From
AFFAIRS OF STATE:
THE INTERAGENCY
AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Gabriel Marcella
Editor
December 2008
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CHAPTER 8
SEDUCED AND ABANDONED:
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PROCESS
William P. Kiehl
Truth also needs propaganda.
—Karl Jaspers,
German philosopher
INTRODUCTION
Strategic information is a term that cries out for
definition. Strategic information is: (1) civilian public
diplomacy currently conducted principally by the U.S.
Department of State, and by other civilian agencies
in a supporting role, e.g., the Broadcasting Board of
Governors for international broadcasting, the Agency
for International Development (AID) in civil affairs
and developmental tasks (many AID programs in
democracy building and AID training programs
have an obvious public diplomacy link or provide
opportunities for public diplomacy); and (2) military
psychological operations and peacetime information
operations with aims and methodology compatible
with civilian public diplomacy, such as Civil Affairs,
the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program, and the expanded IMET (e-IMET)
program.
Strategic information may also have a clandestine
component and utilize grey or black propaganda where
the source of information is either masked or falsified.
This latter form is used by intelligence agencies but is
not used by civilian public diplomacy or peacetime
military psychological operations.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DEFINED
Civilian public diplomacy has evolved from its first
use in 1965 by Dean Edward Gullion of the Fletcher
School at Tufts University, when he coined the term to
refer mainly to nongovernmental actions and people-
to-people programs or what is often now termed
“citizen diplomacy.” By the 1970s, however, public
diplomacy came to mean the U.S. Government’s
informational, educational and cultural exchange
activities abroad. The classic definition of public
diplomacy is attributed to the U.S. Information Agency
and is still the preferred definition in the United States.
Accordingly, “public diplomacy seeks to promote
the national interest and the national security of the
United States through understanding, informing, and
influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue
between American citizens and institutions and their
counterparts abroad.”1
Peacetime public diplomacy of this form was already
in use as early as 1938, when Nelson Rockefeller’s
Office of Inter-American Affairs embarked upon an
ambitious educational and cultural exchange program
with Latin America to blunt actual and potential Nazi
and fascist influence.2
World War II and the creation of the Office of
War Information (OWI), the Voice of America (VOA),
and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) provided
broad additional means for civilian-directed public
diplomacy. At the same time, the War Department
and the uniformed services honed under British
tutorage psychological operations and other military
information operations skills.
THE TOYS OF WAR
Following the war, as is the U.S. custom, the “toys of
war” were put aside in peacetime. In a practical sense,
this meant the demobilization and deactivation of most
of the American civilian and military capability of
waging a “war of ideas.” The Office of War Information,
which also had significant domestic information
coordination functions as well as its more documented
foreign propaganda activities, was dismantled
immediately upon the conclusion of hostilities. The
remnants of OWI’s overseas operations were deposited
in the Department of State where they remained until
1953. The Voice of America was continued, albeit with
much reduced resources.3 The OSS evolved into the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 and retained
a capability for clandestine influence measures and
black propaganda. The peacetime military placed
“psyops” and other information operations firmly on
the back burner.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The Beginning of the National Security Council
Process.
With the passage of the National Security Act and
the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) with
Public Law 80-253 of July 26, 1947, the national security
process began in the Harry Truman administration.4
Continuing the World War II interagency cooperation
and coordination begun by the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee established in 1944 at the
Assistant Secretary level and at the Secretary level in
1945, the NSC attempted to give institutional stability
to national security policymaking. The NSC was
under the chairmanship of the President, with the
Secretaries of State and Defense as its key members.
Other original members included the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman of the
National Security Resources Board. The President could
designate representatives of other executive agencies
to attend meetings. The CIA reported to the NSC, but
the Director of Central Intelligence was not a member;
he attended meetings as an observer and adviser. The
stated function of the NSC was to advise the President
on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to national security and to facilitate
interagency cooperation. This vastly significant
legislation also created the position of Secretary of
Defense, the National Military Establishment, the CIA,
and the National Security Resources Board.5 Despite
the preponderance of military members, during the
Truman administration the NSC was dominated by
the Department of State. State’s Policy Planning Staff
drafted most NSC papers for discussion, approval, and
dissemination.6
From the beginning, strategic information was
reinvited to the table. An early National Security
Council document, NSC-4 entitled “Coordination of
Foreign Information Measures,” brought strategic
information in all of its forms to the forefront. The
document reads in part:
NSC 4
Washington, December 17, 1947
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON
COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES
The Problem
1. To determine what steps are required to strengthen and
coordinate all foreign information measures of the U.S. government
in furtherance of the attainment of U.S. national objectives.
Analysis
2. The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda Campaign
directed primarily against the U.S. and is employing coordinated
psychological, political and economic measures designed to
undermine non-Communist elements in all countries. The
ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine
the prestige of the U.S. and the effectiveness of its national policy
but to weaken and divide world public opinion to a point where
effective opposition to Soviet designs is no longer attainable by
political, economic or military means. . . .
3. The U.S. is not now employing strong, coordinated information
measures to counter this propaganda campaign or to further the
attainment of its national objectives.
4. None of the existing departments or agencies of the U.S.
Government is now charged with responsibility for coordinating
foreign information measures in furtherance of the attainment of
U.S. national objectives.
Conclusions
6. The present world situation requires the immediate strengthening
and coordination of all foreign information measures of the U.S.
Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries
in a direction favorable to the attainment of it objectives and to
counteract effects of anti-U.S. propaganda.7
The Memorandum goes on to charge the Secretary
of State with responsibility to formulate policies and
coordinate all information measures designed to
influence attitudes in foreign countries. The Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs was delegated to exercise
these functions for the Secretary, and he would be
assisted by an interagency staff.
In a separate Memorandum, NSC-4-A entitled
“Psychological Operations,” the NSC notes that there
are two related but separate purposes, i.e., (1) to ensure
that all overt foreign information activities are effectively
coordinated, and (2) to initiate steps looking toward
the conduct of covert psychological operations. NSC-4
dealt with overt methods and a separate document, a
directive to the Director of Central Intelligence, dealt
with the covert operations and established formal
institutionalization of covert operations.8 Perhaps the
most famous of these forays was CIA’s covert support
to The Congress for Cultural Freedom, established in
1950 which once had offices or representatives in some
35 countries.9
In 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board made up
of the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence was
created to coordinate a U.S. response to unconventional
Soviet tactics. The Board worked closely with the NSC in
managing both overt and covert counteroperations.10
The U.S. Information Agency and the National
Security Council.
By 1953, psychological and influence operations
were considered sufficiently indispensable to the
conduct of foreign relations that a new entity was
created which assumed the mantle for civilian overseas
information, and cultural and educational exchanges
activities authorized under the Information and
Cultural Exchanges Act (Public Law 402 of January
27, 1948), also known as the Smith-Mundt Act. These
activities had previously been carried out by the
Department of State.11 In addition to these duties, the
new agency, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA),
was charged with responsibility for the Voice of
America, which eventually moved from its New York
studios to Washington, DC. The Dwight Eisenhower
administration, already well-disposed to what would
later come to be called “public diplomacy” as an
effective tool in the “war of ideas” against the Soviet
Union, not only brought the USIA into existence but
also codified the mission of the new agency in NSC
Document number 165/1.12 The Agency’s mission
remained virtually unchanged until its demise in
1999.
In recent years, there has been a belated recognition
that public diplomacy is an essential element in the
conduct of foreign relations. Essential it is, but it is not
the “silver bullet” or panacea that some pundits might
claim. Indeed, no one can claim that public diplomacy
in its many forms can solve America’s relationship
problems.
LOCALIZED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
A myth worth exploring is the notion that public
diplomacy works best when centrally planned and
focused on a single message or set of messages. Those
that believe this myth would have us believe that
nothing worthwhile in public diplomacy happens
without Washington’s direction.
Anyone who has worked in public diplomacy
abroad—“in the field”—is aware of how important
on-the-ground experience and sensitivity to the local
milieu is to successful public diplomacy. Successful
public diplomacy campaigns are rarely “invented” in
Washington. Indeed, most of the “brilliant” ideas from
inside the Beltway are at best marginally successful
in an overseas context. They too often presuppose a
cookie cutter approach to the world with a one-size-
fits-all policy line to which the hapless public diplomats
abroad are expected to tow.
If there is one concept that seems to elude the
political masters of the Washington bureaucracy, it is
that in public diplomacy it is all about context. Thus
a skilled practitioner of public diplomacy must find a
way to take the “flavor of the month” cooked up by
Washington and make it palatable to key contacts in
the host country. The public diplomacy officer must
find a way to place the message in a context that is both
understandable and reasonable (if not likeable) to the
target audience.
Three examples of localized public diplomacy
which, in the language of the old USIA was “field
driven” public diplomacy, illustrate what is meant
by “localized” public diplomacy. The examples are
illustrative of countless public diplomacy campaigns
over the past half century that originated in the field
rather than in the Washington bureaucracy, despite
the national security systems’ jealously guarded hold
on power.
The first takes place in communist Czechoslovakia
in the late 1970s and early 80s, the second in Finland
in the late 1980s, and the third in Thailand in the late
1990s. There is nothing inherently more profound about
these three choices versus the many other examples of
field-driven public diplomacy. They are all vignettes
from this writer’s own public diplomacy career and
thus may be verified in their authenticity.13
Czechoslovakia.
In the waning days of World War II, as the Red
Army raced westward to Berlin and the Western allies
moved up the boot of Italy and across France to the
Rhine, Czechoslovakia, especially Bohemia, became
one of the last redoubts of the Nazis. Both the Russians
and the Americans moved to eliminate this potential
hold-out. General George Patton’s Third Army moved
aggressively into western Bohemia, and for a time it
appeared that he would be the first to enter Prague
and liberate that city. The communist-dominated
partisans in Prague called for the Red Army to liberate
the city, and thus Patton’s army slowed and met up
with the Red Army in the town of Rokycany just east
of Plzen (Pilsen). At the end of the war then, American
GIs occupied western and southern Bohemia, and the
Red Army occupied the remainder of the country.
As the Red Army was reluctant to leave, the GIs also
stayed on until there was a mutual withdrawal in
1946. During that interval, the American GIs and the
residents of western Bohemia seemed to have formed a
close friendship. After the war, dozens of monuments
were erected by local townspeople as tributes to their
American liberators.
Following the Communist Party coup of February
1948, the regime wished to create the myth that
it was the Red Army alone which liberated all of
Czechoslovakia from fascism. Honoring the GIs
was actively discouraged. After crushing the Prague
Spring with a Russian-led Warsaw Pact occupation
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the authorities took more
drastic measures. Ostensibly in “outrage” over
the Vietnam War, local officials had many of the
monuments to American liberators removed and/or
destroyed. But the memory remained.
In part to look into the history of the American
liberation and in part as a cover for American military
attachés’ travel to border areas and districts of military
interest, the Defense Attaché’s Office at the American
Embassy in Prague in the late 1970s began a series of
automobile trips each May to the towns in western
Bohemia liberated by the United States. A similar series
of journeys was organized in November to visit crash
sites and monuments to fallen U.S. airmen in Slovakia.
Initially only Department of Defense (DoD) personnel
made the journeys but in the early 1980s, other personnel
from the Embassy, including U.S. Ambassador Jack
Matlock joined the small motorcade to Bohemia in
May each year. The visits to the sites where markers
once stood and to the small towns and villages was
very low key and attracted almost no notice, except for
the ubiquitous Statny Tanjy Bezpechnosti (STB or State
Secret Security) detail which shadowed the Americans.
Where a monument remained, a small wreath “from
the American people” was placed on the marker.
In May 1983, the newly arrived Public Affairs
Officer (PAO) joined the motor trips in May and
November and realized the potential that these
events might have for the United States to remind
the people of Czechoslovakia of the American role in
their liberation from the Nazis and also the enduring
interest and concern on the part of the United States
for the oppressed people of this communist state.
Beginning in 1984, the Embassy’s May and November
“wreath-layings”—as they came to be known—took
on a higher profile a and different character. All
embassy employees and their families were actively
encouraged to join the motorcades which now grew
much larger, with up to two dozen vehicles moving
in tandem through the back roads and byways of
Bohemia. The dates and times of the “wreath-layings”
were announced through the Czechoslovak Service of
the Voice of America (VOA)—the most widely listened-
to foreign radio station in Czechoslovakia, (known
euphemistically as “Prague Three” by most Czechs
who had two domestic networks). Radio Free Europe’s
(RFE) Czech and Slovak Services also announced
the events. The Public Affairs Office (aka The Press
and Cultural Service) was able to obtain thousands
of Czechoslovak-American crossed-flag lapel pins
from the U.S. émigré organization, the Czechoslovak
National Congress, VOA bumper stickers, lapel pins,
ballpoint pens, and other “souvenirs” for distribution
to well-wishers along the route.
By 1986, the Press and Cultural Service was
printing special commemorative postcards by the
thousands with a photo of GIs liberating Pilsen for mass
distribution to the by now thousands of Czechs lining
the route and participating in the ceremonies at each
site. Wreaths from “the American people” were placed
in each location where there had been a monument
whether removed or not, and American Ambassador
William Luers addressed large audiences in near-fluent
Czech recalling the friendship between Americans
and the people of Czechoslovakia. The STB observers
were beside themselves. The crowds were too large to
intimidate, and the secret police filming and taping the
events were hardly a secret but were largely ignored
by the crowds who often displayed American flags and
other expressions of support. Detailed reports of the
growing crowds and their enthusiasm were broadcast
back to Czechoslovakia by the VOA and RFE.
This local initiative, from the early forays into the
Bohemian countryside in the late 1970s and especially
after 1984 brought the events to the level of a major
public diplomacy program, proved to be a huge
success. The program reinforced the belief among the
people of Czechoslovakia that the United States and
the West had not abandoned them and was actively
demonstrating that fact through the series of “wreath-
layings” around the country. After the successful
Velvet Revolution in December 1989, which toppled
the communist government, the May Embassy
“wreath-layings” continued in 1990 and culminated
in an event in Pilsen at the newly restored Liberation
Monument in front of the city hall. More than 100,000
Czechs honored the American liberators of their city.
Finland.
In 1638 a small band of Swedish colonists (the
majority of whom happened to be Finns, then under
the rule of the Kingdom of Sweden) founded New
Sweden on the Delaware River, south of today’s
Philadelphia. Nearly 350 years later, a rather low-key
but well-organized effort commemorated this event
in both Sweden and Finland. The two countries and
the U.S. postal authorities had approved the issuance
of stamps to mark the occasion in 1988 and various
Swedish-American and Finish-American organization
were making plans to commemorate the event on both
sides of the Atlantic.
While studying the Finnish language and culture in
preparation for his assignment beginning in July 1987,
the future PAO learned about the 1988 anniversary,
and it triggered a series of ideas and plans to increase
the American profile in Finland and reinforce the
positive feelings for the United States that existed
there. Recalling the slogan “America’s Bicentennial
Salute to Sri Lanka” from an earlier assignment, the
PAO recognized how successful it had been to bring
all public diplomacy programs—the routine ones as
well as those created just for the event—under a single
banner as the PAO had done in Sri Lanka in 1976.
Using this formula as a model, the incoming PAO,
in discussion with the Finnish Embassy in Washington
and the USIA and Department of State, began to
focus on 1988 as “The National Year of Friendship
with Finland.” Upon arrival in Finland, he was able
to convince Ambassador Rockwell Schnabel and
the Country Team of the value of using this event to
further U.S. public diplomacy goals in Finland. Within
a few months, an elaborate program of the National
Year of Friendship with Finland was announced and
underway. A logo for the Finnish-American Year of
Friendship was adopted by both the U.S. Embassy
and the Finnish Foreign Ministry, and soon this logo
was on everything from cultural presentations to
educational exchanges to publications and special
events. The U.S. Information Service alone listed
some 38 separate programs in honor of the “Year of
Friendship” which included an all-star program at the
prestigious Finlandia Hall featuring a video address to
the Finlandia audience (and the national TV audience)
by President Ronald Reagan on the importance of the
relationship between Finland and the United States
over the 350 years since the first Finn set foot in the
New World. The event also kicked off a 5-year $5
million dollar fund-raising campaign to increase the
number of Fulbright grantees between Finland and the
United States. The “Year of Friendship” culminated in
a visit to Finland by President Reagan, the first-ever by
a sitting U.S. president.
Among the benefits of this elaborate program in
cooperation with the Finnish Government was an
increased favorability rating for the United States
as a nation and for specific U.S. foreign policies as
measured by public opinion polls. The high level of
favorability proved to be important as Finland assumed
the Presidency of the Security Council just prior to the
Gulf War and played an important and positive role
which supported U.S. positions. Shortly thereafter
Finland bought its first-ever U.S. military aircraft when
a major contract was awarded for the F-16. This era of
good feeling between the United States and Finland
continued as the Baltic states gained their freedom from
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the
Soviet Union itself disintegrated shortly thereafter.
Thailand.
The Thai economy was one of the fastest growing
of the so-called Asian Tigers in the 1990s. Construction
cranes (the national bird) were seen in every direction
in Bangkok, which went from a charmingly sleazy
backwater to New York on the Chao Priya River in
less than a decade. Wooden houses were replaced
by 60-story buildings, and tropical gardens in the
capital and similar scenes could be seen in other urban
centers throughout the country. Thailand became the
Detroit of Asia as dozens of automobile brands were
manufactured there for the Asian market and auto
parts makers proliferated. But this house of cards was
built on speculation and what came to be called “crony
capitalism” with loose banking practices, slip-shod
securities laws, and massive corruption; and it was all
about to come crashing down.
The U.S.-Thai relationship has had its ups and
downs in the 156-year history of diplomatic relations.
Essentially, the relationship in Thai eyes was a classic
pi-non relationship, that is, an elder brother-younger
brother relationship with the United States as the pi
and Thailand as the non. It was the pi’s responsibility to
look out for the non, to assist when needed, to protect
and to guide the non. The non’s responsibility was to
be loyal to the pi and to follow the pi’s lead. This pi-
non relationship survived the military dictatorships
in Thailand’s post-war era, the Vietnam War, and
American withdrawal from Southeast Asia and seemed
unshakeable in July 1997.
Earlier in the year there had been “runs” on several
international currencies by hedge fund operators, the
most famous being George Soros’ run on the British
pound which netted him hundreds of millions of
dollars in profit. In July 1997 it became the Thai baht’s
turn to be attacked by currency traders, and it proved
to be the beginning of a cascade of economic troubles
that caused first the Thai baht to crumble, and then the
Thai financial system to crash, and eventually the Thai
economy to come tumbling down. A run on a country’s
currency can be overcome easily if the underlying
fundamentals of the economy are sound. But in
Thailand’s case, the fundamentals were in a shambles
thanks to the crony capitalism and corruption of the
banking and securities sectors.
Thailand became the first of the Asian Tigers to fall,
but it soon had company. Indonesia and then South
Korea followed in Thailand’s footsteps and for many
of the same reasons. When the dust had settled, the
Thai baht went from about 24 to the dollar to about
55 to the dollar. Thousands of workers in the financial
sector were suddenly without a job when their banks
and securities firms closed their doors.
This is essentially an economic story, but it relates
to public diplomacy because at its heart is the pi-non
relationship. When Thailand’s economy crashed,
it looked to the United States for help. But the U.S.
Treasury Department, looking through the framework
of economics, not public diplomacy, looked at Thailand
and saw that it basically got what it deserved for
not having its house in order. The State Department
deferred to the Treasury in all things having to do
with economics and finance. So the United States did
nothing when Thailand’s crash came. Puzzled and
resentful, the Thai saw the United States as abandoning
Thailand, and renouncing the pi-non relationship when
the going got tough.
Newspaper editorials pointed to the United States
as the cause of Thailand’s woes. George Soros and
other western currency traders were vilified, and by
implication Western governments, especially the
United States, were seen as responsible for the collapse
throughout Asia. As if this was not bad enough, the
U.S. Government decided that things were beginning
to get out of hand in Asia and announced that it would
bail out Indonesia and South Korea with billions of
dollars in credit. This was like throwing gasoline on a
fire in Thailand. The Thai media and influential Thais
across the spectrum of society exploded in indignation.
The United States would not help Thailand but would
help Indonesia! Thailand was one of the five U.S. treaty
allies in the Pacific, it was a functioning democracy, it
was a loyal U.S. ally, and took its lead from the United
States. Indonesia was none of these things—not a
treaty ally nor even an informal ally, a dictatorship not
a democracy; and Indonesia, more often than not, was
at odds with the United States.
A major financial decision had been made in
Washington without input from two important
sources—first, there was no consultation with regard
to the public diplomacy dimension of this decision in
any of the countries affected, and, second, there was
no consultation with the Embassy in Bangkok which
actually understood the situation in Thailand. Even
before this unfortunate decision was made, the PAO
had outlined a series of public diplomacy strategic and
tactical measures to explain U.S. policy to the Thai and
limit the damage to the relationship. Following the
announcement about aid for Indonesia, Ambassador
William Itoh and the Country Team met to develop an
overall strategy to cope with this near rupture of the
relationship.
Public diplomacy was a central part of the strategy,
which also included convincing State and Treasury to
reverse course and provide an aid package for Thailand
at least proportional to the aid package proposed for
other countries. DoD was called upon through the
Defense Attaché’s Office and the Joint U.S. Military
Assistance Group to cancel an outstanding contract for
F-16 aircraft and parts which would free up hundreds
of millions of dollars for the Thai Government.
The U.S. Information Service’s public diplomacy
strategy focused on several fronts. Because of the crash
of the Thai economy and currency, many of the 8,000
Thai students in American higher education were
suddenly without the financial means to continue
their education. For the United States, this meant well-
publicized and immediate assistance from public and
private sector sources to provide work-study and
loan opportunities for Thai and other Asian students,
and the Institute for International Education and
American higher educational institutions took the
lead. In addition, the Public Affairs Section proposed
to Washington that a special high profile scholarship
program be established for 156 students selected
by the Thai Government to attend U.S. universities
for 3 years. The 156 was linked to the 156 years of
diplomatic relations between the two countries, and
the total funding for the scholarship program provided
through Economic Assistance Funds and administered
by AID came to about $3 million. This is a tiny sum
when compared to the $4 billion in loan guarantees
provided to Thailand or the nearly $1 billion in debt
cancelled by recalling the F-16 contract, but because it
involved people, not hardware or loans, it registered
with the Thai public as real help from America. Other
smaller exchange programs were augmented too, like
the Fulbright Program and other government-funded
internships; but the 156 scholarships made the biggest
headlines.
Determined to demonstrate that the United States
was interested in Thailand, the Embassy encouraged
as many high level visitors as possible to visit Bangkok.
For its part, the U.S. Information Service used each
of these cabinet level or equivalent visits to get the
message out that the United States was interested in
Thailand and would do whatever it could to ease the
burden during a difficult economic time. Every high
level visitor held a press conference and interviews with
Thai media, made highly visible public appearances,
and consistently expressed the deep concern of the
United States for Thailand and the Thai people. It was
a rare week in 1998 when a U.S. cabinet-level official,
congressional delegation, or senior military officer
did not visit Thailand with a full public diplomacy
program.
Recognizing that there was a reservoir of good will
in Thailand built up over many years and reinforced by
the visit by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1996, another
key component of the public diplomacy strategy focused
on reaching out to the gatekeepers of information and
the “influencers” in the society to make the case for the
United States. The PAO arranged a series of lunches
with key editorial boards and influential columnists
to provide them with briefings on the complexities of
international finance and currency speculation. U.S.
Ambassador William Itoh, the fluent Thai-speaking
Deputy Chief of Mission Ralph Boyce, the Embassy’s
entire economic reporting section, and public
diplomacy officers were all mobilized to this effort. In
the end, it was Thai columnists, commentators, and
editorial writers who put the Asian financial debacle
in context and into the proper perspective for their
readers, listeners, and viewers.
The United States emerged not as the villain it
appeared to be when it ignored Thailand’s crisis but
rather as the prime mover in rectifying a corrupt
and mismanaged financial system in Thailand and
in other Asian countries. This was seen as an act of
responsibility worthy of the pi. Ironically, despite their
own best efforts in aiding Thailand, it was Japan that
was blamed for the instability in the Asian financial
world because it continually postponed reforms to its
own banking and financial sector. In opinion polling
following the resolution of the financial crisis, the U.S.
favorability level was nearly identical with the high
mark it had reached immediately after the Clinton visit
in 1996.
With this background on the reality of public
diplomacy as it works in the field, we can return to
the more complex battles for control of strategic
information within the Washington bureaucracy and
the National Security Council system.
THE NSC AND INFORMATION
The NSC system evolved into the principal arm
of the president in forming and executing military,
international, and internal security polices in the
Eisenhower administration.14 President Eisenhower
was more comfortable with the NSC concept than was
Truman, and he created a highly structured system of
integrated policy review based on the Cutler Report.
This system was described as the “policy hill” process
wherein drafts from the agencies moved up from
the agency level through an NSC Planning Board
for review and refinement before reaching the NSC
for consideration. At that time, the NSC consisted of
five statutory members: the President, Vice President,
Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of
the Office of Defense Mobilization. Depending on the
subject matter for discussion, other Cabinet members
and advisors including the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Director of Central Intelligence would participate.
The President’s Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs was a facilitator of the decision making system,
oversaw the recommendations coming up and down
“the hill,” and briefed and summarized discussions but
unlike National Security Advisors from the Kennedy
administration to the present, had no substantive role
in the process.
President Eisenhower created the Operations and
Coordinating Board (OCB) to make sure that decisions
taken by the NSC were followed-up. Meeting weekly
at the Department of State, the OCB was composed of
the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs (chair),
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Directors of the
CIA and the new U.S. Information Agency, Special
Assistants to the President for National Security
Affairs and Security Operations Coordination. Some
40 interagency working groups reported to the OCB
which had its own staff of 24 to support the working
groups.15
The Eisenhower NSC provided regular, fully-
staffed, interagency reviews of major national security
issues which resulted in decisions at the highest level.
Eisenhower himself was fully committed to the process
and chaired 329 of the 366 NSC meetings that took
place in his 8 years as President. While the NSC was in
charge of the policy review process, the Department of
State continued to exercise, under the strong hand of
Secretary John Foster Dulles, full control over the day-
to-day operations of foreign policy.16
The Eisenhower NSC system was sharply
criticized, however, notably in the hearings conducted
in 1960-61 by the Senate Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery (aka the Jackson Subcommittee),
for being inflexible, overstaffed, unable to anticipate
and react to immediate crises, and weighed down by
committees. President Kennedy strongly agreed with
the Jackson Subcommittee critique and immediately
moved to cut the NSC staff and to simplify the foreign
policymaking process, making it more intimate. The
OCB was abolished, and the NSC no longer was
required to monitor the implementation of policies.
President Kennedy also installed McGeorge Bundy as
the National Security Advisor, and the responsibilities
and authorities of the NSC Advisor grew throughout
the Kennedy years.17
In the realm of strategic information, this redefin-
ition of the NSC and the abolition of the OCB took the
wind out of the sails of the new Director of the USIA,
the renowned CBS radio and TV newsman Edward R.
Murrow, who expected to wield considerable influence
in the new administration. Murrow was unaware of the
future diminished role of the NSC when he accepted
the USIA position and was soon outflanked by some of
his own subordinates with strong personal ties to the
White House.18
Murrow found himself and his agency marginalized
despite the fact that he was often invited to attend NSC
meetings. The real decisionmaking lay elsewhere,
leaving Murrow more visible but less influential that
his predecessors under Eisenhower.
The NSC met less and less frequently and some of
its activities were taken up by a more select body, the
“Standing Group.” By April 1963 the Standing Group
was reconstituted with McGeorge Bundy as its chair-
man and a membership that included the Under-
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the
JCS, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Director
of USIA, and the Administrator of AID.19 Strategic
communications, in the form of USIA, was back at the
table at least at the operational level, but it was too late
for the seriously ill Murrow, and the Kennedy years
were nearing an end.
Lyndon Johnson had even less faith in the NSC
process than his predecessor. He considered the NSC
to be a “leaky sieve” and preferred small intimate
groups for decisionmaking. Johnson’s relationship with
USIA and military information operations—and thus
with strategic information—was defined and shaped
almost entirely by the Vietnam War. Illustrative of the
widened role for strategic information due to the war
was Johnson’s National Security Action Memorandum,
No. 32520 which responded to the USIA Director’s
suggestions for an information strategy in Vietnam. It
reads in part:
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 325
TO: THE DIRECTOR, U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY
1. I have reviewed your memorandum of March 16 on the
informational and psychological warfare programs in South
Vietnam. With the exception noted in paragraph 5 [regarding Viet
Cong defectors], I hereby give my general approval to the rapid
and effective execution of the improvements you propose. This
approval is subject to review and concurrence by Ambassador
[Maxwell] Taylor . . . .
2. By copy of this memorandum I request the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and
the Administrator of the Agency for International Development
to give all possible support to an intensified information and
psychological warfare program along the lines developed in your
report.
3. By copy of this memorandum, I request the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget to review with you and as necessary with
other agencies the financial implications of such an intensified
program and to make his recommendation to me as to the best
way of meeting any additional costs.
4. Meanwhile you are directed to proceed with all necessary
actions on the firm understanding that it is my fixed policy that
any worthwhile undertaking shall not be inhibited or delayed
in any way by financial restrictions. We can and will find the
resources we need for all good programs in Vietnam. [Emphasis
added]
Rarely does the strategic information function find
itself in such an enviable position with the implication
at least that there is a blank check for information and
psychological operations.
The Richard Nixon National Security Council
process was so dominated by Henry Kissinger, first
as National Security Advisor, then as the dual-hatted
NSC Advisor and Secretary of State, that strategic
communication was a top-down decision no less
than any other, and all decisions were made without
reference to the NSC process.21 The administration paid
less and less attention to overseas strategic information
and more and more attention to domestic information
management as the Watergate crisis mounted.
The Ford administration brought Kissinger’s deputy
Brent Scowcroft in to replace him as NSC Advisor,
bowing to congressional disapproval of having so
much foreign policy power in the hands of a single
individual. Kissinger continued as Secretary of State,
and Scowcroft managed a cordial relationship with
his former boss while instituting a more low-key NSC
coordination role.22 Strategic communication drifted as
though on auto-pilot.
INFORMATION BECOMES COMMUNICATION
President Jimmy Carter entered office with no
particular design for strategic information but with
the plan to merge the State Department’s Cultural
Exchanges Bureau (CU) into USIA and to soften the
hard edge of “information” in the process.23 Carter
eliminated the word “information” from the foreign
policy lexicon and replaced it with “communication.”
Thus, the USIA was augmented by the addition
of a reluctant partner (CU) to form the Educational
and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the newly named
International Communication Agency or USICA.
USIA, the propaganda agency, was no more. But in
field operations overseas, the USICA looked too much
like the USCIA for many people, an unfortunate error
of judgment on Washington’s part that caused no
end of irritation for those implementing information,
cultural, and educational programs at U.S. embassies
and consulates overseas.
Jimmy Carter came into office determined to
eliminate the abuses of the NSC system under
Kissinger, and envisaged the role of the NSC to be
one of policy coordination and research. The structure
of the NSC was changed to ensure that the NSC
Advisor would be but one of many advisors. Carter
also reduced the staff by 50 percent, and reduced the
number of standing committees from eight to two: a
Policy Review Committee (PRC) usually chaired by
a department, most often the State Department and
the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), always
chaired by the NSC Advisor.24
The Carter NSC has been criticized for failing to
monitor implementation of the President’s policies.
In addition, because there were no clearly developed
foreign policy principles other than arms control (the
prerogative of the SCC), the President frequently
changed his mind depending on who offered advice last.
Carter’s informality complicated the decision making
process. Often no formal records of decisions were
made, leading to indecision and embarrassment.25
As an example of the scant regard the Carter
administration had for strategic information, when the
new President’s U.S. National Strategy was formulated
and disseminated, not so much as a carbon copy of the
document ever reached the USICA, but copies did go,
in addition to the Vice President and the Secretaries
of State and Defense, to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, the Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central
Intelligence. The Top Secret Presidential Directive/
NSC-18 set out the foreign policy priorities of the nation
and the means to achieve them.26 An examination of
the now mainly unclassified document [passages
relating to military strategy, policy, and practices are
still redacted] reveals that among the means to achieve
U.S. foreign policy priorities, there is no mention of
any method of strategic information overt or covert,
civilian or military. For Carter, strategic information
just did not exist—after all, he had eliminated the word
from the foreign policy lexicon in 1978.
ZENITH OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
If there is any certainty in the ways of Washington,
it is that the pendulum always swings back. And
the pendulum on strategic information swung back
dramatically with the beginning of the presidency
of Ronald Reagan. It is no exaggeration to state that
the Reagan administration was the zenith of strategic
communication. Reagan, “the great communicator”
himself, knew the business of persuasion very well
indeed. He chose as his Director of the USICA—hastily
renamed the U.S. Information Agency—Charles Z.
Wick, a close Hollywood confident and family friend
with constant and instant access to the President.27
A series of National Security Decision Directives
increased and institutionalized the access, the power,
and the scope of Wick’s agency and brought public
diplomacy not only to the table of the NSC but to the
very center of the foreign policy process. Five key NSC
documents trace the growth of strategic information
within the Reagan administration. They are NSDD 77,
NSDD 130, NSDD 186, NSDD 266, and NSDD 276. All
five of the key documents have been declassified and
are available through the Reagan Library, Simi Valley,
California.28
In National Security Decision Directive Number 77
entitled “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative
to National Security,”29 the President states: “I have
determined that it is necessary to strengthen the
organization, planning, and coordination of the various
aspects of public diplomacy of the U.S. Government
relative to national security.” NSDD 77 established a
Special Planning Group (SPG) of the NSC under the
chairmanship of the NSC Advisor and consisting of
the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of
the USIA, the Director of AID and the Assistant to the
President for Communications. The role of the SPG was
“to be responsible for the overall planning, direction,
coordination, and monitoring of implementation of
public diplomacy activities.”30
Four interagency standing committees reporting to
the SPG were established by NSDD 77. The committees
would receive support from the NSC staff and periodic
guidance from the SPG which would review their
activities for proper implementation of policy and to
determine resource priorities. The committees were:
• The Public Affairs Committee: Co-chaired by the
Assistant to the President for Communications
and the Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. The committee was
responsible for planning and coordinating U.S.
Government public affairs activities relative
to national security, e.g., major speeches on
national security and public appearances by
senior officials.
• The International Information Committee: Chaired
by a senior representative of USIA; vice
chaired by a senior representative of the State
Department. The committee was responsible
for planning, coordinating, and implementing
international information activities in support
of U.S. policies and interests. The committee also
was empowered to make recommendations and,
as appropriate, direct the concerned agencies,
interagency groups, and working groups with
respect to information strategies in key policy
areas.
• The International Political Committee: Chaired by a
senior representative of the Department of State;
vice-chaired by a senior representative of USIA.
The committee was responsible for planning,
coordinating, and implementing international
political activities in support of U.S. policies
and interests, including aid, training, and
organizational support for foreign governments
and private groups to encourage the growth of
democratic political institutions and practices.
• The International Broadcasting Committee:
Chaired by a representative of the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. The
committee was responsible for the planning
and coordination of international broadcasting
activities sponsored by the U. S. Government.
The next major addition to the institutional build-
up of strategic information came with National
Security Decision Directive Number 130, “U.S.
International Information Policy.” The Directive31
calls international information an integral and vital
part of U.S. national security policy and strategy and,
along with other elements of public diplomacy, a key
strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political
and ideological trends. NSDD 130 cites a need for
sustained commitment to improving the quality and
effectiveness of U.S. international information efforts,
the level of resources devoted to them, and their
coordination with other elements of national security
policy and strategy. Of interest, the document also
calls for a greater role for international information
considerations in formulating policies.
The document addresses in some detail an
international information strategy, including
international radio broadcasting; other international
information instruments such as publications, new
technologies, cooperation with the private sector,
overcoming barriers to communication; strategically
targeted information and communications assistance
to other nations; psychological factors in maintaining
the confidence of allied governments and in deterring
military action; and the capability by the armed forces
to have an immediate and effective use of psychological
operations in crisis and in wartime. Revitalization and
full integration of psychological operations in military
operations is declared to be an important priority for
DoD. The NSDD concludes with a series of functional
requirements related to international information
and the approval of the establishment of the Foreign
Opinion Research Advisory Group. In National
Security Decision Directive 223, “Implementing the
Geneva Exchanges Initiative,” the “softer side” of
public diplomacy became the subject of presidential
attention. This directive,32 following on the heels of the
Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Meeting in Geneva in 1986
and the Geneva Exchanges Initiative, was aimed at
enhancing bilateral cooperation at all levels; including
through educational and student exchanges, people-to-
people programs, media, and information exchanges,
and consultations.
The President noted that he attached “high
priority to the exchanges initiative” and requested all
relevant U.S. Government agencies to give it a high
priority also and “to render every possible assistance
to implementation.” A new Interagency Group on
the President’s Geneva Exchanges Initiatives was
established, chaired by the NSC Senior Director for
European and Soviet Affairs. A new Office of the
Coordinator for the President’s U.S.-Soviet Exchanges
Initiative was established at USIA to work with USIA
and other agencies and the private sector to develop
programs in the agreed areas and work on new
initiatives. The remainder of the NSDD 223 detailed
the duties and responsibilities of the coordinator and
his relationship to existing offices and programs.
THE SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD
The President’s Special Review Board (or the
Tower Board chaired by Senator John Tower)
submitted its Report to the President on February 26,
1987. In a nationwide address on March 4, President
Reagan announced that he endorsed the Board’s
recommendations and intended to go beyond them in
rebuilding the NSC process to repair the damage done
by the Iran-Contra Affair.
NSDD 266 details specific steps in implementing the
Board’s recommendation and other reforms.33 Much
of the document goes beyond the scope of the current
discussion and addresses the statutory responsibilities
and membership of the NSC in some detail. The
document must be seen in the perspective of the Iran-
Contra hearings and the revelation of covert activities
undertaken by staff of the NSC. Much of the document
addresses these issues. From the perspective of strategic
information, however, the following passage in Section
I. A., “Organizing for National Security,” is relevant:
The Directors of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and United States Information
Agency are special statutory advisors to the NSC.
The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency shall be the principal advisor to the President,
the Secretary of State and the NSC on arms control and
disarmament matters. The Director of the United States
Information Agency shall be the principal advisor to
the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on
international informational, educational, and cultural
matters. [Emphasis added]
The Directive goes on to spell out in detail the role
of the National Security Advisor, the NSC staff, the
NSC and the Interagency Process, including meetings,
the process, covert action, use of nongovernment
personnel, the intelligence process, and reporting.
Among the directives is a prohibition on conduct of
covert activities by NSC staff.
Continuing the damage control from the Iran-
Contra Scandal, NSDD 27634 provides additional
detailed guidance on the “National Security Council
Interagency Process.” The President defines five
groupings within the NSC process, defines their
authority, membership, and prerogatives. The five are:
(1) National Security Council, (2) National Security
Planning Group (NSPG), (3) Senior Review Group
(SRG), (4) The Policy Review Group (PRG), and (5)
Other Interagency Groups. According to NSDD 276:
Within their respective areas of authority as set forth
in NSDD 266, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and
the Director of the USIA may approve the continuation of
existing senior interagency groups to the extent necessary
or desirable to promote an effective NSC process; by June
30, 1987, the National Security Advisor shall be notified
of those interagency groups they have determined shall
continue to function.35
THE POST COLD WAR CHILL
In contrast to the Reagan years, President George
H. W. Bush’s NSC held itself aloof from strategic
communication. Unlike the rare Reagan-Wick personal
relationship, the President’s relationships with USIA
Director Gelb and later with Director Henry Catto were
more in the norm and not based on long-term family
friendships but on political relationships, and as such,
were more distant. Charles Wick was the last USIA
Director to enjoy instant access to the President.36
With a strong background in international affairs,
CIA Director, UN Ambassador, Ambassador to China,
and 8 years as Vice President, George H. W. Bush made
wholesale changes to the NSC, even following the
reforms in 1987.37 President Bush’s NSD-138 provided a
new charter for the NSC, the Policy Review Group was
enlarged to a Committee, the Deputy National Security
Advisor named as chair of the Deputies Committee
and a Principals Committee screened matters for the
NSC. Eight Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs)
were formed to absorb regional and functional
responsibilities.
Public Diplomacy was not shut out of the NSC
process as it had been under President Jimmy Carter
or marginalized to a lesser extent as in the Kennedy,
Johnson, and Nixon administrations, but in contrast
to the Eisenhower years, and especially the Reagan
administration, the influence of strategic information
was weak.39
A blow to USIA came with the unexpected and
sudden dissolution of the USSR in 1991 after releasing its
grip on the Warsaw Pact with the end of the Berlin Wall
and the beginning of the Velvet Revolution in Prague.
The absence of “an enemy” created the absence of the
long-time rationale for American public diplomacy,
especially the robust public diplomacy of the Cold War
era. The George H. W. Bush administration decided to
take a “peace dividend” and cut the USIA budget in
each succeeding year.40
This lack of enthusiasm for public diplomacy was
adhered to and expanded upon by the new President.
The Clinton administration preserved some key public
diplomacy programs, notably the Fulbright Academic
Exchanges in a kind of posthumous salute to Bill
Clinton’s mentor and fellow Rhoads Scholar, Senator
J. William Fulbright. But the Clinton administration
continued the sharp cuts to the overall public diplomacy
budget, especially in international information
programs which suffered near catastrophic declines.41
By the beginning of the second Clinton term, the
indications that USIA’s days were numbered grew more
obvious. In 1998, there was an Executive-Legislative
agreement to “merge” USIA (and originally also
USAID) into the Department of State. The ostensible
rationale was that this would not only save money but
would bring public diplomacy closer to the center of
foreign policy formulation. In truth, the accommodation
worked out between Secretary Madeleine Albright
and Senator Jesse Helms was a compromise to achieve
funding for the current U.S. contribution and previous
year’s arrears to the United Nations (UN).
The Clinton administration gained funding,
including the significant backlog in funding for the U.S.
contribution to the UN. In return, Senator Helms was
to have his long time wish fulfilled—the emasculation
of USAID‘s independence and influence in Congress
by being placed within the Department of State. USIA’s
dismemberment was simply a bonus. In the negotiations
that followed, USAID escaped confinement within
State and emerged a weakened but still independent
voice in the foreign policy establishment, but USIA,
already weakened by years of budget cuts after the Cold
War, was extinguished as an entity. (See the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. Public
Law 105-277.) On October 1, 1999, the Agency’s public
diplomacy personnel and functions were scattered
throughout the State Department bureaucracy, and
its largest component was shorn away entirely as the
Voice of America and the other broadcasting entities
were placed with the independent Broadcasting Board
of Governors (BBG).42
It takes no great imagination to realize that the
dismantling of the USIA, the dissolution of its personnel
and functions with the State Department bureaucracy,
and the creation of a BBG responsible to no one (not
the Secretary of State, not even the President) is a
compound and nearly fatal blow to the ability of the
United States to project a global information strategy.
We now examine the present situation in the years
following the reorganization of the foreign affairs
agencies and what future role that strategic information
may have in the National Security Council process.
AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS AND REINVENTING
THE WHEEL
In the waning days of the existence of the USIA,
the Clinton National Security Council on April 30,
1999, issued a still classified Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 68 on International Public Information.
The directive, according to published media reports at
the time and the website of the Federation of American
Scientists, was issued to “address problems identified
during military missions in Kosovo and Haiti, when
no single U.S. agency was empowered to coordinate
U.S. efforts to sell its policies and to counteract bad
press abroad.”43 In addition, with the soon-to-be-
accomplished “merger” of USIA into the Department
of State, the existing NSC Directive, NSDD 77 issued
in the Reagan administration would be inoperative,
and PDD-68 was seen as a replacement for the Reagan
document.
Senior officials of the Departments of State and
Defense, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury, the CIA and
the FBI, according to public sources, were designated
as members of the International Public Information
(IPI) Core Group. The Core Group was to be chaired by
the soon-to-be-created position of Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the State Depart-
ment. The IPI Core Group was to “assist efforts in de-
feating adversaries.” The U.S. intelligence community
would “play a crucial role . . . for identifying hostile
foreign propaganda and deception that targets the
U.S.” In addition, again according to public reports,
the IPI was designed to “influence foreign audiences”
in support of U.S. foreign policy and to counteract
propaganda by enemies of the United States.
Reportedly, the IPI Core Group Charter stated that:
• IPI control over “international military
information” was intended to “influence the
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals.”
• “The objective of IPI is to synchronize the
informational objectives, themes, and messages
that will be projected overseas . . . to prevent
and mitigate crises and to influence foreign
audiences in ways favorable to the achievement
of U.S. foreign policy objectives.”
• Information distributed through IPI should be
designed not “to mislead foreign audiences” and
that information programs “must be truthful.”
• [Regarding the likelihood that foreign media
reports are reflected in American media,
information aimed at domestic audiences
should] “be coordinated, integrated, decon-
flicted and synchronized with the [IPI Core
Group] to achieve a synergistic effect for
strategic information activities.”44
One might term PDD 68 merely “reinventing the
wheel” but because the existing mechanism (NSDD-
77) was being “deconstructed” along with the USIA,
some means to coordinate strategic information had to
be found.
The PDD 68 system likely might have worked had
it become operational. However, because the incoming
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs, Evelyn Lieberman, was reluctant to sit down at
the same table with the intelligence community, only
one meeting of the IPI Core Group occurred during
the Clinton administration. It was left to working level
bureaucrats to attempt to coordinate their international
information activities in the absence of leadership from
above.
A NEW DIRECTION
The George W. Bush administration’s first National
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-1) organized the
NSC process to the desires of the new administration.
NSPD-1 replaced the system of Presidential Decision
Directive and Presidential Review Directives as an
instrument for communicating presidential decisions
about national security policies. The document listed
the NSC attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory),
the role of the Vice President presiding in the absence
of the President, the strong agenda determining role
of the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and the NSC’s relationship with the National
Economic Council (NEC). The directive also continued
the role of the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC)
and the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC). NSPD-1
further set out the organization of the NSC process as
follows:
Management of the development and implementation
of national security policies by multiple agencies of the
United States Government shall usually be accomplished
by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/
PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day to day
fora for interagency coordination of national security
policy.45
Six regional NSC/PCCs, chaired by an official of Under
Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank as designated by
the Secretary of State, were established. In addition,
“topical” or functional NSC/PCCs were established as
follows:
• Democracy, Human Rights and International
Operations
• International Development and Humanitarian
Assistance
• Global Environment
• International Finance
• Transnational Economic Issues
• Counterterrorism and National Preparedness
• Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and
Planning
• Arms Control
• Proliferation, Counter proliferation, and
Homeland Defense
• Intelligence and Counterintelligence
• Records Access and Information Security
There was no NSC/PCC designated for Strategic
Information, Public Diplomacy, or Foreign Information
Activities. The closest approximation was in the PCC
on Democracy, Human Rights, and International
Operations. NSPD 1 also abolished by March 1, 2001,
the existing system of Interagency Working Groups and
other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies,
and executive committees, except for those established
by statute.46 Of immediate practical concern in the
field of strategic information, the IPI Core Group was
among the casualties, and no replacement organization
or group was named. Strategic Information or Public
Diplomacy did not appear to be a high priority in the
early days of the new administration.
Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11), the Bush administration found itself in need
of a strategic information policy and a structure to
deal with the acknowledged crisis in American public
diplomacy. There was a general recognition that in
the absence of an agency like the USIA, there was no
central focus for public diplomacy, and the record of
the State Department in public diplomacy since the
“anschluss” which brought USIA into the Department
was generally recognized to have been a failure.47
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS
The solution might have been to resurrect the USIA
or create a similar agency either within or outside the
State Department as a number of reports and studies
recommended.48 Instead, the White House called forth
a White House solution by creating a new White House
Office of Global Communications (OGC) headed by
a Deputy Assistant to the President. According to
the Executive Order setting up the Office, the OGC’s
mission was
to advise the President, the heads of appropriate offices
within the Executive Office of the President and the heads
of executive departments and agencies on utilization of the
most effective means for the U.S. Government to ensure
consistency in messages that will promote the interests
of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding,
build support for and among coalition partners of the
United States, and inform international audiences.49
Among the functions of the new Office were:
• assessment of methods and strategies (except
for “special activities,” i.e., covert operations) to
deliver information to audiences abroad;
• development of a strategy for disseminating
truthful, accurate and effective messages about
the United States, its government and policies,
and the American people and culture;
• coordination of the creation of temporary teams
of communicators for short-term placement in
areas of high global interest and media attention
(however no team could be deployed without
prior consultation with the Departments of
State and Defense and prior notification to the
NSC Advisor);
• encouragement of the use of state of the art
media and technology.
While on the surface, the Office of Global Communica-
tion appeared to be a solution of sorts for the lack of direc-
tion and leadership in the strategic communication/
public affairs arena, there were built-in flaws in the
system that would prevent the OGC from being very
effective in any of its functions. Chief among these
flaws was that the OGC was outside the NSC process
and the interagency system. The Executive Order itself
stated that “nothing in this order shall be construed to
impair or otherwise affect any function assigned by law
or by the President to the National Security Council or
to the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.” Further, the Executive Order noted that it
did not alter “existing authorities of any agency.”50
Given the inherent weaknesses in the structure and
authorities of the Office of Global Communications, it
surprised few observers to note the steady decline in
the OGC’s relevance and its eventual and unheralded
disappearance from the White House organization
chart in 2005.
FUSION
Just as in the Clinton administration, for most of the
Bush administration a rough form of coordination and
cooperation among working level professionals from
the public diplomacy bureaus of the State Department
and elements of DoD, USAID, and other agencies held
the threads together while waiting for senior leaders to
decide what form an international information strategy
would take. The so-called “Fusion Team” which meets
in State Annex 44 (the former USIA Headquarters
Building) is the best example of keeping this flame alive.
While the Fusion Team has an important function no
doubt, it is no substitute for a top to bottom interagency
process on strategic information which has not been
evident since the end of the Reagan administration.
WHO’S IN CHARGE?
The Department of State inherited public
diplomacy from the USIA and would be expected to
lead the effort on strategic information. Regrettably,
for numerous reasons outlined in the nearly 30
reports and recommendations by public and private
organizations designed to rescue public diplomacy
from its current nadir, this State Department leadership
did not materialize.51 Without going into the details of
systemic failure to utilize properly the resources of
public diplomacy inherited by the Department in this
venue, one can point to the lack of long-term, unified,
and consistent leadership over public diplomacy as
one major cause.
A succession of short-term leaders has presided
over public diplomacy in the Department of State since
October 1999. Under Secretary Evelyn Lieberman’s
largely ineffective tenure ended with the Republican
victory in 2000. After a lengthy transition, advertising
executive Charlotte Beers was sworn in only a few
weeks after 9/11. Her tenure was tortured and brief,
and when she departed “for personal reasons,” she
was succeeded by an interim replacement, Assistant
Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Patricia
Harrison, until the administration was able to convince
Ambassador to Morocco Margaret Tutweiler to take
up the challenge. Within a few months, Tutweiler, who
arrived stating that she would stay only for a short
time, left for Wall Street and was replaced again on an
interim basis by Harrison. In a surprise appointment,
President Bush announced that his close confidant and
communications advisor, Karen Hughes, would take
up the post of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs, but the new appointment would
not be taken up for nearly 5 months due to family
commitments. Even under the best of circumstances,
with this kind of revolving door in leadership, it is
hard to imagine an effective public diplomacy strategy
being undertaken.
To Ms. Hughes’ credit, she and her Deputy, Dina
Powell, “hit the ground running” with a series of
outreach encounters and listening tours at home and
abroad. Hughes appeared to recognize the most serious
flaw in the foreign affairs reorganization of 1998-99, i.e.,
that there is no unity of command or central authority
over public diplomacy in the Department of State. If
anything, there is even less unity in the interagency
process regarding strategic communication. Input
over assignments, resources, and administrative issues
can lead to input over policy and strategy, but in the
absence of any influence over officers in the field, an
Under Secretary is powerless to manage the program
responsibilities, and public diplomacy is a program-
intensive function. A number of alleged “fixes” were
made in the Department to strengthen Hughes’
position within the bureaucracy, including assigning
one regional deputy assistant secretary in each regional
bureau to be in charge of public diplomacy and
giving (in theory at least) the Under Secretary shared
line authority over that position with the regional
assistant secretary. Evaluation, budgeting, and other
administrative functions for State Department public
diplomacy bureaus and offices reported to the Under
Secretary rather than to individual bureau heads,
thanks to Hughes’ insistence.
Other minor measures could be taken within
the authority of the Department to centralize the
Under Secretary’s role in public diplomacy. Still, as
numerous outside reports point out, only so much can
be done within the existing flawed structure. Hughes
apparently came to realize this and departed for the
greener pastures of the private sector in 2008. After a
lengthy Senate hold on his nomination, a new Under
Secretary, James Glassman, was sworn in with only a
few months left in the Bush administration. Glassman,
formerly with the BBG, has a keen understanding of
public diplomacy and has made an impressive start in
what is surely a lame duck role. There is little time for
the kind of dramatic change that is required to revitalize
public diplomacy no matter how valiant the effort on
Glassman’s part. Eventually perhaps, Congress will
tire of a band-aid approach to fixing public diplomacy
and decide to undo or redo the reorganization of the
foreign affairs agencies so badly botched in 1998-99. In
the meantime, America’s strategic information may be
neither strategic nor very informative.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
The 2005 report by the Public Diplomacy Council,
A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy, made the case that
it may be impossible to turn back the clock and recreate
the independent USIA, complete with responsibility
over international civilian broadcasting. The Council
called instead for a semi-independent agency lodged
within the State Department but with a unified chain of
command and control over overseas public diplomacy
operations.52 This would eliminate the serious flaw
which plagues the Under Secretary and would result
in a much improved performance. With the change
of administrations in Washington, however, there
may exist a brief period during which a reenergized
and independent agency for public diplomacy could
be created and be well-integrated into the national
security process as it was in the Reagan and Eisenhower
administrations.
Importantly, the crucial role of localized public
diplomacy must be recognized. Public diplomacy must
return to its “field-driven” roots, and public diplomacy
officers in the field must have greater latitude to create
strategies within the context of the societies and cultures
in which they operate. This presupposes that adequate
resources, too, must be directed to overseas operations
and the increased staffing required. The cleverest
strategy will fail if there are too few personnel and
financial resources available for its implementation.
It is critical to realize, as several studies have pointed
out in recent years, that the Department of State is
not the only important actor in public diplomacy or
strategic information in the U.S. Government.53 In order
to coordinate and manage the breadth of international
information and exchange programs conducted by any
new agency, State, Defense, USAID, and the more than
60 offices, bureaus, and executive departments that
already report international exchanges, training, or
information programs, the NSC or interagency process
on strategic information must be reconstituted. Indeed,
nearly half of all of the reports and studies on public
diplomacy undertaken in the past 3 years have pointed
to interagency coordination as a serious problem
that must be addressed.54 Solutions vary and include
structures within the NSC and outside it, but there is
broad agreement that the current interagency process
requires strengthening.
Based on the history of American experimentation
with strategic information in the NSC process, there
are two periods which emerge as worthy exemplars—
the Eisenhower administration and the Reagan
administration. Both administrations had elaborate,
and perhaps to some overly bureaucratized, systems of
advice, analysis, monitoring, and execution of strategic
information programs at multiple levels from the
working level to the senior leader level. Yet, for the most
part, they worked, and for that reason alone are worth
a careful look. The criticisms of both the Eisenhower
and the Reagan NSC processes over the passage of time
seem to be not very cogent. Eisenhower’s NSC process
was not too slow and unwieldy, and if it proved to
be so—as in a period of crisis—it was by-passed. The
Reagan NSC system is too often seen through the
prism of the Iran-Contra Affair; that situation was an
aberration, not the norm, and the reforms instituted by
the Tower Board set the system straight.
The conclusion is inescapable. Congress and the
Executive should relook at the organization of public
diplomacy/strategic communication and alter the
current flawed design to create unity of command and
clear lines of authority whether that is in a separate
agency, an agency within the State Department,
or some third variant. Because “localized public
diplomacy” has been shown to be more effective than
world-wide strategies designed inside the Beltway,
public diplomacy should be field-driven. In addition,
the Executive Branch should return to a more elaborate
and tested formula for an interagency process that
worked in both the Eisenhower and the Reagan NSCs.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8
1. Public Diplomacy Council, A Call for Action on Public
Diplomacy: A Report of the Public Diplomacy Council, 2nd ed.,
Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, 2005.
2. Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural
Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, Dulles, VA: Potomac Books,
2005; Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign
Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950, New York: Foreign Policy
Association, 1981.
3. Arndt; Wilson Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: the
Story of the U.S. Information Agency, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2004.
4. Office of the Historian, Department of State, History of the
National Security Council, 1947-1997, Washington, DC: Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State; J. Pike, “National
Security Council (NSC) Truman Administration [1947-1953],“
1999, retrieved February 21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-
hst/index.html.
5. Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS,
and NSC, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
6. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.
7. National Security Council, “NSC-4 Coordination of Foreign
Information Measures,” 1947, retrieved February 21, 2006, from
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-4.html.
8. Ibid.
9. Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for
Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe,
New York: The Free Press, 1989.
10. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.
11. Arndt; Dizard.
12. Department of Political Science, University of California
at Los Angeles, The 187 serially numbered NSC documents
approved during the Eisenhower administration, arranged by
subject, retrieved February 21, 2006, from UCLA Web site www.
polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/DATA/nscjfkl1.gif.
13. For additional details, see William P. Kiehl, Oral History
Interview, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, The Association
for Diplomatic Studies and Training: Arlington, VA, September
15, 2005, pp. 133-160, 165-220, 279-321.
14. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Arndt.
19. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.
20. Lyndon B. Johnson, “National Security Action
Memorandum No. 325,” The White House, 1968, retrieved
February 21, 2006, from LJ Library Web site www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/
johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam.
21. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.
22. Ibid.
23. Arndt; Dizard.
24. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.
25. Ibid.
26. Jimmy Carter, U.S. National Strategy, Presidential
Directive (NSC-18,1977), The White House, retrieved February.
21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd18.pdf.
27. Arndt; Dizard; Frank A. Ninkovich, U.S. Information
Policy and Cultural Diplomacy, Headline Series No. 308, New York:
Foreign Policy Association, 2004.
28. Ronald W. Reagan, “Management of Public Diplomacy
Relative to National Security,” NSDD 77, 1983, retrieved
February 21, 2006, from fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd23-1966t.gif; Ronald
W. Reagan, “US international Information Policy,” NSDD 130,
1984, retrieved February 21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
nsdd/23-2213t.gif; Ronald W. Reagan, “Implementing the Geneva
Exchanges Initiative,” NSDD 223, 1986, retrieved February
21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2781a.gif; Ronald
W. Reagan, “Implementation of the Recommendations of the
President’s Special Review Board,” NSDD 266, 1987a, retrieved
February 21, 2006, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2980a.
gif; Ronald W. Reagan, “National Security Council Interagency
Process,” NSDD 276, 1987b, retrieved February 21, 2006, from
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-3091a.gif.
29. Reagan, NSDD 77, 1983.
30. Ibid.
31. Reagan, NSDD 130, 1984.
32. Reagan, NSDD 223, 1986.
33. Reagan, NSDD 266, 1987a.
34. Reagan, NSDD 276, 1987b.
35. Ibid.
36. Charles Z. Wick, “Letter: Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” e-mail and
attachments to author, December 2004.
37. Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997.
38. George H. W. Bush, “United States Government
International Broadcasting: National Security Directive 51, 1990,”
retrieved February 21, 2006, from The Bush Library, bushlibrary.
tamu.edu/research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2051/0001.pdf.
39. Arndt; Dizard.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. William P. Kiehl, “Can Humpty Dumpty Be Saved?”
American Diplomacy, November 2003, retrieved February 26, 2006,
from www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org.
43. William Clinton, “Presidential Decision Directive, PDD
68,” April 1999, retrieved February 21, 2006 from www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/pdd-68.htm.
44. Ibid.
45. George W. Bush, “NSPD-1: Organization of the National
Security Council,” 2001, retrieved February 21, 2006, from www.
fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd-1.htm.
46. Ibid.
47. For just a few examples of the many reports and studies
which are critical of the current structure and effectiveness of public
diplomacy, see Stephen Johnson, Helle C. Dale, Patrick Cronin,
“Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization,
Coordination, and Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 08-
05-2005, 1875, pp. 1-14; U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Public
Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of
a National Communication Strategy, GAO-05-323, 2005, retrieved
February 21, 2006, from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-323;
U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State
Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, GAO-
03-951, Washington, DC: U.S. GAO, 2003; Kiehl.
48. Susane Epstein and Lisa Mages, Public Diplomacy: a Review
of Past Recommendations, Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, September 2, 2005.
49. George W. Bush, The White House, Executive Order
Establishing the Office of Global Communication, January 21,
2003, retrieved February 26, 2006 from www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/01/20030121-3.html.
50. Ibid.
51. Among the many reports and recommendations are those
contained in Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab
and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic
Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2003; J. H. Brown, “The
Purposes and Cross Purposes of American Public Diplomacy,”
American Diplomacy, September 2002, retrieved February 26, 2006
from www.publicdilomacycouncil.org; Defense Science Board, Report
of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,
Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Epstein and Mages, Bruce
Gregory, “Public Diplomacy, and Strategic Communication:
Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,” American Political
Science Association Conference on International Communication
and Conflict Washington, DC: George Washington University and
Georgetown University, August 31, 2005, pp. 1-46; Johnson, Dale,
Cronin, Jeffrey Jones, “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for
the United States,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 39, pp. 108-114;
Kiehl.
52. Public Diplomacy Council, 2005.
53. Defense Science Board, 2004; Gregory.
54. Epstein and Mages.
WILLIAM P. KIEHL is founding President and Chief
Executive Officer of Public Diplomacy Worldwide.
He has taught diplomacy at the Foreign Service
Institute and was Diplomat in Residence at the U.S.
Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership
as Senior Fellow of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping
Institute. During a career of 33 years Dr. Kiehl served
as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of
State, and in numerous public diplomacy positions
at home and abroad. He has published articles on
public diplomacy and peacekeeping, and edited the
book America’s Dialogue with the World (2007). Dr. Kiehl
holds a Ph.D. in higher education management from
the University of Pennsylvania.
