally planned and

    focused on a single message or set of messages. Those

    that believe this myth would have us believe that

    nothing worthwhile in public diplomacy happens

    without Washington’s direction.

     

     Anyone who has worked in public diplomacy

    abroad—“in the field”—is aware of how important

    on-the-ground experience and sensitivity to the local

    milieu is to successful public diplomacy. Successful

    public diplomacy campaigns are rarely “invented” in

    Washington. Indeed, most of the “brilliant” ideas from

    inside the Beltway are at best marginally successful

    in an overseas context. They too often presuppose a

    cookie cutter approach to the world with a one-size-

    fits-all policy line to which the hapless public diplomats

    abroad are expected to tow.

     If there is one concept that seems to elude the

    political masters of the Washington bureaucracy, it is

    that in public diplomacy it is all about context. Thus

    a skilled practitioner of public diplomacy must find a

    way to take the “flavor of the month” cooked up by

    Washington and make it palatable to key contacts in

    the host country. The public diplomacy officer must

    find a way to place the message in a context that is both

    understandable and reasonable (if not likeable) to the

    target audience.

     Three examples of localized public diplomacy

    which, in the language of the old USIA was “field

    driven” public diplomacy, illustrate what is meant

    by “localized” public diplomacy. The examples are

    illustrative of countless public diplomacy campaigns

    over the past half century that originated in the field

    rather than in the Washington bureaucracy, despite

    the national security systems’ jealously guarded hold

    on power.

     The first takes place in communist Czechoslovakia

    in the late 1970s and early 80s, the second in Finland

    in the late 1980s, and the third in Thailand in the late

    1990s. There is nothing inherently more profound about

    these three choices versus the many other examples of

    field-driven public diplomacy. They are all vignettes

    from this writer’s own public diplomacy career and

    thus may be verified in their authenticity.13

     

    Czechoslovakia.

     In the waning days of World War II, as the Red

    Army raced westward to Berlin and the Western allies

    moved up the boot of Italy and across France to the

    Rhine, Czechoslovakia, especially Bohemia, became

    one of the last redoubts of the Nazis. Both the Russians

    and the Americans moved to eliminate this potential

    hold-out. General George Patton’s Third Army moved

    aggressively into western Bohemia, and for a time it

    appeared that he would be the first to enter Prague

    and liberate that city. The communist-dominated

    partisans in Prague called for the Red Army to liberate

    the city, and thus Patton’s army slowed and met up

    with the Red Army in the town of Rokycany just east

    of Plzen (Pilsen). At the end of the war then, American

    GIs occupied western and southern Bohemia, and the

    Red Army occupied the remainder of the country.

    As the Red Army was reluctant to leave, the GIs also

    stayed on until there was a mutual withdrawal in

    1946. During that interval, the American GIs and the

    residents of western Bohemia seemed to have formed a

    close friendship. After the war, dozens of monuments

    were erected by local townspeople as tributes to their

    American liberators.

     Following the Communist Party coup of February

    1948, the regime wished to create the myth that

    it was the Red Army alone which liberated all of

    Czechoslovakia from fascism. Honoring the GIs

    was actively discouraged. After crushing the Prague

    Spring with a Russian-led Warsaw Pact occupation

    of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the authorities took more

    drastic measures. Ostensibly in “outrage” over

     the Vietnam War, local officials had many of the

    monuments to American liberators removed and/or

    destroyed. But the memory remained.

     In part to look into the history of the American

    liberation and in part as a cover for American military

    attachés’ travel to border areas and districts of military

    interest, the Defense Attaché’s Office at the American

    Embassy in Prague in the late 1970s began a series of

    automobile trips each May to the towns in western

    Bohemia liberated by the United States. A similar series

    of journeys was organized in November to visit crash

    sites and monuments to fallen U.S. airmen in Slovakia.

    Initially only Department of Defense (DoD) personnel

    made the journeys but in the early 1980s, other personnel

    from the Embassy, including U.S. Ambassador Jack

    Matlock joined the small motorcade to Bohemia in

    May each year. The visits to the sites where markers

    once stood and to the small towns and villages was

    very low key and attracted almost no notice, except for

    the ubiquitous Statny Tanjy Bezpechnosti (STB or State

    Secret Security) detail which shadowed the Americans.

    Where a monument remained, a small wreath “from

    the American people” was placed on the marker.

     In May 1983, the newly arrived Public Affairs

    Officer (PAO) joined the motor trips in May and

    November and realized the potential that these

    events might have for the United States to remind

    the people of Czechoslovakia of the American role in

    their liberation from the Nazis and also the enduring

    interest and concern on the part of the United States

    for the oppressed people of this communist state.

    Beginning in 1984, the Embassy’s May and November

    “wreath-layings”—as they came to be known—took

    on a higher profile a and different character. All

    embassy employees and their families were actively

    encouraged to join the motorcades which now grew

    much larger, with up to two dozen vehicles moving

    in tandem through the back roads and byways of

    Bohemia. The dates and times of the “wreath-layings”

    were announced through the Czechoslovak Service of

    the Voice of America (VOA)—the most widely listened-

    to foreign radio station in Czechoslovakia, (known

    euphemistically as “Prague Three” by most Czechs

    who had two domestic networks). Radio Free Europe’s

    (RFE) Czech and Slovak Services also announced

    the events. The Public Affairs Office (aka The Press

    and Cultural Service) was able to obtain thousands

    of Czechoslovak-American crossed-flag lapel pins

    from the U.S. émigré organization, the Czechoslovak

    National Congress, VOA bumper stickers, lapel pins,

    ballpoint pens, and other “souvenirs” for distribution

    to well-wishers along the route.

     By 1986, the Press and Cultural Service was

    printing special commemorative postcards by the

    thousands with a photo of GIs liberating Pilsen for mass

    distribution to the by now thousands of Czechs lining

    the route and participating in the ceremonies at each

    site. Wreaths from “the American people” were placed

    in each location where there had been a monument

    whether removed or not, and American Ambassador

    William Luers addressed large audiences in near-fluent

    Czech recalling the friendship between Americans

    and the people of Czechoslovakia. The STB observers

    were beside themselves. The crowds were too large to

    intimidate, and the secret police filming and taping the

    events were hardly a secret but were largely ignored

    by the crowds who often displayed American flags and

    other expressions of support. Detailed reports of the

    growing crowds and their enthusiasm were broadcast

    back to Czechoslovakia by the VOA and RFE.

     

     This local initiative, from the early forays into the

    Bohemian countryside in the late 1970s and especially

    after 1984 brought the events to the level of a major

    public diplomacy program, proved to be a huge

    success. The program reinforced the belief among the

    people of Czechoslovakia that the United States and

    the West had not abandoned them and was actively

    demonstrating that fact through the series of “wreath-

    layings” around the country. After the successful

    Velvet Revolution in December 1989, which toppled

    the communist government, the May Embassy

    “wreath-layings” continued in 1990 and culminated

    in an event in Pilsen at the newly restored Liberation

    Monument in front of the city hall. More than 100,000

    Czechs honored the American liberators of their city.

     

    Finland.

     In 1638 a small band of Swedish colonists (the

    majority of whom happened to be Finns, then under

    the rule of the Kingdom of Sweden) founded New

    Sweden on the Delaware River, south of today’s

    Philadelphia. Nearly 350 years later, a rather low-key

    but well-organized effort commemorated this event

    in both Sweden and Finland. The two countries and

    the U.S. postal authorities had approved the issuance

    of stamps to mark the occasion in 1988 and various

    Swedish-American and Finish-American organization

    were making plans to commemorate the event on both

    sides of the Atlantic.

     While studying the Finnish language and culture in

    preparation for his assignment beginning in July 1987,

    the future PAO learned about the 1988 anniversary,

    and it triggered a series of ideas and plans to increase

    the American profile in Finland and reinforce the

    positive feelings for the United States that existed

    there. Recalling the slogan “America’s Bicentennial

    Salute to Sri Lanka” from an earlier assignment, the

    PAO recognized how successful it had been to bring

    all public diplomacy programs—the routine ones as

    well as those created just for the event—under a single

    banner as the PAO had done in Sri Lanka in 1976.

     Using this formula as a model, the incoming PAO,

    in discussion with the Finnish Embassy in Washington

    and the USIA and Department of State, began to

    focus on 1988 as “The National Year of Friendship

    with Finland.” Upon arrival in Finland, he was able

    to convince Ambassador Rockwell Schnabel and

    the Country Team of the value of using this event to

    further U.S. public diplomacy goals in Finland. Within

    a few months, an elaborate program of the National

    Year of Friendship with Finland was announced and

    underway. A logo for the Finnish-American Year of

    Friendship was adopted by both the U.S. Embassy

    and the Finnish Foreign Ministry, and soon this logo

    was on everything from cultural presentations to

    educational exchanges to publications and special

    events. The U.S. Information Service alone listed

    some 38 separate programs in honor of the “Year of

    Friendship” which included an all-star program at the

    prestigious Finlandia Hall featuring a video address to

    the Finlandia audience (and the national TV audience)

    by President Ronald Reagan on the importance of the

    relationship between Finland and the United States

    over the 350 years since the first Finn set foot in the

    New World. The event also kicked off a 5-year $5

    million dollar fund-raising campaign to increase the

    number of Fulbright grantees between Finland and the

    United States. The “Year of Friendship” culminated in

    a visit to Finland by President Reagan, the first-ever by

    a sitting U.S. president.

     

     Among the benefits of this elaborate program in

    cooperation with the Finnish Government was an

    increased favorability rating for the United States

    as a nation and for specific U.S. foreign policies as

    measured by public opinion polls. The high level of

    favorability proved to be important as Finland assumed

    the Presidency of the Security Council just prior to the

    Gulf War and played an important and positive role

    which supported U.S. positions. Shortly thereafter

    Finland bought its first-ever U.S. military aircraft when

    a major contract was awarded for the F-16. This era of

    good feeling between the United States and Finland

    continued as the Baltic states gained their freedom from

    the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the

    Soviet Union itself disintegrated shortly thereafter.

     

    Thailand.

     The Thai economy was one of the fastest growing

    of the so-called Asian Tigers in the 1990s. Construction

    cranes (the national bird) were seen in every direction

    in Bangkok, which went from a charmingly sleazy

    backwater to New York on the Chao Priya River in

    less than a decade. Wooden houses were replaced

    by 60-story buildings, and tropical gardens in the

    capital and similar scenes could be seen in other urban

    centers throughout the country. Thailand became the

    Detroit of Asia as dozens of automobile brands were

    manufactured there for the Asian market and auto

    parts makers proliferated. But this house of cards was

    built on speculation and what came to be called “crony

    capitalism” with loose banking practices, slip-shod

    securities laws, and massive corruption; and it was all

    about to come crashing down.

     

     The U.S.-Thai relationship has had its ups and

    downs in the 156-year history of diplomatic relations.

    Essentially, the relationship in Thai eyes was a classic

    pi-non relationship, that is, an elder brother-younger

    brother relationship with the United States as the pi

    and Thailand as the non. It was the pi’s responsibility to

    look out for the non, to assist when needed, to protect

    and to guide the non. The non’s responsibility was to

    be loyal to the pi and to follow the pi’s lead. This pi-

    non relationship survived the military dictatorships

    in Thailand’s post-war era, the Vietnam War, and

    American withdrawal from Southeast Asia and seemed

    unshakeable in July 1997.

     Earlier in the year there had been “runs” on several

    international currencies by hedge fund operators, the

    most famous being George Soros’ run on the British

    pound which netted him hundreds of millions of

    dollars in profit. In July 1997 it became the Thai baht’s

    turn to be attacked by currency traders, and it proved

    to be the beginning of a cascade of economic troubles

    that caused first the Thai baht to crumble, and then the

    Thai financial system to crash, and eventually the Thai

    economy to come tumbling down. A run on a country’s

    currency can be overcome easily if the underlying

    fundamentals of the economy are sound. But in

    Thailand’s case, the fundamentals were in a shambles

    thanks to the crony capitalism and corruption of the

    banking and securities sectors.

     Thailand became the first of the Asian Tigers to fall,

    but it soon had company. Indonesia and then South

    Korea followed in Thailand’s footsteps and for many

    of the same reasons. When the dust had settled, the

    Thai baht went from about 24 to the dollar to about

    55 to the dollar. Thousands of workers in the financial

    sector were suddenly without a job when their banks

    and securities firms closed their doors.

     

     This is essentially an economic story, but it relates

    to public diplomacy because at its heart is the pi-non

    relationship. When Thailand’s economy crashed,

    it looked to the United States for help. But the U.S.

    Treasury Department, looking through the framework

    of economics, not public diplomacy, looked at Thailand

    and saw that it basically got what it deserved for

    not having its house in order. The State Department

    deferred to the Treasury in all things having to do

    with economics and finance. So the United States did

    nothing when Thailand’s crash came. Puzzled and

    resentful, the Thai saw the United States as abandoning

    Thailand, and renouncing the pi-non relationship when

    the going got tough.

     Newspaper editorials pointed to the United States

    as the cause of Thailand’s woes. George Soros and

    other western currency traders were vilified, and by

    implication Western governments, especially the

    United States, were seen as responsible for the collapse

    throughout Asia. As if this was not bad enough, the

    U.S. Government decided that things were beginning

    to get out of hand in Asia and announced that it would

    bail out Indonesia and South Korea with billions of

    dollars in credit. This was like throwing gasoline on a

    fire in Thailand. The Thai media and influential Thais

    across the spectrum of society exploded in indignation.

    The United States would not help Thailand but would

    help Indonesia! Thailand was one of the five U.S. treaty

    allies in the Pacific, it was a functioning democracy, it

    was a loyal U.S. ally, and took its lead from the United

    States. Indonesia was none of these things—not a

    treaty ally nor even an informal ally, a dictatorship not

    a democracy; and Indonesia, more often than not, was

    at odds with the United States.

     A major financial decision had been made in

    Washington without input from two important

     

    sources—first, there was no consultation with regard

    to the public diplomacy dimension of this decision in

    any of the countries affected, and, second, there was

    no consultation with the Embassy in Bangkok which

    actually understood the situation in Thailand. Even

    before this unfortunate decision was made, the PAO

    had outlined a series of public diplomacy strategic and

    tactical measures to explain U.S. policy to the Thai and

    limit the damage to the relationship. Following the

    announcement about aid for Indonesia, Ambassador

    William Itoh and the Country Team met to develop an

    overall strategy to cope with this near rupture of the

    relationship.

     Public diplomacy was a central part of the strategy,

    which also included convincing State and Treasury to

    reverse course and provide an aid package for Thailand

    at least proportional to the aid package proposed for

    other countries. DoD was called upon through the

    Defense Attaché’s Office and the Joint U.S. Military

    Assistance Group to cancel an outstanding contract for

    F-16 aircraft and parts which would free up hundreds

    of millions of dollars for the Thai Government.

     The U.S. Information Service’s public diplomacy

    strategy focused on several fronts. Because of the crash

    of the Thai economy and currency, many of the 8,000

    Thai students in American higher education were

    suddenly without the financial means to continue

    their education. For the United States, this meant well-

    publicized and immediate assistance from public and

    private sector sources to provide work-study and

    loan opportunities for Thai and other Asian students,

    and the Institute for International Education and

    American higher educational institutions took the

    lead. In addition, the Public Affairs Section proposed

    to Washington that a special high profile scholarship

    program be established for 156 students selected

    by the Thai Government to attend U.S. universities

    for 3 years. The 156 was linked to the 156 years of

    diplomatic relations between the two countries, and

    the total funding for the scholarship program provided

    through Economic Assistance Funds and administered

    by AID came to about $3 million. This is a tiny sum

    when compared to the $4 billion in loan guarantees

    provided to Thailand or the nearly $1 billion in debt

    cancelled by recalling the F-16 contract, but because it

    involved people, not hardware or loans, it registered

    with the Thai public as real help from America. Other

    smaller exchange programs were augmented too, like

    the Fulbright Program and other government-funded

    internships; but the 156 scholarships made the biggest

    headlines.

     Determined to demonstrate that the United States

    was interested in Thailand, the Embassy encouraged

    as many high level visitors as possible to visit Bangkok.

    For its part, the U.S. Information Service used each

    of these cabinet level or equivalent visits to get the

    message out that the United States was interested in

    Thailand and would do whatever it could to ease the

    burden during a difficult economic time. Every high

    level visitor held a press conference and interviews with

    Thai media, made highly visible public appearances,

    and consistently expressed the deep concern of the

    United States for Thailand and the Thai people. It was

    a rare week in 1998 when a U.S. cabinet-level official,

    congressional delegation, or senior military officer

    did not visit Thailand with a full public diplomacy

    program.

     Recognizing that there was a reservoir of good will

    in Thailand built up over many years and reinforced by

    the visit by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1996, another

    key component of the public diplomacy strategy focused

    on reaching out to the gatekeepers of information and

    the “influencers” in the society to make the case for the

    United States. The PAO arranged a series of lunches

    with key editorial boards and influential columnists

    to provide them with briefings on the complexities of

    international finance and currency speculation. U.S.

    Ambassador William Itoh, the fluent Thai-speaking

    Deputy Chief of Mission Ralph Boyce, the Embassy’s

    entire economic reporting section, and public

    diplomacy officers were all mobilized to this effort. In

    the end, it was Thai columnists, commentators, and

    editorial writers who put the Asian financial debacle

    in context and into the proper perspective for their

    readers, listeners, and viewers.

     The United States emerged not as the villain it

    appeared to be when it ignored Thailand’s crisis but

    rather as the prime mover in rectifying a corrupt

    and mismanaged financial system in Thailand and

    in other Asian countries. This was seen as an act of

    responsibility worthy of the pi. Ironically, despite their

    own best efforts in aiding Thailand, it was Japan that

    was blamed for the instability in the Asian financial

    world because it continually postponed reforms to its

    own banking and financial sector. In opinion polling

    following the resolution of the financial crisis, the U.S.

    favorability level was nearly identical with the high

    mark it had reached immediately after the Clinton visit

    in 1996.

     With this background on the reality of public

    diplomacy as it works in the field, we can return to

    the more complex battles for control of strategic

    information within the Washington bureaucracy and

    the National Security Council system.

     

    THE NSC AND INFORMATION

     

     The NSC system evolved into the principal arm

    of the president in forming and executing military,

    international, and internal security polices in the

    Eisenhower administration.14 President Eisenhower

    was more comfortable with the NSC concept than was

    Truman, and he created a highly structured system of

    integrated policy review based on the Cutler Report.

    This system was described as the “policy hill” process

    wherein drafts from the agencies moved up from

    the agency level through an NSC Planning Board

    for review and refinement before reaching the NSC

    for consideration. At that time, the NSC consisted of

    five statutory members: the President, Vice President,

    Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of

    the Office of Defense Mobilization. Depending on the

    subject matter for discussion, other Cabinet members

    and advisors including the Secretary of the Treasury,

    the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the

    Director of Central Intelligence would participate.

    The President’s Special Assistant for National Security

    Affairs was a facilitator of the decision making system,

    oversaw the recommendations coming up and down

    “the hill,” and briefed and summarized discussions but

    unlike National Security Advisors from the Kennedy

    administration to the present, had no substantive role

    in the process.

     President Eisenhower created the Operations and

    Coordinating Board (OCB) to make sure that decisions

    taken by the NSC were followed-up. Meeting weekly

    at the Department of State, the OCB was composed of

    the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs (chair),

    the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Directors of the

    CIA and the new U.S. Information Agency, Special

    Assistants to the President for National Security

    Affairs and Security Operations Coordination. Some

    40 interagency working groups reported to the OCB

    which had its own staff of 24 to support the working

    groups.15

     The Eisenhower NSC provided regular, fully-

    staffed, interagency reviews of major national security

    issues which resulted in decisions at the highest level.

    Eisenhower himself was fully committed to the process

    and chaired 329 of the 366 NSC meetings that took

    place in his 8 years as President. While the NSC was in

    charge of the policy review process, the Department of

    State continued to exercise, under the strong hand of

    Secretary John Foster Dulles, full control over the day-

    to-day operations of foreign policy.16

     The Eisenhower NSC system was sharply

    criticized, however, notably in the hearings conducted

    in 1960-61 by the Senate Subcommittee on National

    Policy Machinery (aka the Jackson Subcommittee),

    for being inflexible, overstaffed, unable to anticipate

    and react to immediate crises, and weighed down by

    committees. President Kennedy strongly agreed with

    the Jackson Subcommittee critique and immediately

    moved to cut the NSC staff and to simplify the foreign

    policymaking process, making it more intimate. The

    OCB was abolished, and the NSC no longer was

    required to monitor the implementation of policies.

    President Kennedy also installed McGeorge Bundy as

    the National Security Advisor, and the responsibilities

    and authorities of the NSC Advisor grew throughout

    the Kennedy years.17

     In the realm of strategic information, this redefin-

    ition of the NSC and the abolition of the OCB took the

    wind out of the sails of the new Director of the USIA,

    the renowned CBS radio and TV newsman Edward R.

    Murrow, who expected to wield considerable influence

    in the new administration. Murrow was unaware of the

    future diminished role of the NSC when he accepted

    the USIA position and was soon outflanked by some of

    his own subordinates with strong personal ties to the

    White House.18

     Murrow found himself and his agency marginalized

    despite the fact that he was often invited to attend NSC

    meetings. The real decisionmaking lay elsewhere,

    leaving Murrow more visible but less influential that

    his predecessors under Eisenhower.

     The NSC met less and less frequently and some of

    its activities were taken up by a more select body, the

    “Standing Group.” By April 1963 the Standing Group

    was reconstituted with McGeorge Bundy as its chair-

    man and a membership that included the Under-

    Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy

    Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central

    Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the

    JCS, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Director

    of USIA, and the Administrator of AID.19 Strategic

    communications, in the form of USIA, was back at the

    table at least at the operational level, but it was too late

    for the seriously ill Murrow, and the Kennedy years

    were nearing an end.

     Lyndon Johnson had even less faith in the NSC

    process than his predecessor. He considered the NSC

    to be a “leaky sieve” and preferred small intimate

    groups for decisionmaking. Johnson’s relationship with

    USIA and military information operations—and thus

    with strategic information—was defined and shaped

    almost entirely by the Vietnam War. Illustrative of the

    widened role for strategic information due to the war

    was Johnson’s National Security Action Memorandum,

    No. 32520 which responded to the USIA Director’s

    suggestions for an information strategy in Vietnam. It

    reads in part:

     

    NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 325

    TO: THE DIRECTOR, U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY

    1. I have reviewed your memorandum of March 16 on the

    informational and psychological warfare programs in South

    Vietnam. With the exception noted in paragraph 5 [regarding Viet

    Cong defectors], I hereby give my general approval to the rapid

    and effective execution of the improvements you propose. This

    approval is subject to review and concurrence by Ambassador

    [Maxwell] Taylor . . . .

    2. By copy of this memorandum I request the Secretary of Defense,

    the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and

    the Administrator of the Agency for International Development

    to give all possible support to an intensified information and

    psychological warfare program along the lines developed in your

    report.

    3. By copy of this memorandum, I request the Director of the

    Bureau of the Budget to review with you and as necessary with

    other agencies the financial implications of such an intensified

    program and to make his recommendation to me as to the best

    way of meeting any additional costs.

    4. Meanwhile you are directed to proceed with all necessary

    actions on the firm understanding that it is my fixed policy that

    any worthwhile undertaking shall not be inhibited or delayed

    in any way by financial restrictions. We can and will find the

    resources we need for all good programs in Vietnam. [Emphasis

    added]

    Rarely does the strategic information function find

    itself in such an enviable position with the implication

    at least that there is a blank check for information and

    psychological operations.

     The Richard Nixon National Security Council

    process was so dominated by Henry Kissinger, first

    as National Security Advisor, then as the dual-hatted

    NSC Advisor and Secretary of State, that strategic

    communication was a top-down decision no less

    than any other, and all decisions were made without

    reference to the NSC process.21 The administration paid

    less and less attention to overseas strategic information

    and more and more attention to domestic information

    management as the Watergate crisis mounted.

     The Ford administration brought Kissinger’s deputy

    Brent Scowcroft in to replace him as NSC Advisor,

    bowing to congressional disapproval of having so

    much foreign policy power in the hands of a single

    individual. Kissinger continued as Secretary of State,

    and Scowcroft managed a cordial relationship with

    his former boss while instituting a more low-key NSC

    coordination role.22 Strategic communication drifted as

    though on auto-pilot.

     

    INFORMATION BECOMES COMMUNICATION

     

     President Jimmy Carter entered office with no

    particular design for strategic information but with

    the plan to merge the State Department’s Cultural

    Exchanges Bureau (CU) into USIA and to soften the

    hard edge of “information” in the process.23 Carter

    eliminated the word “information” from the foreign

    policy lexicon and replaced it with “communication.”

     Thus, the USIA was augmented by the addition

    of a reluctant partner (CU) to form the Educational

    and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the newly named

    International Communication Agency or USICA.

    USIA, the propaganda agency, was no more. But in

    field operations overseas, the USICA looked too much

    like the USCIA for many people, an unfortunate error

    of judgment on Washington’s part that caused no

    end of irritation for those implementing information,

    cultural, and educational programs at U.S. embassies

    and consulates overseas.

     Jimmy Carter came into office determined to

    eliminate the abuses of the NSC system under

    Kissinger, and envisaged the role of the NSC to be

    one of policy coordination and research. The structure

    of the NSC was changed to ensure that the NSC

    Advisor would be but one of many advisors. Carter

    also reduced the staff by 50 percent, and reduced the

    number of standing committees from eight to two: a

    Policy Review Committee (PRC) usually chaired by

    a department, most often the State Department and

    the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), always

    chaired by the NSC Advisor.24

     The Carter NSC has been criticized for failing to

    monitor implementation of the President’s policies.

    In addition, because there were no clearly developed

    foreign policy principles other than arms control (the

    prerogative of the SCC), the President frequently

    changed his mind depending on who offered advice last.

    Carter’s informality complicated the decision making

    process. Often no formal records of decisions were

    made, leading to indecision and embarrassment.25

     As an example of the scant regard the Carter

    administration had for strategic information, when the

    new President’s U.S. National Strategy was formulated

    and disseminated, not so much as a carbon copy of the

    document ever reached the USICA, but copies did go,

    in addition to the Vice President and the Secretaries

    of State and Defense, to the Director of the Office of

    Management and Budget, the Director of the Arms

    Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of

    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central

    Intelligence. The Top Secret Presidential Directive/

    NSC-18 set out the foreign policy priorities of the nation

    and the means to achieve them.26 An examination of

    the now mainly unclassified document [passages

    relating to military strategy, policy, and practices are

    still redacted] reveals that among the means to achieve

    U.S. foreign policy priorities, there is no mention of

    any method of strategic information overt or covert,

    civilian or military. For Carter, strategic information

    just did not exist—after all, he had eliminated the word

    from the foreign policy lexicon in 1978.

     

    ZENITH OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

     

     If there is any certainty in the ways of Washington,

    it is that the pendulum always swings back. And

    the pendulum on strategic information swung back

    dramatically with the beginning of the presidency

    of Ronald Reagan. It is no exaggeration to state that

    the Reagan administration was the zenith of strategic

    communication. Reagan, “the great communicator”

    himself, knew the business of persuasion very well

    indeed. He chose as his Director of the USICA—hastily

    renamed the U.S. Information Agency—Charles Z.

    Wick, a close Hollywood confident and family friend

    with constant and instant access to the President.27

     A series of National Security Decision Directives

    increased and institutionalized the access, the power,

    and the scope of Wick’s agency and brought public

    diplomacy not only to the table of the NSC but to the

    very center of the foreign policy process. Five key NSC

    documents trace the growth of strategic information

    within the Reagan administration. They are NSDD 77,

    NSDD 130, NSDD 186, NSDD 266, and NSDD 276. All

    five of the key documents have been declassified and

    are available through the Reagan Library, Simi Valley,

    California.28

     In National Security Decision Directive Number 77

    entitled “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative

    to National Security,”29 the President states: “I have

    determined that it is necessary to strengthen the

    organization, planning, and coordination of the various

    aspects of public diplomacy of the U.S. Government

    relative to national security.” NSDD 77 established a

    Special Planning Group (SPG) of the NSC under the

    chairmanship of the NSC Advisor and consisting of

    the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of

    the USIA, the Director of AID and the Assistant to the

    President for Communications. The role of the SPG was

    “to be responsible for the overall planning, direction,

    coordination, and monitoring of implementation of

    public diplomacy activities.”30

     Four interagency standing committees reporting to

    the SPG were established by NSDD 77. The committees

    would receive support from the NSC staff and periodic

    guidance from the SPG which would review their

    activities for proper implementation of policy and to

    determine resource priorities. The committees were:

     The Public Affairs Committee: Co-chaired by the

    Assistant to the President for Communications

    and the Deputy Assistant to the President for

    National Security Affairs. The committee was

    responsible for planning and coordinating U.S.

    Government public affairs activities relative

    to national security, e.g., major speeches on

    national security and public appearances by

    senior officials.

     The International Information Committee: Chaired

    by a senior representative of USIA; vice

    chaired by a senior representative of the State

    Department. The committee was responsible

    for planning, coordinating, and implementing

    international information activities in support

    of U.S. policies and interests. The committee also

    was empowered to make recommendations and,

    as appropriate, direct the concerned agencies,

    interagency groups, and working groups with

    respect to information strategies in key policy

    areas.

     The International Political Committee: Chaired by a

    senior representative of the Department of State;

    vice-chaired by a senior representative of USIA.

    The committee was responsible for planning,

    coordinating, and implementing international

    political activities in support of U.S. policies

    and interests, including aid, training, and

    organizational support for foreign governments

    and private groups to encourage the growth of

    democratic political institutions and practices.

     The International Broadcasting Committee:

    Chaired by a representative of the Assistant to

    the President for National Security Affairs. The

    committee was responsible for the planning

    and coordination of international broadcasting

    activities sponsored by the U. S. Government.

     The next major addition to the institutional build-

    up of strategic information came with National

    Security Decision Directive Number 130, “U.S.

    International Information Policy.” The Directive31

    calls international information an integral and vital

    part of U.S. national security policy and strategy and,

    along with other elements of public diplomacy, a key

    strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political

    and ideological trends. NSDD 130 cites a need for

    sustained commitment to improving the quality and

    effectiveness of U.S. international information efforts,

    the level of resources devoted to them, and their

    coordination with other elements of national security

    policy and strategy. Of interest, the document also

    calls for a greater role for international information

    considerations in formulating policies.

     The document addresses in some detail an

    international information strategy, including

    international radio broadcasting; other international

    information instruments such as publications, new

    technologies, cooperation with the private sector,

    overcoming barriers to communication; strategically

    targeted information and communications assistance

    to other nations; psychological factors in maintaining

    the confidence of allied governments and in deterring

    military action; and the capability by the armed forces

    to have an immediate and effective use of psychological

    operations in crisis and in wartime. Revitalization and

    full integration of psychological operations in military

    operations is declared to be an important priority for

    DoD. The NSDD concludes with a series of functional

    requirements related to international information

    and the approval of the establishment of the Foreign

    Opinion Research Advisory Group. In National

    Security Decision Directive 223, “Implementing the

    Geneva Exchanges Initiative,” the “softer side” of

    public diplomacy became the subject of presidential

    attention. This directive,32 following on the heels of the

    Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Meeting in Geneva in 1986

    and the Geneva Exchanges Initiative, was aimed at

    enhancing bilateral cooperation at all levels; including

    through educational and student exchanges, people-to-

    people programs, media, and information exchanges,

    and consultations.

     The President noted that he attached “high

    priority to the exchanges initiative” and requested all

    relevant U.S. Government agencies to give it a high

    priority also and “to render every possible assistance

    to implementation.” A new Interagency Group on

    the President’s Geneva Exchanges Initiatives was

    established, chaired by the NSC Senior Director for

    European and Soviet Affairs. A new Office of the

    Coordinator for the President’s U.S.-Soviet Exchanges

    Initiative was established at USIA to work with USIA

    and other agencies and the private sector to develop

    programs in the agreed areas and work on new

    initiatives. The remainder of the NSDD 223 detailed

    the duties and responsibilities of the coordinator and

    his relationship to existing offices and programs.

     

    THE SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD

     

     The President’s Special Review Board (or the

    Tower Board chaired by Senator John Tower)

    submitted its Report to the President on February 26,

    1987. In a nationwide address on March 4, President

    Reagan announced that he endorsed the Board’s

    recommendations and intended to go beyond them in

    rebuilding the NSC process to repair the damage done

    by the Iran-Contra Affair.

     NSDD 266 details specific steps in implementing the

    Board’s recommendation and other reforms.33 Much

    of the document goes beyond the scope of the current

    discussion and addresses the statutory responsibilities

    and membership of the NSC in some detail. The

    document must be seen in the perspective of the Iran-

    Contra hearings and the revelation of covert activities

    undertaken by staff of the NSC. Much of the document

    addresses these issues. From the perspective of strategic

    information, however, the following passage in Section

    I. A., “Organizing for National Security,” is relevant:

    The Directors of the United States Arms Control and

    Disarmament Agency and United States Information

    Agency are special statutory advisors to the NSC.

    The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament

    Agency shall be the principal advisor to the President,

    the Secretary of State and the NSC on arms control and

    disarmament matters. The Director of the United States

    Information Agency shall be the principal advisor to

    the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on

    international informational, educational, and cultural

    matters. [Emphasis added]

     The Directive goes on to spell out in detail the role

    of the National Security Advisor, the NSC staff, the

    NSC and the Interagency Process, including meetings,

    the process, covert action, use of nongovernment

    personnel, the intelligence process, and reporting.

    Among the directives is a prohibition on conduct of

    covert activities by NSC staff.

     Continuing the damage control from the Iran-

    Contra Scandal, NSDD 27634 provides additional

    detailed guidance on the “National Security Council

    Interagency Process.” The President defines five

    groupings within the NSC process, defines their

    authority, membership, and prerogatives. The five are:

    (1) National Security Council, (2) National Security

    Planning Group (NSPG), (3) Senior Review Group

    (SRG), (4) The Policy Review Group (PRG), and (5)

    Other Interagency Groups. According to NSDD 276:

     

    Within their respective areas of authority as set forth

    in NSDD 266, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of

    Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director

    of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and

    the Director of the USIA may approve the continuation of

    existing senior interagency groups to the extent necessary

    or desirable to promote an effective NSC process; by June

    30, 1987, the National Security Advisor shall be notified

    of those interagency groups they have determined shall

    continue to function.35

     

    THE POST COLD WAR CHILL

     

     In contrast to the Reagan years, President George

    H. W. Bush’s NSC held itself aloof from strategic

    communication. Unlike the rare Reagan-Wick personal

    relationship, the President’s relationships with USIA

    Director Gelb and later with Director Henry Catto were

    more in the norm and not based on long-term family

    friendships but on political relationships, and as such,

    were more distant. Charles Wick was the last USIA

    Director to enjoy instant access to the President.36

     With a strong background in international affairs,

    CIA Director, UN Ambassador, Ambassador to China,

    and 8 years as Vice President, George H. W. Bush made

    wholesale changes to the NSC, even following the

    reforms in 1987.37 President Bush’s NSD-138 provided a

    new charter for the NSC, the Policy Review Group was

    enlarged to a Committee, the Deputy National Security

    Advisor named as chair of the Deputies Committee

    and a Principals Committee screened matters for the

    NSC. Eight Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs)

    were formed to absorb regional and functional

    responsibilities.

     Public Diplomacy was not shut out of the NSC

    process as it had been under President Jimmy Carter

    or marginalized to a lesser extent as in the Kennedy,

    Johnson, and Nixon administrations, but in contrast

    to the Eisenhower years, and especially the Reagan

    administration, the influence of strategic information

    was weak.39

     A blow to USIA came with the unexpected and

    sudden dissolution of the USSR in 1991 after releasing its

    grip on the Warsaw Pact with the end of the Berlin Wall

    and the beginning of the Velvet Revolution in Prague.

    The absence of “an enemy” created the absence of the

    long-time rationale for American public diplomacy,

    especially the robust public diplomacy of the Cold War

    era. The George H. W. Bush administration decided to

    take a “peace dividend” and cut the USIA budget in

    each succeeding year.40

     This lack of enthusiasm for public diplomacy was

    adhered to and expanded upon by the new President.

    The Clinton administration preserved some key public

    diplomacy programs, notably the Fulbright Academic

    Exchanges in a kind of posthumous salute to Bill

    Clinton’s mentor and fellow Rhoads Scholar, Senator

    J. William Fulbright. But the Clinton administration

    continued the sharp cuts to the overall public diplomacy

    budget, especially in international information

    programs which suffered near catastrophic declines.41

     By the beginning of the second Clinton term, the

    indications that USIA’s days were numbered grew more

    obvious. In 1998, there was an Executive-Legislative

    agreement to “merge” USIA (and originally also

    USAID) into the Department of State. The ostensible

    rationale was that this would not only save money but

    would bring public diplomacy closer to the center of

    foreign policy formulation. In truth, the accommodation

    worked out between Secretary Madeleine Albright

    and Senator Jesse Helms was a compromise to achieve

    funding for the current U.S. contribution and previous

    year’s arrears to the United Nations (UN).

     The Clinton administration gained funding,

    including the significant backlog in funding for the U.S.

    contribution to the UN. In return, Senator Helms was

    to have his long time wish fulfilled—the emasculation

    of USAID‘s independence and influence in Congress

    by being placed within the Department of State. USIA’s

    dismemberment was simply a bonus. In the negotiations

    that followed, USAID escaped confinement within

    State and emerged a weakened but still independent

    voice in the foreign policy establishment, but USIA,

    already weakened by years of budget cuts after the Cold

    War, was extinguished as an entity. (See the Foreign

    Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. Public

    Law 105-277.) On October 1, 1999, the Agency’s public

    diplomacy personnel and functions were scattered

    throughout the State Department bureaucracy, and

    its largest component was shorn away entirely as the

    Voice of America and the other broadcasting entities

    were placed with the independent Broadcasting Board

    of Governors (BBG).42

     It takes no great imagination to realize that the

    dismantling of the USIA, the dissolution of its personnel

    and functions with the State Department bureaucracy,

    and the creation of a BBG responsible to no one (not

    the Secretary of State, not even the President) is a

    compound and nearly fatal blow to the ability of the

    United States to project a global information strategy.

    We now examine the present situation in the years

    following the reorganization of the foreign affairs

    agencies and what future role that strategic information

    may have in the National Security Council process.

     

    AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS AND REINVENTING

    THE WHEEL

     In the waning days of the existence of the USIA,

    the  Clinton  National  Security Council  on  April 30,

    1999,  issued  a  still  classified  Presidential  Decision

    Directive (PDD) 68 on International Public Information.

    The directive, according to published media reports at

    the time and the website of the Federation of American

    Scientists, was issued to “address problems identified

    during military missions in Kosovo and Haiti, when

    no single U.S. agency was empowered to coordinate

    U.S. efforts to sell its policies and to counteract bad

    press abroad.”43 In addition, with the soon-to-be-

    accomplished “merger” of USIA into the Department

    of State, the existing NSC Directive, NSDD 77 issued

    in the Reagan administration would be inoperative,

    and PDD-68 was seen as a replacement for the Reagan

    document.

     Senior officials of the Departments of State and

    Defense, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury, the CIA and

    the FBI, according to public sources, were designated

    as members of the International Public Information

    (IPI) Core Group. The Core Group was to be chaired by

    the soon-to-be-created position of Under Secretary for

    Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the State Depart-

    ment. The IPI Core Group was to “assist efforts in de-

    feating adversaries.” The U.S. intelligence community

    would “play a crucial role . . . for identifying hostile

    foreign propaganda and deception that targets the

    U.S.” In addition, again according to public reports,

    the IPI was designed to “influence foreign audiences”

    in support of U.S. foreign policy and to counteract

    propaganda by enemies of the United States.

    Reportedly, the IPI Core Group Charter stated that:

     • IPI control over “international military

    information” was intended to “influence the

    emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and

    ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,

    organizations, groups, and individuals.”

     • “The objective of IPI is to synchronize the

    informational objectives, themes, and messages

    that will be projected overseas . . . to prevent

    and mitigate crises and to influence foreign

    audiences in ways favorable to the achievement

    of U.S. foreign policy objectives.”

     • Information distributed through IPI should be

    designed not “to mislead foreign audiences” and

    that information programs “must be truthful.”

     • [Regarding the likelihood that foreign media

    reports are reflected in American media,

    information aimed at domestic audiences

    should] “be coordinated, integrated, decon-

    flicted and synchronized with the [IPI Core

    Group] to achieve a synergistic effect for

    strategic information activities.”44

    One might term PDD 68 merely “reinventing the

    wheel” but because the existing mechanism (NSDD-

    77) was being “deconstructed” along with the USIA,

    some means to coordinate strategic information had to

    be found.

     The PDD 68 system likely might have worked had

    it become operational. However, because the incoming

    Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public

    Affairs, Evelyn Lieberman, was reluctant to sit down at

    the same table with the intelligence community, only

    one meeting of the IPI Core Group occurred during

    the Clinton administration. It was left to working level

    bureaucrats to attempt to coordinate their international

    information activities in the absence of leadership from

    above.

     

    A NEW DIRECTION

     

     The George W. Bush administration’s first National

    Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-1) organized the

    NSC process to the desires of the new administration.

    NSPD-1 replaced the system of Presidential Decision

    Directive and Presidential Review Directives as an

    instrument for communicating presidential decisions

    about national security policies. The document listed

    the NSC attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory),

    the role of the Vice President presiding in the absence

    of the President, the strong agenda determining role

    of the Assistant to the President for National Security

    Affairs, and the NSC’s relationship with the National

    Economic Council (NEC). The directive also continued

    the role of the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC)

    and the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC). NSPD-1

    further set out the organization of the NSC process as

    follows:

    Management of the development and implementation

    of national security policies by multiple agencies of the

    United States Government shall usually be accomplished

    by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/

    PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day to day

    fora for interagency coordination of national security

    policy.45

    Six regional NSC/PCCs, chaired by an official of Under

    Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank as designated by

    the Secretary of State, were established. In addition,

    “topical” or functional NSC/PCCs were established as

    follows:

     • Democracy, Human Rights and International

    Operations

     • International Development and Humanitarian

    Assistance

     • Global Environment

     • International Finance

     • Transnational Economic Issues

     • Counterterrorism and National Preparedness

     • Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and

    Planning

     • Arms Control

     • Proliferation, Counter proliferation, and

    Homeland Defense

     • Intelligence and Counterintelligence

     • Records Access and Information Security

     There was no NSC/PCC designated for Strategic

    Information, Public Diplomacy, or Foreign Information

    Activities. The closest approximation was in the PCC

    on Democracy, Human Rights, and International

    Operations. NSPD 1 also abolished by March 1, 2001,

    the existing system of Interagency Working Groups and

    other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies,

    and executive committees, except for those established

    by statute.46 Of immediate practical concern in the

    field of strategic information, the IPI Core Group was

    among the casualties, and no replacement organization

    or group was named. Strategic Information or Public

    Diplomacy did not appear to be a high priority in the

    early days of the new administration.

     Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001

    (9/11), the Bush administration found itself in need

    of a strategic information policy and a structure to

    deal with the acknowledged crisis in American public

    diplomacy. There was a general recognition that in

    the absence of an agency like the USIA, there was no

    central focus for public diplomacy, and the record of

    the State Department in public diplomacy since the

    “anschluss” which brought USIA into the Department

    was generally recognized to have been a failure.47

     

    GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS

     

     The solution might have been to resurrect the USIA

    or create a similar agency either within or outside the

    State Department as a number of reports and studies

    recommended.48 Instead, the White House called forth

    a White House solution by creating a new White House

    Office of Global Communications (OGC) headed by

    a Deputy Assistant to the President. According to

    the Executive Order setting up the Office, the OGC’s

    mission was

    to advise the President, the heads of appropriate offices

    within the Executive Office of the President and the heads

    of executive departments and agencies on utilization of the

    most effective means for the U.S. Government to ensure

    consistency in messages that will promote the interests

    of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding,

    build support for and among coalition partners of the

    United States, and inform international audiences.49

     Among the functions of the new Office were:

     • assessment of methods and strategies (except

    for “special activities,” i.e., covert operations) to

    deliver information to audiences abroad;

     • development of a strategy for disseminating

    truthful, accurate and effective messages about

    the United States, its government and policies,

    and the American people and culture;

     • coordination of the creation of temporary teams

    of communicators for short-term placement in

    areas of high global interest and media attention

    (however no team could be deployed without

    prior consultation with the Departments of

    State and Defense and prior notification to the

    NSC Advisor);

     • encouragement of the use of state of the art

    media and technology.

    While on the surface, the Office of Global Communica-

    tion appeared to be a solution of sorts for the lack of direc-

    tion and leadership in the strategic communication/

    public affairs arena, there were built-in flaws in the

    system that would prevent the OGC from being very

    effective in any of its functions. Chief among these

    flaws was that the OGC was outside the NSC process

    and the interagency system. The Executive Order itself

    stated that “nothing in this order shall be construed to

    impair or otherwise affect any function assigned by law

    or by the President to the National Security Council or

    to the Assistant to the President for National Security

    Affairs.” Further, the Executive Order noted that it

    did not alter “existing authorities of any agency.”50

    Given the inherent weaknesses in the structure and

    authorities of the Office of Global Communications, it

    surprised few observers to note the steady decline in

    the OGC’s relevance and its eventual and unheralded

    disappearance from the White House organization

    chart in 2005.

     

    FUSION

     

     Just as in the Clinton administration, for most of the

    Bush administration a rough form of coordination and

    cooperation among working level professionals from

    the public diplomacy bureaus of the State Department

    and elements of DoD, USAID, and other agencies held

    the threads together while waiting for senior leaders to

    decide what form an international information strategy

    would take. The so-called “Fusion Team” which meets

    in State Annex 44 (the former USIA Headquarters

    Building) is the best example of keeping this flame alive.

    While the Fusion Team has an important function no

    doubt, it is no substitute for a top to bottom interagency

    process on strategic information which has not been

    evident since the end of the Reagan administration.

     

    WHO’S IN CHARGE?

     

     The Department of State inherited public

    diplomacy from the USIA and would be expected to

    lead the effort on strategic information. Regrettably,

    for numerous reasons outlined in the nearly 30

    reports and recommendations by public and private

    organizations designed to rescue public diplomacy

    from its current nadir, this State Department leadership

    did not materialize.51 Without going into the details of

    systemic failure to utilize properly the resources of

    public diplomacy inherited by the Department in this

    venue, one can point to the lack of long-term, unified,

    and consistent leadership over public diplomacy as

    one major cause.

     A succession of short-term leaders has presided

    over public diplomacy in the Department of State since

    October 1999. Under Secretary Evelyn Lieberman’s

    largely ineffective tenure ended with the Republican

    victory in 2000. After a lengthy transition, advertising

    executive Charlotte Beers was sworn in only a few

    weeks after 9/11. Her tenure was tortured and brief,

    and when she departed “for personal reasons,” she

    was succeeded by an interim replacement, Assistant

    Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Patricia

    Harrison, until the administration was able to convince

    Ambassador to Morocco Margaret Tutweiler to take

    up the challenge. Within a few months, Tutweiler, who

    arrived stating that she would stay only for a short

    time, left for Wall Street and was replaced again on an

    interim basis by Harrison. In a surprise appointment,

    President Bush announced that his close confidant and

    communications advisor, Karen Hughes, would take

    up the post of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy

    and Public Affairs, but the new appointment would

    not be taken up for nearly 5 months due to family

    commitments. Even under the best of circumstances,

    with this kind of revolving door in leadership, it is

    hard to imagine an effective public diplomacy strategy

    being undertaken.

     To Ms. Hughes’ credit, she and her Deputy, Dina

    Powell, “hit the ground running” with a series of

    outreach encounters and listening tours at home and

    abroad. Hughes appeared to recognize the most serious

    flaw in the foreign affairs reorganization of 1998-99, i.e.,

    that there is no unity of command or central authority

    over public diplomacy in the Department of State. If

    anything, there is even less unity in the interagency

    process regarding strategic communication. Input

    over assignments, resources, and administrative issues

    can lead to input over policy and strategy, but in the

    absence of any influence over officers in the field, an

    Under Secretary is powerless to manage the program

    responsibilities, and public diplomacy is a program-

    intensive function. A number of alleged “fixes” were

    made in the Department to strengthen Hughes’

    position within the bureaucracy, including assigning

    one regional deputy assistant secretary in each regional

    bureau to be in charge of public diplomacy and

    giving (in theory at least) the Under Secretary shared

    line authority over that position with the regional

    assistant secretary. Evaluation, budgeting, and other

    administrative functions for State Department public

    diplomacy bureaus and offices reported to the Under

    Secretary rather than to individual bureau heads,

    thanks to Hughes’ insistence.

     Other minor measures could be taken within

    the authority of the Department to centralize the

    Under Secretary’s role in public diplomacy. Still, as

    numerous outside reports point out, only so much can

    be done within the existing flawed structure. Hughes

    apparently came to realize this and departed for the

    greener pastures of the private sector in 2008. After a

    lengthy Senate hold on his nomination, a new Under

    Secretary, James Glassman, was sworn in with only a

    few months left in the Bush administration. Glassman,

    formerly with the BBG, has a keen understanding of

    public diplomacy and has made an impressive start in

    what is surely a lame duck role. There is little time for

    the kind of dramatic change that is required to revitalize

    public diplomacy no matter how valiant the effort on

    Glassman’s part. Eventually perhaps, Congress will

    tire of a band-aid approach to fixing public diplomacy

    and decide to undo or redo the reorganization of the

    foreign affairs agencies so badly botched in 1998-99. In

    the meantime, America’s strategic information may be

    neither strategic nor very informative.

     

    WHAT CAN BE DONE?

     

     The 2005 report by the Public Diplomacy Council,

    A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy, made the case that

    it may be impossible to turn back the clock and recreate

    the independent USIA, complete with responsibility

    over international civilian broadcasting. The Council

    called instead for a semi-independent agency lodged

    within the State Department but with a unified chain of

    command and control over overseas public diplomacy

    operations.52 This would eliminate the serious flaw

    which plagues the Under Secretary and would result

    in a much improved performance. With the change

    of administrations in Washington, however, there

    may exist a brief period during which a reenergized

    and independent agency for public diplomacy could

    be created and be well-integrated into the national

    security process as it was in the Reagan and Eisenhower

    administrations.

     Importantly, the crucial role of localized public

    diplomacy must be recognized. Public diplomacy must

    return to its “field-driven” roots, and public diplomacy

    officers in the field must have greater latitude to create

    strategies within the context of the societies and cultures

    in which they operate. This presupposes that adequate

    resources, too, must be directed to overseas operations

    and the increased staffing required. The cleverest

    strategy will fail if there are too few personnel and

    financial resources available for its implementation.

     It is critical to realize, as several studies have pointed

    out in recent years, that the Department of State is

    not the only important actor in public diplomacy or

    strategic information in the U.S. Government.53 In order

    to coordinate and manage the breadth of international

    information and exchange programs conducted by any

    new agency, State, Defense, USAID, and the more than

    60 offices, bureaus, and executive departments that

    already report international exchanges, training, or

    information programs, the NSC or interagency process

    on strategic information must be reconstituted. Indeed,

    nearly half of all of the reports and studies on public

    diplomacy undertaken in the past 3 years have pointed

    to interagency coordination as a serious problem

    that must be addressed.54 Solutions vary and include

    structures within the NSC and outside it, but there is

    broad agreement that the current interagency process

    requires strengthening.

     Based on the history of American experimentation

    with strategic information in the NSC process, there

    are two periods which emerge as worthy exemplars—

    the Eisenhower administration and the Reagan

    administration. Both administrations had elaborate,

    and perhaps to some overly bureaucratized, systems of

    advice, analysis, monitoring, and execution of strategic

    information programs at multiple levels from the

    working level to the senior leader level. Yet, for the most

    part, they worked, and for that reason alone are worth

    a careful look. The criticisms of both the Eisenhower

    and the Reagan NSC processes over the passage of time

    seem to be not very cogent. Eisenhower’s NSC process

    was not too slow and unwieldy, and if it proved to

    be so—as in a period of crisis—it was by-passed. The

    Reagan NSC system is too often seen through the

    prism of the Iran-Contra Affair; that situation was an

    aberration, not the norm, and the reforms instituted by

    the Tower Board set the system straight.

     The conclusion is inescapable. Congress and the

    Executive should relook at the organization of public

    diplomacy/strategic communication and alter the

    current flawed design to create unity of command and

    clear lines of authority whether that is in a separate

    agency, an agency within the State Department,

    or some third variant. Because “localized public

    diplomacy” has been shown to be more effective than

    world-wide strategies designed inside the Beltway,

    public diplomacy should be field-driven. In addition,

    the Executive Branch should return to a more elaborate

    and tested formula for an interagency process that

    worked in both the Eisenhower and the Reagan NSCs.

     

     

    ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

     1. Public Diplomacy Council, A Call for Action on Public

    Diplomacy: A Report of the Public Diplomacy Council, 2nd ed.,

    Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, 2005.

     2. Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural

    Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, Dulles, VA: Potomac Books,

    2005; Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign

    Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950, New York: Foreign Policy

    Association, 1981.

      3. Arndt; Wilson Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: the

    Story of the U.S. Information Agency, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner

    Publishers, 2004.

     4. Office of the Historian, Department of State, History of the

    National Security Council, 1947-1997, Washington, DC: Bureau

    of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State; J. Pike, “National

    Security Council (NSC) Truman Administration [1947-1953],“

    1999, retrieved February 21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-

    hst/index.html.

     5. Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS,

    and NSC, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

     6. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

     7. National Security Council, “NSC-4 Coordination of Foreign

    Information Measures,” 1947, retrieved February 21, 2006, from

    www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-4.html.

     8. Ibid.

     9. Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for

    Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe,

    New York: The Free Press, 1989.

     10. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

     11. Arndt; Dizard.

     12. Department of Political Science, University of California

    at Los Angeles, The 187 serially numbered NSC documents

    approved during the Eisenhower administration, arranged by

    subject, retrieved February 21, 2006, from UCLA Web site www.

    polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/DATA/nscjfkl1.gif.

     13. For additional details, see William P. Kiehl, Oral History

    Interview, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, The Association

    for Diplomatic Studies and Training: Arlington, VA, September

    15, 2005, pp. 133-160, 165-220, 279-321.

     14. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

     15. Ibid.

     16. Ibid.

     17. Ibid.

     18. Arndt.

     19. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

     20. Lyndon B. Johnson, “National Security Action

    Memorandum No. 325,” The White House, 1968, retrieved

    February 21, 2006, from LJ Library Web site www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/

    johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam.

     21. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

     22. Ibid.

     23. Arndt; Dizard.

     24. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

     25. Ibid.

     26. Jimmy Carter, U.S. National Strategy, Presidential

    Directive (NSC-18,1977), The White House, retrieved February.

    21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd18.pdf.

     27. Arndt; Dizard; Frank A. Ninkovich, U.S. Information

    Policy and Cultural Diplomacy, Headline Series No. 308, New York:

    Foreign Policy Association, 2004.

     28. Ronald W. Reagan, “Management of Public Diplomacy

    Relative to National Security,” NSDD 77, 1983, retrieved

    February 21, 2006, from fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd23-1966t.gif; Ronald

    W. Reagan, “US international Information Policy,” NSDD 130,

    1984, retrieved February 21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/

    nsdd/23-2213t.gif; Ronald W. Reagan, “Implementing the Geneva

    Exchanges Initiative,” NSDD 223, 1986, retrieved February

    21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2781a.gif; Ronald

    W. Reagan, “Implementation of the Recommendations of the

    President’s Special Review Board,” NSDD 266, 1987a, retrieved

    February 21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2980a.

    gif; Ronald W. Reagan, “National Security Council Interagency

    Process,” NSDD 276, 1987b, retrieved February 21, 2006, from

    www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-3091a.gif.

     29. Reagan, NSDD 77, 1983.

     30. Ibid.

     31. Reagan, NSDD 130, 1984.

     32. Reagan, NSDD 223, 1986.

     33. Reagan, NSDD 266, 1987a.

     34. Reagan, NSDD 276, 1987b.

      35. Ibid.

     36. Charles Z. Wick, “Letter: Report of the Defense Science

    Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” e-mail and

    attachments to author, December 2004.

     37. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.

     38. George H. W. Bush, “United States Government

    International Broadcasting: National Security Directive 51, 1990,”

    retrieved February 21, 2006, from The Bush Library, bushlibrary.

    tamu.edu/research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2051/0001.pdf.

     39. Arndt; Dizard.

     40. Ibid.

     41. Ibid.

     42. William P. Kiehl, “Can Humpty Dumpty Be Saved?”

    American Diplomacy, November 2003, retrieved February 26, 2006,

    from www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org.

     43. William Clinton, “Presidential Decision Directive, PDD

    68,” April 1999, retrieved February 21, 2006 from www.fas.org/irp/

    offdocs/pdd-68.htm.

     44. Ibid.

     45. George W. Bush, “NSPD-1: Organization of the National

    Security Council,” 2001, retrieved February 21, 2006, from www.

    fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd-1.htm.

     46. Ibid.

     47. For just a few examples of the many reports and studies

    which are critical of the current structure and effectiveness of public

    diplomacy, see Stephen Johnson, Helle C. Dale, Patrick Cronin,

    “Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization,

    Coordination, and Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 08-

    05-2005, 1875, pp. 1-14; U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Public

    Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of

    a National Communication Strategy, GAO-05-323, 2005, retrieved

    February 21, 2006, from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-323;

    U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State

    Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, GAO-

    03-951, Washington, DC: U.S. GAO, 2003; Kiehl.

     48. Susane Epstein and Lisa Mages, Public Diplomacy: a Review

    of Past Recommendations, Washington, DC: Congressional Research

    Service, September 2, 2005.

     49. George W. Bush, The White House, Executive Order

    Establishing the Office of Global Communication, January 21,

    2003, retrieved February 26, 2006 from www.whitehouse.gov/news/

    releases/2003/01/20030121-3.html.

     50. Ibid.

     51. Among the many reports and recommendations are those

    contained in Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab

    and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic

    Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,

    Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2003; J. H. Brown, “The

    Purposes and Cross Purposes of American Public Diplomacy,”

    American Diplomacy, September 2002, retrieved February 26, 2006

    from www.publicdilomacycouncil.org; Defense Science Board, Report

    of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,

    Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Epstein and Mages, Bruce

    Gregory, “Public Diplomacy, and Strategic Communication:

    Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,” American Political

    Science Association Conference on International Communication

    and Conflict Washington, DC: George Washington University and

    Georgetown University, August 31, 2005, pp. 1-46; Johnson, Dale,

    Cronin, Jeffrey Jones, “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for

    the United States,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 39, pp. 108-114;

    Kiehl.

     52. Public Diplomacy Council, 2005.

     53. Defense Science Board, 2004; Gregory.

     54. Epstein and Mages.

     

     

    WILLIAM P. KIEHL is founding President and Chief

    Executive Officer of Public Diplomacy Worldwide.

    He has taught diplomacy at the Foreign Service

    Institute and was Diplomat in Residence at the U.S.

    Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership

    as Senior Fellow of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping

    Institute. During a career of 33 years Dr. Kiehl served

    as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau

    of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of

    State, and in numerous public diplomacy positions

    at home and abroad. He has published articles on

    public diplomacy and peacekeeping, and edited the

    book America’s Dialogue with the World (2007). Dr. Kiehl

    holds a Ph.D. in higher education management from

    the University of Pennsylvania.

    2 comments:

    David Comp said...

    Many thanks for posting your chapter to your blog. I enjoyed reading this history cultural and educational exchange activities have found it helpful in my own research efforts on public diplomacy. I also look forward to reading more of Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security.

    PDWorldwide said...

    David & others: The entire text of "Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security" is available as a pdf download for free on the Strategic Studies website. There are not copyright restrictions so you can reprint the book chapters or the entire book if you wish. You can also get a free copy of the book in paper form via SSI.

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