My PD Blog

The Revolving Door Continues...

2011-05-30T11:28:00.000-07:00

I was recently asked for my comments on the resignation of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale. While I am sure that Ms. McHale tried her best to reinvigorate PD and took some steps in the right direction to attempt to reassert some "command and control" of this function within the State Department, her tenure was only marginally successful.

As long as political appointees continue to stay in office for an average of two years or less, our foreign policy and particularly our public diplomacy efforts will be less than successful. Each new appointee is determined to "reinvent the wheel." By the time they figure out what the problems are and have some sense of what to do they are out the revolving door back to wherever they prefer to be and the next incumbent will start the process all over again.

Multiply this by 1500 senior administration positions and another 1500 staff aides etc. and you have a prescription for inefficiency which plagues every administration. Isn't it time we cut back on the number of non-professionals in diplomacy just as we have in the military? In the 19th century, most officers--including generals--were appointees or simply bought their commissions and the nation paid a high price for such amatuerism. We professionalized the military officer corps in the early 20th century and it is now the most efficient force in the world. Will we ever professionalize the diplomatic service and the senior ranks of the bureaucracy? The president is entitled to have a cabinet that is loyal and politically committed but below the cabinet level and at the ambassadorial level abroad, most advanced countries rely on career professionals to perform these roles.

Cairo 2011. Is It Berlin 1989 or Tashkent 1991.

2011-02-13T14:25:00.000-08:00

I am not an expert on the Middle East but I could not help wondering why so many commentators have likened the events in Cairo 2011 to those in Berlin 1989. The notion that somehow the revolution that is sweeping parts of the Middle East is similar to the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe has gained some traction in much of the media. This is a serious mistake based on superficial knowledge of both the Mideast and Eastern and Central Europe. Any serious study of history will point out the shortcomings in this theory. The underpinnings of democracy in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary for example were far more robust than those in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. The former three nations had previous experience with democracy, elections that actually meant something, and rule of law before communism was imposed on them by a foreign power--the USSR. The countries of North Africa and the Middle East had no such experience. A much better analogy might be the new independent states of the former USSR since they too have a history absent any significant prior democratic experience. And with only one or two exceptions, these countries today have largely non-democratic governments, led mainly by their former communist rulers but under another political label--whether Russia, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan--the communist authoritarian government has merely given way to rule by the same corrupt oligarchy but without the Communist Party ideology. This pattern does not auger well for the future of the new "social revolutionary" states of the Middle East. I hope I am wrong in this analysis and that the social revolutions in places like Cairo will eventually lead to more democratic, representative government. Only time will tell.

IIP Bureau Changes

2011-02-13T14:23:00.000-08:00

IIP Bureau Announces Changes

IIP Bureau Changes--A Comment (originally posted on the PDC Blog)

I recently had an opportunity to talk with IPP Coordinator Dawn McCall about the changes instituted by IIP in response to their recent study or "business review " of the Bureau. Among the many discoveries uncovered by the study was the fact that only six percent of Bureau time was devoted to dialogue with the field. The changes detailed in the IIP Media Release below are an attempt in part to bring field operations back front and center in the IIP Bureau's thinking.

For my part I welcome the changes but must admit that they are woefully late and should have been undertaken a decade or more ago. The looming question of course is, with a freeze on discretionary spending ordered by the President and a Congress more inclined to reduce budgets rather than freeze them, what will happen to the Department of State's budget in 2011 and beyond? And since IIP has not been a particularly high priority for State in the past, will IIP be able to undertake even the most important of these changes? It is more important than ever for public diplomacy to make the case that global engagement, strategic communication or whatever one wishes to call it, is a national security priority and as such should be exempted from the general freeze or recision in budgets that is surely coming.

January 28, 2011

IIP Bureau Announces Changes

To Strengthen Its International Information Programs and Products

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) today announced a series of changes to strengthen its ability to support American foreign policy goals and national security interests through information products and engagement activities.

“There has been a breathtaking revolution in the global communications environment, and we must keep pace with it,” explained IIP Coordinator Dawn McCall. “These changes will enable the Bureau of International Information Programs to quickly and effectively reach out to people around the globe in support of American foreign policy priorities.”

The Bureau of International Information Programs produces programs and products that inform and engage foreign audiences, including print publications, videos, web-based materials, and speaker programs. It employs 280 government personnel in Washington, D.C. and overseas.

“Our bureau is filled with dedicated and innovative women and men,” McCall said, “and we need a contemporary approach that makes the best possible use of their talents. As President Obama said in the State of the Union address, ‘We can’t win the future with a government of the past.’”

McCall explained that the changes were based on a thorough three-month business review that examined every aspect of IIP’s operations, programs, and products. The review included focus groups, site visits to American embassies and consulates abroad, and working groups within IIP. It also encompassed significant changes in how citizens around the world access information and engage with others.

McCall noted that recent trends and new communication channels demand a change in approach. These trends include:

The rapid growth of mobile phone technologies;
The use of multiple devices, and multi-tasking, by youth around the world;
The explosion of social media;
The continued importance of traditional media – television, radio, and print;
English no longer dominates the Web – more than fifty percent of web users speak a native language other than English, and site “stickiness” doubles when a web offering is in the language of the user.

“In today’s crowded communications environment, we cannot expect audiences to come to us,” concluded McCall. “Instead, we must go to where they prefer to be, and think of new ways to engage with them.” She outlined the following changes to achieve IIP’s new objectives:

Re-tool the way that IIP uses the web to more effectively engage with audiences. IIP will transition America.Gov to directly distribute content to the full range of social networks and existing 3rd party sites where audiences actually spend their time, while continuing to create foreign policy-focused content for use at embassy and consulate sites.

“It makes economic and strategic sense to take full advantage of existing web sites and social media platforms where our target audiences already spend their time,” said McCall. “Our focus must shift to proactive tactics instead of passively putting our content on a shelf and expecting them to find it.”

Expanded use of mobile technologies, including SMS programs and Smartphone apps, while ensuring the continued provision of products for such traditional media as print and radio, and for American centers and corners.
More products in foreign languages, supported by a central translation team.
Consolidation of content producers into a content development group to create content in written, digital, video and audio formats.
Creation of a talent management unit to identify and recruit expert Americans as writers, bloggers, and speakers for IIP and American missions;
A new audience research unit, to provide research and analysis on audiences, channels, and use of IIP products.

McCall noted that the changes will be accomplished with IIP’s current budget and number of government employees.

“The Department of State’s 2010 Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy established a clear mission, set of priorities, and guidelines for American public diplomacy,” said Judith A. McHale, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. “These changes to the Bureau of International Information Programs will significantly strengthen IIP’s ability to carry out this critical mission.”

###

Foreign Affairs for the 21st Century

2010-01-21T12:46:00.000-08:00

Foreign Affairs for the 21st Century

Layalina Perspectives, Vol. II Issue 1, January 2010

By William P. Kiehl, Ed. D.

The Past is Prologue

A little more than 60 years ago foresighted American leaders devised a national security structure for the post-World War II 20th Century. In the 1980s, another group of foresighted American leaders devised a way to create a more efficient and effective defense structure for our national security. Additional changes to create a Department of Homeland Security and to coordinate the intelligence community came after 9-11. Now the time has come for the current generation of foresighted American leaders to match these efforts in the realm of foreign affairs.

With the passage of the National Security Act in 1947, the United States positioned itself for the post-WWII world on a new and innovative structure(1). That structure created many of the institutions that still serve us today: The Department of Defense (DoD) merging the War and Navy Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC process of inter-agency consultation and cooperation. By the 1980s it was clear that the service rivalries and bureaucratic infighting in the Defense Department was reducing military effectiveness and wasting enormous sums of money through redundancies and inefficiencies. The solution--the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act--was a masterstroke that over time created "joint-ness", a "purple" or integrated military without destroying the individual services that have served the nation so well over two centuries(2). While no one would deny that there remain huge inefficiencies and waste in this enormous bureaucracy, it is generally considered that DoD is infinitely better positioned for the 21st century than the civilian side of the United States Government.

In the aftermath of the tragedy of 9-11, American leaders searched for the cause of the failure to stop a terrorist attack on American soil and found it in the turf-wars and bureaucratic ossification among our intelligence and law enforcement agencies and many of those entities became today’s Department of Homeland Security (3). The intelligence community too was reorganized and the Director of Central Intelligence function was split from the CIA Directorship(4) with the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It is too soon to tell if these were masterstrokes or merely stages in the evolution of these functions.

A Growing Problem

The only significant part of the national security structure of the U.S. Government that has not changed in any serious way is that of foreign affairs. With the ill-served consolidation of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the Department of State and the weakening of the Agency for International Development (USAID) as a viable voice in foreign policy debate, the Department of State emerged from the 20th century a weaker, less relevant and more ambiguous partner of the Department of Defense and other agencies of national security. This led to the gradual but inexorable accumulation of civilian duties to the military--public diplomacy, foreign assistance and nation building in particular.

While the Departments of State and Defense were able to keep within their lanes with a relatively clear demarcation of responsibilities during the period of the Cold War, in the post-Cold War era this delineation has become blurred. Even more problematic has been the large and growing imbalance in funding dedicated to military vs. civilian international responsibilities and national security. In large measure the drift of public diplomacy (strategic communication), foreign assistance (civil-military affairs) from the civilian world of the State Department and USAID to the military world of the uniformed services and various DoD contractors is the result of this funding imbalance.

This situation has become untenable and thus it is time for a reappraisal and reassessment of the whole structure of foreign affairs just as Goldwater-Nichols served for the whole structure of national defense.

The Department of Foreign Affairs

Currently composed of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the Foreign and Commercial Service (FCS) of the Department of Commerce, The Department of the Treasury’s Office of International Affairs and Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the U. S. Department of Agriculture and numerous other bureaus, commissions, agencies and offices scattered through a dozen cabinet departments, America’s foreign affairs lacks cohesion and cohesiveness. The State Department which considers itself the coordinator and premier inter pares in foreign affairs is often only a junior partner or an after-thought in the process. Indeed with so many actors in foreign affairs today, it is likely that on any given issue another agency from Treasury to the EPA to Transportation will consider itself as having the lead. Traditional diplomacy, the hallmark of State is only one of many instruments of national power and sometimes the one least appropriate or least considered.

To re-right the balance in America’s national security structure, the Department of State must be broadened into a true Department of Foreign Affairs (the original name by the way) and like the Department of Defense should be restructured to accommodate the many roles it must play. Within the Department of Foreign Affairs there could be semi-independent sub-departments, similar to the departments of the individual services in the Defense Department, to deal with traditional diplomacy (i.e. state-to-state relations), public diplomacy (similar to the former USIA), foreign assistance (USAID), foreign trade (USTR, FCS, FAS etc.), stabilization and reconstruction (in league with DoD). These Departments within the Department of Foreign Affairs could function as the Department of Diplomacy, the Department of Public Diplomacy, the Department of International Development, the Department of International Trade, etc.

This Goldwater-Nichols scale reform for the civilian side of national security is long overdue. And while the parallels between the original Defense Department reorganization and the new design for a Department of Foreign Affairs can be overdrawn, the effect could be even more significant and beneficial for the future of United States foreign relations. Although State is now charged with coordinating all civilian activity abroad, it cannot manage this responsibility with current budgeting and authorities. It is recognized widely that State needs a broader mandate and authority beyond the traditional diplomatic and consular functions to encompass wide-ranging end-to-end coordination and management of foreign affairs from public diplomacy to development to trade. Already elements of this design can be seen in the September 2009 Project on National Security Reform’s Report to the President Turning Ideas Into Action (see Chapter 11, pp. 105-107 entitled "Next Generation State Department").

Further Reforms

The time is right for a new National Security Act to update the 1947 version, to re-define the roles and responsibilities and realign mission and the budget priorities assigned to each of the partners in national security. The Congress too should take a close look at how the national security functions are budgeted and funded through the relevant House and Senate committees for the Departments of Defense and a newly expanded role for a Department of Foreign Affairs. Realignment of agency missions and the committee structure and funding mechanisms are woefully in need of reform and the large-scale restructuring of the foreign affairs component of national security would provide a most convenient vehicle for this realignment.

(1) For more details on the Act see: http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml

(2) An overview of Goldwater-Nichols may be found at:http://www.agaus.org/Documents/GoldwaterNichols.pdf

(3) http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/budget/fy2004/ homeland.html

(4) http://www.dni.gov/faq_about.htm

Kindle Edition of Global Intentions is Doing Well

2009-10-07T13:16:00.000-07:00

I was delighted to learn that the Kindle edition of my recent book Global Intention Local Results: How Colleges Can Create International Communities is selling nearly as many copies as the paperback edition. You can check out the Kindle edition here: http://www.amazon.com/Global-Intentions-Local-Results-ebook/dp/B001L5U2TM/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1254946795&sr=1-1

At $11.95 and "voice enabled" it is a real bargain. I predict that it won't be too long before the Kindle edition outsells the paper version.

Addressing the Public Diplomacy Challenge

2009-10-03T08:34:00.000-07:00

In an earlier blog entitled "Analogy" on September 15th (http://pdworldwide.blogspot.com/2009/09/analogy.html#links),

I mentioned that I had some solutions to two big problems.

Here is one of the solutions as presented in my recent article in

the Foreign Service Journal (October 2009): http://www.pdworldwide.com/Publications.html

Mark Lynch may be onto something!

2009-09-28T13:23:00.000-07:00

Earlier today in his Blog, Mark Lynch bemoaned the lack of progress in public diplomacy on the part of the Obama Administration. After such great starts and clever symbolic moves and inspiring rhetoric-- nothing. He wonders why. As Mark stated:

"I don't know why it has proven so difficult for the U.S. government to mount public diplomacy and strategic communications campaigns in support of key administration policy goals. Is it something about the organization of the government, leadership, or the allocation of the resources? Is it that deeds have not kept up with words, harming the credibility of such communications campaigns? Is it the cultural clash between traditional public diplomacy and the demands of goal-oriented strategic communications?"

The answer is obvious, at least to those of us who have practiced public diplomacy for decades in Washington and overseas. It is in part an organizational problem and we know how to fix that--by moving public diplomacy out of the State Department or at least by giving it unity of organization and some degree of autonomy within State. Leadership must come from the President on down. Unless the White House is solidly behind PD, no one will really pay any attention. And the resource issue is another obvious point for improvement. I and many others have called for a tripling of resources for PD (not in new money I hasten to point out but rather in re-programming of DoD funds which attempt to do strategic communication through the use of highly paid, unreliable and ultimately incompetent contractors.) Maybe we can't solve our PD problem by re-creating USIA but we can improve our PD posture enormously by unifying public diplomacy, making it more distinct from traditional diplomacy in State, adequately funding it and putting some of the power of the White House behind it. For more details check out my article in the upcoming October issue of The Foreign Service Journal.

An Analogy

2009-09-15T16:13:00.000-07:00

The other evening I had the pleasure of listening to "the standard conversation" about public diplomacy organized around the launch of a new book (A New Public Diplomacy) on the subject, edited by Phil Seib of USC's well endowed Center for Public Diplomacy. By the use of "standard conversation" I am not meaning to put anyone down--rather to point out how unremarkable it is for several hundred public diplomacy "enthusiasts" to gather and have almost exactly the same conversation every time.

If ever there was a subject that was "all talk and no action" it is public diplomacy. And this gathering of the faithful at the Newseum's First Amendment space really brought that home to me. The only question I had and I was happy to hold my piece was: "So what are we going to do about

it?" I did not bother to ask because I knew that there would be no consensus reply. The conversation had gone on long enough. And besides, the canopies and white wine beckoned. I am not the only one to notice that despite some high hopes, the Obama Administration has not exactly moved mountains on public diplomacy!

And that brings me to the "analogy" in the title of this essay. It struck me that the issues of public diplomacy and health care in America have a number of similarities.

For starters, everyone realizes that American Public Diplomacy (PD) and the US health care system are broken and there must be a solution or the situation will just get more and more serious. Yes, everyone realizes that we have a PD problem/health care problem. That's the easy part!

Second, but in each case there is absolutely no consensus as to how best to address this problem. In the case of PD there have been about four dozen reports or sets of recommendations over the past 10 years and for health care well I don't need to tell anyone reading this blog that there are a lot of ideas our there--most of which are mutually exclusive and many of which are counterproductive. There are thousands of pages of draft legislation. The devil truly is in the details.

Third, there is that awkward problem of money. The financial crisis and the exploding federal deficit has pretty well messed up the tried and true solution so beloved by Congress--that is, throw money at it. So we now have that wonderful phrase "deficit neutral."

Fourth, there is not even a consensus that this is an issue that the federal government has the lead on. For PD there are those who want the private sector to take over the job while for health care there are those who insist on a significant government role.

Fifth, there is a remarkable absence of leadership from the White House on the issue of public diplomacy just has there was (until recently) on the health care issue. Will this just be another case of too little too late?

And finally, in both debates, the solution is disarmingly simple. I suppose you expect me to tell you what it is? Maybe I will in the next posting. In the meantime, why don't you tell me what you think on one or both of these issues?

Unfinished Business

2009-08-22T15:37:00.000-07:00

I have been asked to post this article that I wrote in 2001 on State Department reform and reorganization. It will be obvious to everyone that while a couple of the ideas in the paper found favor on the 7th floor of State, most of the ideas were rejected as in the "too hard to do" box. In some ways, the time when this paper was written seems a 100 years ago; in other ways just yesterday.

Unfinished Business:

Foreign Affairs Consolidation was

only the Beginning

William P. Kiehl

© National Security Studies Quarterly Volume VII, Issue 1 (Winter 2001).

ON 1 OCTOBER 1999, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ABSORBED THE

formerly independent United States Information Agency (USIA),

concluding a consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies agreed upon

by both the Clinton administration and Congress. The consolidation also

brought the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the De-

partment of State and brought the Agency for International Development

(AID) under closer State Department control.1 Unfortunately for the Depart-

ment of State and for the foreign policy interests of the United States, the

consolidation missed a unique opportunity to reform the “host” agency itself.

There is no one close to the foreign policy process who can fail to recog-

nize the Department of State is a troubled cabinet agency. Indeed the depart-

ment that often talks about “failed “ or “failing” states is a failed—or at least

failing—cabinet department. Starved for resources for a generation and an-

nually expected to “do more with less,” the department’s failings are all too

evident. Problems include an antiquated and over-centralized financial ac-

counting system; three incompatible e-mail systems and serious weaknesses

across the cyberspace spectrum; little serious training or emphasis on man-

agement and planning; very serious morale, retention, and recruitment prob-

lems; appalling security lapses; decreased relevance in the interagency pro-

cess, especially in economic and political-military matters; a culture fixated

on process rather than product; and a reputation for both arrogance and du-

plicity on Capitol Hill which belies the reality that the Department of State

loses on nearly every issue—and without much of a fight. Is it as bad

as all that? Ask any Foreign Service officer.2

With a new administration there is another, perhaps ephemeral,

chance for a real reorganization of these vital foreign affairs functions.

The Department of State did not fail in one year, nor in one administra-

tion, and it will require at least one four year term to make the Depart-

ment of State relevant again to U.S. interests and goals. There needs to

be a “quick fix” and a longer-term structural change. First, some imme-

diate readjustments to the previous consolidation are necessary.

QUICK FIXES

The consolidation of foreign policy bureaucracies in the Clinton admin-

istration suffered a range of short-comings due to a variety of reasons,

ranging from bureaucratic politics to the vagaries of personalities. These

problems, embodied specifically in the incorporation of ACDA and USIA

into the department and the conduct of U.S. diplomacy in the former So-

viet Union, require immediate attention.

When ACDA and USIA were folded into the Department of State,

the institutional legacy of each agency took wildly different paths.

In an effort to mollify critics in the arms control community and in Con-

gress, ACDA’s successor within the Department of State became in-

stantly over-staffed and bureaucratically bloated. To remedy this ineffi-

ciency, Congress should eliminate one or two bureaus—and their as-

sociated assistant secretaries—of the four currently under the aegis of the

under secretary of state for arms control.

In contrast to ACDA’s fate, the relics of USIA were scattered about the

Department of State in an effort to diminish the former agency’s clout

while swallowing its resource base. Thanks to congressional interven-

tion, the department could not complete a full-scale raid on public di-

plomacy resources. Still, the damage was done. Public diplomacy strate-

gies, and especially international information programs, in the Depart-

ment of State suffer from a lack of institutional clout and influence. To

resolve these problems, Congress should ease the organizational chal-

lenges presented by a department spokesman, nominally an assistant

secretary, who works directly for the secretary of state. The Bureau of

Public Affairs rarely has been “managed” at all by its assistant secretary
due to the more compelling duties of department spokesman.

The quick fix here is to separate the functions of department spokes-

man and assistant secretary of state for public affairs. The spokesman,

equivalent to an under secretary, should work directly for the secre-

tary of state but coordinate the department’s public statements

closely with the under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs.

There should be an assistant secretary for public affairs who would

actually oversee the Bureau of Public Affairs and report to the under

secretary. The Bureau of Public Affairs, after some legislative fixes to

strike archaic provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act3 barring use of

foreign targeted material in the United States, would be enriched

immeasurably by joining with the overseas public information effort in

a single bureau producing information material for use domestically

and internationally.4

With the departure from office of a deputy secretary whose overriding

interest was the former Soviet Union, the bureaucratic anomaly of

an Office of the Newly Independent States reporting directly to the

deputy secretary, with the status of a bureau, should cease. The logical

outcome should be the assignment of the European and Caucasian

states of the former-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Bureau of

European Affairs and the Central Asian states to the Bureau of South

Asian Affairs—renamed the Bureau of Central and Southern Asian Af-

fairs.

Realistically, these remedies may be all that could be accomplished in

the course of a year or two by any new administration. Even these rela-

tively minor adjustments, in some cases, would require formal congres-

sional approval; in all cases, they should have congressional input and

cooperation. These measures are just the beginning, however. The next

two stages of the process will be far more difficult and more challenging

to both the new administration and the entrenched bureaucracy of the

Department of State. The Congress too must re-think some basic as-

sumptions.

LONGER-TERM REFORM

The next two steps in the process of transforming the Department of

State from a failing cabinet department into one which serves effec-

tively the foreign affairs interests of the United States will require a dra-

matic change in thinking by the foreign policy establishment, the Con-

gress, and the rank-and-file foreign service and civil service employees
of the department. The two steps are essential and must be linked to make

the transformation work.5

Step one requires the Congress and other stakeholders to recognize

the Department of State is just as much a national security instrument

as is the U.S. military and the U.S. intelligence community.6 This means

that to increase national security there must be an increase in foreign

affairs funding along with defense funding and intelligence funding. The

three components are interlinked like three horses in a troika. Imagine a

Russian troika with two thoroughbreds and a mule hitched to a sleigh

and you will have some idea of the rough ride by funding two compo-

nents of national security adequately while starving the third—the foreign

affairs budget. Whether this new thinking results in the foreign affairs

account being moved into a national security appropriation or remaining

as the existing State, Justice, Commerce appropriation is a congres-

sional decision. What must occur, however, is an agreement between

the White House and the Congress to bring foreign affairs into alignment

with defense and intelligence. Without a robust foreign affairs budget,

the diplomatic resources simply are not there to use. This results, as evi-

denced all too frequently in recent years, in looking to the military to

solve nearly every problem. The common phrase in military circles is

“if your only tool is a hammer, then every problem becomes a nail.” Con-

gress and the administration must work together to provide policy

makers with other tools so that diplomacy can defuse issues before the

military hammer becomes the only option available to the United States.

This is not only more humane, it is also much more cost effective.

Exercising a real capability for preventive diplomatic solutions,

even while linking dispute resolution to sizeable economic assistance,

costs but a small fraction of the traditional multilateral military peace-

keeping solution. If the Department of State had been able to assemble a

more impressive diplomatic arsenal coupled with the promise of substan-

tial economic aid, even a recalcitrant Yugoslavia might have been eased

into a more benign role in both Bosnia and Kosovo. That is not to

argue that the military option would not have been used. It might have

come to that. But because U.S. diplomatic options were so weak they

were given neither the time nor the principal focus of the administration.

There was, from the outset of U.S involvement in each crisis, a sense

of the inevitability of the military option.

If the Congress and the new administration can agree on the premise

that foreign affairs is integral to national security, then a realistic bud-
get to refurbish the infrastructure, reward employees, and modernize the

means to conduct foreign policy can be put into place over the course of

two to four years. Too often, the major stakeholders in foreign

policy—members of Congress and their staffs, as well as members of

the public and the press—have been drawn to believe in an old-fashioned

and never accurate stereotype of diplomats and diplomatic life. Ask the

vice consul in Mumbai, or the cultural affairs officer in Lagos, or the

economic officer in Tashkent how many black tie dinners and garden

parties they attend and how often they or their families have been ill

because of bad water, bad air, or unsanitary conditions—the answer

will not encourage young Americans to join the Foreign Service. The

stakeholders, with a realistic picture of what diplomacy is all about, will

be less reluctant to make the investment in diplomacy as a lower cost,

longer-term tool so that the military tool may be used less frequently and

only when other means have not been successful. A military solution

should never be the substitute for an under-funded or non-existent diplo-

matic solution.

In practical terms this will mean restoring the foreign affairs appro-

priation to roughly the same level within the federal budget that it had

in 1961, that is 4% of the federal budget or a nearly four-fold increase

from the present level of 1% of the budget.7 The increased funding ini-

tially should be sufficient to provide the security enhancements and re-

store infrastructure for overseas operations so sorely needed. A rela-

tively small portion of these funds also should go to eliminate U.S. ar-

rears in payments to the United Nations (UN) and for UN operations,

like peacekeeping, which have prior U.S. commitments. There is also a

need to increase targeted assistance to friends and potential friends

abroad to enhance U.S. interests. Without a safe, secure diplomatic

work environment, restoration of America’s reputation as a reliable

member of the international community, and sufficient funds to reward

friends and assist potential friends in the developing world, the task of cre-

ating a peaceful world environment for the development of civil societ-

ies and market economies will be made more difficult and, in the end,

more expensive in both blood and fortune. A small investment in diplo-

macy now can prevent the kinds of future world crises that can cost the

United States and its citizens dearly down the road.

Most of the increase in funding should go where it will have the most

immediate, as well as the most long-lasting, positive impact. It should go

to preserve and enhance the Department of State’s most precious re-

source—its people. One small glimmer of light in the current department

has been the renaming of the Bureau of Personnel to the Bureau of Hu-

man Resources. That is precisely what the people constitute—the

most important resource of the department. The private sector long

ago realized people are the key to success. Most of government has

more recently come to this realization. Perhaps the Department of

Defense is the best role model in this regard. The Department of Defense

not only talks about “the Quality of our Forces”—it backs up these

words with actions.8 Quality has been achieved only at great expense

and effort. It has required the creation of institutions and procedures

honed over more than two decades to develop a high level of effective-

ness and efficiency in the U.S. armed forces.

Key Defense Department priorities have been to attract highly mo-

tivated and skilled people, to retain highly skilled people in sufficient

numbers, to develop leadership skills and other institutional, on-the-job

and self-study types of training at each level of leadership, and to pro-

vide these motivated, skilled, and well trained people with technologi-

cally superior equipment and facilities. This unquestionably has worked

for the U.S. military and it has been vital to operational success. The

Department of State should have a similar set of priorities for its people

to ensure it own operational success in diplomacy.

The prevailing attitude in the Department of State has long been one

almost haughtily averse to training. The conventional wisdom is that di-

plomacy is an art, not a science. Accordingly, it is reasoned, there is no

formula to follow. The Foreign Service attracts the best and the bright-

est the United States has to offer and they have all the intellectual tools

they need. That intelligence need only be combined with experience in

the field and in Washington and it will result in a highly professional diplo-

matic service. Unfortunately, these assumptions are no longer valid, if

they ever were. Diplomacy has a body of knowledge, a history of what

works and what does not, and a code of practices and procedures that

must be passed on generation to generation in a more formal way than is

now the case. There is a formula to follow so long as flexibility is not

sacrificed to formula. As for the best and the brightest, evidence suggests

they are now choosing multinationals, banks, and dot.coms, rarely the

Foreign Service. The Department of State cannot offer a competitive sal-

ary and benefits package or the promise of rapid advancement for

the highly talented and motivated. Granted, money and advancement

are not everything. Still, the Foreign Service offers neither physical safety

in the age of terrorism, nor status and respect in the age of bureaucracy’s

association with incompetence. Most critically, however, the Foreign Ser-

vice struggles to offer even relevance as modern technology offers direct

methods of communication, the military’s regional commanders-in-

chief (CINCs) exert tremendous influence, and the process of global-

ization changes the international environment. The Department of

State must re-think the way it deals with its people or, in the case of re-

cruitment, potential people. Just as education should not end with a di-

ploma, education and training in the Department of State must be an on-

going effort from day one to—and through—retirement. The Depart-

ment of State and U.S. diplomacy already have paid a high price for not

wisely investing in people. The Department of State must follow the

Defense Department model of loyalty down as well as loyalty up, and

genuine investment in people, their training, and their equipment lest our

diplomatic capacities continue to erode as an increasingly dispirited

and cynical Foreign Service struggles to do more and more with less and

less.

A relatively small investment in state of the art communications to

enable all parts of the Department of State to interact with each other

in real time across a wide bandwidth is an investment that will pay great

dividends. Just as with the Defense Department, high quality, well-

trained and well motivated people need the best equipment to do the

best job. Video conferencing, compatible e-mail systems, and full band-

width Internet access at home and abroad are not luxuries in today’s

global political, economic, cultural, and information societies; they are

the price of doing business effectively. All this quality recruitment,

motivation, training, and equipment will cost money just as it has in the

U.S. military.

If reform at the Department of State were just a question of money,

however, it would be a relatively simple solution indeed. Money will

go a long way in bringing the Department of State’s infrastructure

and personnel policies up to standard. But that will not be enough.

The next step, simultaneous with the infusion of additional funds, must be

a radical restructuring of the organization of the department and its in-

ternal policies and procedures. What is suggested here is nothing less than

a transformation of the department’s corporate culture.9

Step two calls for a simplification and a leveling of the organizational
structure of the department. Without going into elaborate details, this

step envisages: six regional divisions of the world corresponding a bit

more closely to the Defense Department’s regional CINCs; a di-

vision for multi-regional affairs including the United Nations and other

international organizations and the “global” bureaus; specialized bu-

reaus like the existing Consular Affairs, Educational and Cultural Af-

fairs, Legal, Congressional Relations, Administration, Diplomatic

Security, and so forth, which might remain largely intact while other

functions could be subsumed within regional bureaus. This would pro-

vide a long awaited opportunity to cut back on the number of bureaus

(as well as assistant secretaries and their equivalents), rationalize the

geographic diplomatic units with those of military commands, and re-

balance the relative influence and resources within the regional bureaus

and between regional and functional bureaus.

One innovation might be the physical relocation of some regional

deputy assistant secretaries and some key staff to co-locate with a regional

CINC outside the Washington, DC, area. The territory assigned to the

CINCs and the six regional bureaus of the Department of State should

be adjusted so they more closely match. Situating a State Department

policy cell with the CINC will provide greater interaction between the

department and the regional CINCs than currently takes place through a

single State Department political advisor assigned as a member of the

CINC’s staff. It will simultaneously assist in the necessary decentraliza-

tion of decision making within the Department of State. In the informa-

tion age, a CINC-based State Department cell could provide real time

value-added policy input directly to the most senior levels of the depart-

ment, horizontally to the CINC, and through the CINC to the Joint Staff.

This reorganization will require decentralized financial and adminis-

trative authority and responsibility, devolving it to the various bureaus

in Washington and especially to the overseas missions. A whole range of

procurement, grant making, and travel processing should be shifted

to the bureaus and overseas missions without reference to central author-

ity. The Department of State must realize that over-centralization for

purposes of control stifles creativity, dampens initiative, and pulls ef-

ficiency down to the lowest common denominator. Decentralization will

empower employees and free staff and time for training. The current

culture builds an unnecessary and destructive “us versus them” wall

between the “policy wonks” and the “admin types.” Recent suggestions

to create a second deputy secretary of state for management to join the

current deputy secretary (for policy) would only compound this mutual

alienation. Staffing throughout the department should be consistent with

the goal that at least 20% of each bureau’s complement should be un-

dergoing some form of short-term or long-term training or educational

development at any given time. Training must be mandatory and be

tied directly to advancement. Some additional consolidation of

foreign affairs functions remains to be done. The Foreign Commercial

Service, now lodged in the Department of Commerce and the Foreign

Agricultural Service now a part of the Agriculture Department would

be better able to complement the work of the Department of State by

being incorporated with other economic functions of the department.

These Foreign Service officers, who now find themselves stranded in

larger non-foreign affairs agencies in which they have little influence,

would make an immediate contribution to new thinking at State.

Finally, planning, especially planning on an interagency basis, must

be required of all offices of the Department of State. Too often, bril-

liant papers and plans are crafted by, for, and of the Department of State

without ever being seen, much less contributed to, by any other part of

the U.S. government. These papers are part of the endless paper chase

within Foggy Bottom, which, in the end, means nothing, influences noth-

ing and drains away the energies and talents of department staff. In order

to be meaningful and influential, planning must be integrated into ev-

ery part of the Department, planners must not be separated from policy

and all stakeholders in the outcome must be integral to the planning pro-

cess. If the Department of Defense and the U.S. military have been criti-

cized for over-planning, this error is preferable to under-planning. Plan-

ning, like training, must be made a high priority for the department.

Advancement in the service must be contingent on specific training re-

quirements at every level of leadership. This training must include plan-

ning and interagency coordination as requirements for advancement to

mid-level and senior positions. Will this new organization and

funding guarantee a more stable and peaceful world? Will it eliminate

poverty and injustice, rogue states and terrorism, would-be dictators,

and errors of judgment? Unfortunately, the answer is “no.” As long

as there is a human equation in international relations the world will

not always be as we would wish.

What a reinvigorated Department of State can do, however, is to manage

the one constant in the world—change.

The United States of America enters the twenty-first century as the

most dominant power of this or any earlier age. The country’s military

and economic power is unrivaled. But because we know change is ever

present, we must now devote a real effort to rebuild U.S. diplomatic

readiness and to care for our complex bilateral and multilateral rela-

tions. Every dominant world power throughout history has made the

same mistake—it assumed that the status quo would last forever. When

change came, and those that the great power dominated determined

themselves to dominate, the great power was unprepared or unwilling

to use diplomatic tools to manage change and relied on military might

in a vain attempt to cling to power. The vision of a transformed Depart-

ment of State presented in this article, with the diplomatic tools nec-

essary to manage change and rebuild relationships within the world com-

munity—a kind of Vision 2010 for diplomacy—will cost money, take

enormous effort, and require the dedicated commitment of all in-

volved. To continue to muddle along, however, is no longer a vi-

able alternative.

ENDNOTES

1. For the details of the reorganization

plan see Reorganization Plan and

Report (revised March 1999) Sub-

mitted Pursuant to Section 1601 of

the Foreign Affairs Reform and Re-

structuring Act of 1998 as Con-

tained in Public Law 105-277.

2. See findings based upon interviews

with Foreign Service officers, in

Stephanie Smith Kinney , “Develop-

ing Diplomats for 2010: If Not Now,

When?,” American Diplomacy Vol.

V, No. 3, (Summer 2000): 16. The

author concludes there is broad

agreement that neither the Depart-

ment nor the Foreign Service is

“ready to meet the challenges to

American diplomacy.”

3. Commonly known as the Smith-

Mundt Act, the United States Infor-

mation and Educational Exchange

Act of 1948, as amended, 22 U.S.C.

1431, prohibits the dissemination of

informational materials produced for

overseas use in the United States or

to U.S. citizens and residents. Sec-

tion 208 of the USIA Authorization

Act, FY 1986 and 1987, U.S.C.
1461-1a, “The Zorinsky Amend-

ment” adds to these prohibitions.

Some exceptions to the general pro-

hibitions have been made by Con-

gress over the years for films, publi-

cations, and materials, the domestic

distribution of which Congress de-

termined to be in the national inter-

est. In the age of the Internet, the 24/

7 news cycle, and satellite television,

these prohibitions on domestic dis-

semination based on irrational fears

of the creation of an American gov-

ernment propaganda agency have

long outlived whatever usefulness

they may have had.

4. Two minor fixes should be undertaken

immediately to transfer the oversees

American speakers’ program from

the Office of International Informa-

tion Programs to the Bureau of Edu-

cational and Cultural affairs (ECA)

given the program’s Fulbright-Hayes

origins and to reorganize the ECA

Bureau along geographic lines to

enable it to interact better with the

true power centers of the department.

5. It is not the purpose of this article to

lay out a detailed blueprint for all of

the reforms needed, but rather to

raise consciousness about some of

the more obvious changes so-long

overdue, and to suggest directions for

those changes.

6. Ambassador William C. Harrop “The

Infrastructure of American Diplo-

macy,” American Diplomacy, Sep-

tember 2000. The article makes an

excellent case for the inclusion of the

Department of State in the national

security realm of the federal budget

and pointedly notes the “hollowing

out” of U.S. diplomatic readiness.

7. See The Budget in Brief For Fiscal

Year 2001, Released by the U.S.

Department of State, 7 February

2000.

8. One need only peruse a publication

such as Joint Vision 2020 to under-

stand the Department of Defense’s

commitment of resources to ensure

quality in the armed forces. Office

of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Director for Strategic Plans

and Policy, J5; Strategy Division,

Joint Vision 2020, US Government

Printing Office, Washington DC,

June 2000, or http://www.dtic.mil/

jv2020/jvpub2.htm.

9. This is not the first call for a basic

reform of the Department of State

and its way of doing business.

Among the more recent of more than

two dozen such studies are: The

Henry L. Stimson Center, Equipped

for the Future, October 1998; The

Center for Strategic and Interna-

tional Studies, Reinventing Diplo-

macy in the Information Age, Octo-

ber 1998: and U.S. Department of

State, America’s Overseas Presence

in the 21st Century, November 1999.

William P. Kiehl is a member of the Senior Foreign Service with the Department of State. He is
currently Diplomat in Residence at the Center for Strategic Leadership, U. S. Army War College
and a Senior Fellow of the Peacekeeping Institute. The writer’s views are his own and do not necessarily
reflect those of the institutions with which he is affiliated.

R.I.P. Merce Cunningham

2009-08-01T15:22:00.000-07:00

The other day I saw the obit for the late great dancer-choreographer Merce Cunningham who died at age 90 and it took me back to two occasions when I met this unassuming yet brilliant artist. The first was in the early 1970s when he and his company were on a cultural exchange tour to Yugoslavia and several other countries. I still remember the performance in the Museum of Modern Art in Novi Beograd across the Sava River from the Yugoslav capital. This was my first tour with the U.S. Information Agency and I was amazed and impressed by the USG's sponsorship of such an avant garde performance. It certainly made a positive impact on the young Yugoslavs that I knew. The second meeting was when John Cage and Merce Cunningham combined their talents on a visit to Moscow a few years later. Because the people of the Soviet Union were more isolated than were the southern Slavs of the Balkan peninsula, this taste of Western decadence--atonal music and modern dance--stunned and delighted the Russian intelligentsia even more. It was an example of cultural diplomacy at its best at a time when we understood how important it was and were willing to invest in something that did not have an immediate return.

William P. Kiehl Named Editor of American Diplomacy

2009-07-21T19:09:00.000-07:00

William P. Kiehl, Ed. D. will assume the duties of Editor of the Internet journal American Diplomacy in August 2009 succeeding Ambassador (ret.) James Bullington.

Dr. Kiehl is founding President and CEO of PD Worldwide International Consultants. He taught public diplomacy at the Foreign Service Institute, lectured at European and American universities, served as the Executive Director of the Public Diplomacy Council at George Washington University, and was Diplomat in Residence at the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership/Senior Fellow of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute.

During a Foreign Service career of 33 years with the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency, Dr. Kiehl served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and in numerous other public diplomacy positions at home and abroad. He has published many articles on public diplomacy, edited the book America’s Dialogue with the World (2006) and is the author of Global Intentions Local Results: How Colleges Can Create International Communities (2008). Dr. Kiehl holds his Ed.D. from the University of Pennsylvania.

http://www.americandiplomacy.org/index_temp.html

White House Briefing by Judith McHale

2009-07-16T13:43:00.000-07:00

The text of Judith McHale's briefing to the White House Press Corps follows. I would have liked to have seen just a little more background knowledge on the history of public diplomacy by the Under Secretary and a lot more specific knowledge--like the budget for PD! --but the initiative to appear before the WH press was a good one. Much of what is mentioned here is new wine in old bottles, of course. The truest thing she said was: "What made all this work were ambassadors and a corps of professional foreign service officers and locally engaged staff at embassies and consulates overseas. They provided the ideas and advice we needed to bridge our electronic efforts here with real live people overseas. And they carried out the face-to-face personal engagement that will always be the heart of successful public diplomacy."

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release July 15, 2009

PRESS BRIEFING BY PRESS SECRETARY ROBERT GIBBS
AND UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY JUDITH McHALE

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

3:27 P.M. EDT

MR. GIBBS: Good afternoon, folks. Before we get started with our regularly scheduled program, I want to bring to you guys a special guest, Judith McHale, who is Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, to discuss some of the efforts that we undertook to highlight the President's speech in Ghana throughout the continent of Africa -- a successful effort that she and her team worked closely on with members of the White House, including our media guys, Macon Phillips and Katie Stanton.

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Thank you, Robert. I'm delighted to be here with all of you today to talk about some of the exciting new initiatives that we're starting at the State Department.

As President Obama visited Ghana last weekend, U.S. ambassadors and State Department Public Diplomacy personnel created unprecedented engagement with people in Africa and around the world. We worked under the leadership of the White House and built on our initial experiments in new media global outreach at the time of the President's Cairo and Moscow speeches. We interacted directly with hundreds of thousands of people, helped the President to engage tens of millions, and showed the world that America listens and wants to engage.

This was a model of creative public diplomacy for the 21st century. I believe that it is embodied in what Secretary Clinton calls "smart power." We broke new ground in using technology to engage nontraditional audiences. The centerpiece was a creative White House initiative that bridged new media and old. Macon Phillips, Katie Stanton, and others at the White House Office of New Media should take a bow, as should the entire State Department team.

Before the speech, we set up an SMS, or texting service, throughout Africa and invited people to text the President in either English or French. Nearly 16,000 did so, from 87 countries in Africa and beyond. Our embassy in South Africa partnered with a mobile-based social networking site and garnered an additional 200,000 questions and comments from throughout the continent.

And as the President spoke on Saturday, we sent simultaneous SMS highlights of the speech to over 12,000 people in some 80 countries in French and English, and solicited their feedback via text message. We posted hundreds of those messages on America.gov, the State Department's Public Diplomacy Web site, and on whitehouse.gov.

In return, the President answered questions selected from this massive influx by three African journalists in a podcast that we dubbed into French, Swahili, Portuguese and Arabic, in addition to the original English. On the screens here behind me, I believe, you can see a visual representation of the words the President used in his speech and of the words used by those who texted him. We'll also show you what the questions looked like on the White House Web site.

So you can see this came out of the President's feed, and then the responses -- and you can see by the sort of prominence of the words, those which resonated with the community, obviously "Obama" being a huge one, but all the things -- and you can see -- if you focused on it, you see some of the concepts that came throughout his speech.

Next slide. Then what we did, because we wanted to continue this community, was a map of the world with comments popping up where they came so others could check in and could see how they were doing.

What made all this work were ambassadors and a corps of professional foreign service officers and locally engaged staff at embassies and consulates overseas. They provided the ideas and advice we needed to bridge our electronic efforts here with real live people overseas. And they carried out the face-to-face personal engagement that will always be the heart of successful public diplomacy.

Our overseas teams worked with local media to enable them to broadcast the President's speech and report on his trip to Ghana. They invited audiences to ambassadorial residences, cultural centers and movie theaters to view and discuss the speech. Ambassadors and public affairs officers led panel discussions and spoke to local and regional media to amplify the President's themes.

Here are just a few examples. Our embassy in Freetown gave micro-grants to dozens of cinema centers throughout Sierra Leone that showed the speech live, free of charge, to all comers, reaching thousands in even far-flung corners of the country.

Our Mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa invited 200 representatives of 53 African countries to a speech screening and discussion. In this hemisphere, in the Dominican Republic, our embassy hosted a screening of the speech with Spanish subtitles for university students and conducted a discussion afterwards. In Canada, our embassy and consulates actively reached out to the Afro-Canadian groups throughout the country.

Audience response, both in person and online, was overwhelmingly positive. Embassy anecdotes and SMS messages alike show that the President's speech and our efforts to help him engage with people struck a chord.

In Niger, which is currently going through a constitutional crisis, audience members at the embassy screening stood up during the speech and cried out, "He speaks for us." A young South African texted, "President Obama, I'm 20 years old, can't believe that we've actually been given this opportunity. Thank you." A Zimbabwean who had fled that country to Mozambique texted, "Thank you, sir, for that uplifting speech." He went on to say, "I will stay and contribute to the democratic reforms in my country of Zimbabwe."

I think that the enthusiasm of Africans, especially young people, to use technology to engage with us shows the very potential and promise of the continent that the President stressed in his speech. Africans are as technologically capable and eager for connections with the world as any people on Earth.

I'm proud that the State Department could partner with the White House to help the President build a conversation with citizens in Africa and beyond, creating and sustaining the kind of global dialogue that, as Secretary Clinton said today in her speech, makes America a smarter and stronger nation.

Thank you very much.

Q How are you going to keep using this list? If you have 16,000 phone numbers now, what are they going to be getting?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Well, it's actually not 16,000. It is about 250,000 e-mail addresses that we have. And one of the things that I'm very committed to, and I think it's critical to do it, is to have an ongoing involvement with them. So we're developing a variety of ways to reach out and continue that discussion.

We received several -- I think about 100,000 different comments and questions going through those -- some of them we're posting online. And we're going to continue to identify, when you looked at that analysis of the words that were used, we can begin to see communities which are groupings. So if we identify individuals who are -- we're going to be building communities around themes -- those who are interested in the topic of democracy, we would set up discussion forums for them to be able to participate in education and other things. So we're continuing to do that, because, to me, that's a critical component of what we're trying to do, is to build these networks and continue to sustain them by providing them information about topics that they're interested in.

MR. GIBBS: Margaret.

Q Do you know whether past administrations have had databases of non-Americans, of foreigners, to use for diplomatic purposes and how they were collected?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: I don't know. Sorry, I don't have an answer.

Q You mentioned engaging with tens of millions of people. Can you just go over that math?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: How did we do it? Well, online we had about 250,000. But in Africa, it was a great sort of matching of new and old technologies, so one of the things we did -- obviously, the feed went out live and was carried by television networks throughout Africa. But radio is such a predominant -- it is one of the predominant media still in Africa, so what we did -- the speech went out live, but we also did this podcast. So when we received the 250,000 questions that came in, we had three African journalists who went through about 100,000 of those questions, I believe, to sort them out -- came up with a number of questions for the President to answer.

We submitted them to the President. He answered them on a podcast, which was recorded. The podcast was both downloaded online, but it was also transmitted -- in many cases by bicycle, frankly -- to radio stations and broadcast on radio stations.

So we've been aggregating the data of all the outlets that we reached, and we're in the process of continuing to refine that. But basically, it was the combined reach of online -- of traditional media -- radio, television -- and online.

Q Adds up to tens of millions?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Yes, absolutely.

Q Did you coordinate the effort with the local governments? Do you think this coordination is needed?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: I think we -- I'm not exactly certain of the answers to whether we did it, but we were able to certainly work with our posts, and I think where it was appropriate and they felt like they wanted to do that, they did. I know that there were many government officials who were invited to the embassy viewing events. So certainly they knew about it and there was a lot of support for our efforts. There was not any resistance that I know of -- so, yes.

Q Do you have any feedback from the governments in the region?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: I have not heard anything specifically myself.

Q Can you tell us anything about the State Department's efforts to disseminate his speech in Moscow, since that was --

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Certainly.

Q -- not broadcast widely live?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: That's correct. One of the things that we're looking at, and I think it's an important point, is that each of these events that we want to do we want to tailor it specifically for the event. In the case of Moscow, we did have public diplomacy outreach, but it was more regional. Given the nature of the speech, we felt it was more appropriate to be a regional outreach, and so we did a variety of things.

We had a texting initiative that we did around the Moscow speech. We also have developed a Facebook community and following, which is really interesting, because we launched it following up on Cairo, and we found the group migrated with us to Moscow and is continuing to grow. It grew about 25 percent with the Africa initiative. So Facebook became a key component -- but also understanding what were the tools that the individuals in that region were using, which was somewhat different. And so we had a presence on the applicable tools there. And we're going to continue to do that.

Q Regionally, are you talking about Russia, former Soviet Union, or even wider than that?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: It was primarily Russia and some of the adjacent countries is where we went to for the Moscow speech.

MR. GIBBS: Mark.

Q What was the amount of the micro grant to the movie theaters to show the speech, do you know?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: No, I don't know. I know it was not a lot of money. But they basically -- I thought it was a very innovative approach, where they basically went out and contracted with cinemas for people to go for free. But I don't believe it was a significant amount of money. When they call it "micro grant," I'm taking them at their word.

Q What's your operation's budget?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Our total budget for this initiative?

Q No, for --

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: For public diplomacy?

Q Right.

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: You know, I'm relatively new to my job, so can I answer that in a couple more weeks? (Laughter.)

Q Just to follow up on Jonathan's question, should we assume that if the -- I mean, what was the number of outreach in Russia? I mean, you're here to talk about all the great outreach you did with the Africa speech. It does -- does it seem that the outreach didn't -- wasn't as effective?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: No, I think it was very effective in the --

Q How do you know, measure-wise? Do you have the numbers?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: I don't have the specific numbers with me, but what we are doing is analyzing what were the targeted audience that we were trying to reach within the region, and understanding -- I mean, in Moscow, we were basically using new media. So it was not a television/radio kind of outreach effort. I don't think we have the numbers. Do you have the numbers for -- I don't have them with me.

Q I mean, just a --

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: We're checking --

Q We got a public briefing on Cairo, a pre-briefing on --but we have not gotten a big briefing on the Moscow --

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: My guess would be we're talking in the thousands for that.

MR. GIBBS: They tend to be a little skeptical. (Laughter.)

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Oh, you tend to be a little skeptical? (Laughter.)

Q -- between the lines of information, information, no information.

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: You know what, we can get you that information. But I would tell you that the answer is in the thousands, as opposed to the hundreds of thousands, just given the nature of what we were trying to do there.

Q Is the goal here to create a global database of foreign citizens around the world from different regions to poll together? And if so, what do you intend, or what do you anticipate doing in terms of reaching out to them in the months and years ahead? And what will you be sending to these people? What's the strategy?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: The strategy is one which I think is very consistent with the President's strategy and the strategy of the Secretary of State, which is to actually reach out to reengage, if you will, and connect with citizens all over the world; to listen to them, to understand what is on their minds so that as we sort of move forward together to face all the challenges that we're facing, we have the basis of a conversation and dialogue.

So that is, frankly, the basis of what we're trying to do. The follow-up for it, and the strategy -- because a key part, as I said earlier, is to keep them engaged -- is to continue to provide content and information which is of value to them, things which they want to receive, information which they are seeking, and engage them in that dialogue. There's so many issues that I think face us collectively and the challenges that face us, so we're going to be a stronger --

Q -- do that around the world.

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: We are doing that around the world. That is correct. That is the challenge.

Q Just a quick question. How do you guard against only reaching the elites if you're using these new media methods?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Well, we're not just using new media. One of the points that I wanted to make in the Africa situation is that new media will work in certain places, but it's a tool, not a strategy. And I believe that quite passionately. And so we're going to use it where appropriate to reach certain targeted demographics. But, frankly, in the case of Africa, we had free cinemas, we had radio outreach. We understand -- we know very well that throughout Africa, radio is the predominant media.

And so we were very careful to be sure that the speech was accessible to the largest population by understanding what is the media infrastructure in each country. And it's one of the strengths of the embassies, is that they understand that and they report it to us, and we tailor each of these initiatives to the available infrastructure.

So it's designed to reach sort of less-affluent populations. It is designed to reach deep into these countries. And I think if you got to read some of the questions, you would be pretty amazed at the reactions that we got and the feedback that we got from our embassies. It reached very, very deep into these areas.

Q How did that work with radio?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: How did it work with radio?

Q Yes.

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Well, two things: One, the speech went out live. Secondly, we had a podcast, so people had sent in questions; the President answered questions. We downloaded the podcast. The embassies actually transferred it to a disk and bicycled it to local radio stations throughout Africa. I mean, that's literally the way it was done. And it is continuing to play now. So it has gotten multiple plays, and it's continuing to play.

Q How did you kind of assess the Cairo effort now that there's been some time between? Are you -- you said you wanted to kind of continue the dialogue --

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Right.

Q Is that continuing? And then are we going to get copies of the slides you showed?

MR. GIBBS: We can get you copies of those.

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Each of these -- we're learning more and more as we do them, which is sort of the fun thing about doing it. And compared to -- Cairo was the global initiative. This one was probably -- had a slightly different focus; it was primarily Africa and throughout Europe where we saw the African diaspora. So it was slightly -- we had a slightly different initiative to it. And we're learning on each and every case.

But the key for me is, as we go through this, A, to learn, to be sure that we get better at what we're doing and constantly evolving it, and we've got great folks helping us out in doing that; and secondly, to be sure that we don't just -- this is not just a one-off with these folks, so that when they come in -- they sort of come to engage with us, that we continue to follow up.

And so we have a number of programs in place that we're going to continue to do that. Our technology infrastructure is constantly evolving so that we're able to continue that engagement because, to me, that's the absolute critical thing that we're going to have to do.

Q What I was getting at is, are you still getting people engaging on the Cairo speech?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Yes, absolutely. And because -- but that's an effort on our part to do that, to reach out, to sort of provide them with the information and subjects that they want to engage on. But it is absolutely a key part of what we're doing. So we've developed discussion rooms that they can join, and we're trying to sort of understand the things that they're interested in and be sure that we actually are responding to that to keep them alive. And we're going to keep that discussion going.

And the other thing that we want to do is to inject new content into that conversation, so if we see they're interested in energy or the environment, bringing in experts who could help facilitate that conversation.

Q Is this series of speeches to be continued? Like an obvious geographic gap is China and Asia in general.

MR. GIBBS: Well, we'll be there soon enough. (Laughter.)

Q My question, is there a comparable effort here in the United States -- maybe it's a question for you, Robert -- and if so, who's in charge of it? Who's building the domestic database?

MR. GIBBS: Well, there are people that obviously e-mail questions to the White House Web site, sign up for e-mail alerts, are notified of goings-on of the administration, initiatives, recovery plan, things like that. There's a -- I mentioned Macon Phillips and Katie Stanton, who are on our new media team, who help obviously not only domestically, but also internationally, in reaching out in order to let people know what we're doing.

Q Do we know how big that base has built up to?

MR. GIBBS: Several million from the last time I checked. I don't have an exact number. But the amount of traffic that we have gotten -- and I have some better slides on this back in the office -- we've seen an exponential jump in the amount of traffic overall, since the inauguration, of people seeking information. And obviously, if you look at the Web site that has been revamped, we did it in a way that we hoped was user-friendly, that we could drive as many people as had questions about stuff that was going on to a very user-friendly site.

Q Would we be concerned if a foreign government were collecting e-mail addresses of Americans and hoping to keep them engaged in the future?

MR. GIBBS: It's probably no more different than to sign up for e-mail updates at rollcall.com.

Q Well, that's a smart answer, but you want to answer the question? It's clever, but is there any concern --

MR. GIBBS: No, it's both smart and a factual answer.

Q Well, is there any concern that a foreign government -- setting this precedent of foreign governments collecting e-mail addresses of citizens of, say, this country, and then keeping them informed in their own way about what they're doing?

MR. GIBBS: If somebody e-mails the government of South Africa and has a question about their policies, and that Web-site has the ability for somebody to sign up for continual updates in order to get engaged, I'll let each of the 300-or-so-million people in this country that seek information from that to do so voluntarily. Nobody is being forced to give out their e-mail addresses. And obviously, the President is deeply concerned about cyber-security and keeping privacy concerns, as they are at rollcall, very protective.

Yes, sir.

Q On Afghanistan, how do you plan to engage public diplomacy in Afghanistan and Pakistan --

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: I'm sorry, I couldn't hear the question.

Q In Afghanistan and Pakistan, how do you plan to use public diplomacy to win over the people?

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Well, in every country in the world, we have a pretty active public diplomacy program and plan. And in both of those countries, which I've been sort of looking at quite intensely recently, we have a number of public diplomacy initiatives in each of those countries, appropriate to the country. So, for example, in Pakistan, we have, as you probably know, a very robust exchange program. We have more Fulbright students coming from Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. We have high school students coming over from Pakistan. So there are a number of initiatives that we will continue to do that.

Same thing in Afghanistan, where a lot of our efforts are focused on building Afghan capacity to sort of deal in a lot of different areas. So we have very aggressive plans and programs in both of those countries, and we have public diplomacy initiatives in every country in the world.

MR. GIBBS: All right, thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY McHALE: Okay, thank you.

Who's In Charge?

2009-07-16T13:04:00.000-07:00

This news story seems to imply that the Pentagon has not lost its taste for running public diplomacy with the change of administrations.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4190904&c=AME&s=TOP

Len Baldyga's take on PD

2009-07-09T12:22:00.000-07:00

The attached is Leonard J. Baldyga's speech at the recent Murrow Conference at Tuft's Flectcher School. It makes some very good points worth reflecting upon and perhaps even acting upon!

http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/32-3/Baldyga.pdf

This is Cultural Diplomacy for the 21st Century

2009-06-25T19:15:00.000-07:00

ON THE ROAD TO BURMA
Globetrotting with Ozomatli, unlikely U.S. diplomats
BY RANDALL ROBERTS
Ozomatli: ( Jiro Yamaguchi, Wil-Dog Abers, Justin Porée, Raúl Pacheco, Mario Calire, Asdru Sierra, Ulises Bella
Eduardo Mackinlay
The Ozomatli posse: Logging frequent-flier miles, courtesy of the U.S. government

Four days into a five-day tour of Rangoon, Burma, we thought we’d had our fill of weirdness. But after Ozomatli are led through Kawechan School for the Blind’s darkened hallways and up a flight of stairs, the sound of a flailing guitar solo and the thump of a bass drum punch through the corridor. Around a corner, standing on a stage, four conservatively dressed men wearing sunglasses and matching pink-and-blue polo-type shirts are banging out a rock song. They look like a ’60s surf band, the Ventures or something — square and stiff.

Ozomatli, a band born in Los Angeles in 1996, are scheduled to perform a few songs for students, orphans and disabled kids as part of an outreach program arranged by the U.S. Department of State. They didn’t count on any competition, and they watch from the side as a band called Blind Reality, facing 100 people of varying degrees of disability, creates a chaotic, freakazoid sound that only four sightless rock dudes living in the pocket of one of the world’s most beaten-down countries could possibly make.

See the full story at: http://www.laweekly.com/2009-06-25/music/music-without-borders/

Just Words?

2009-06-12T14:30:00.000-07:00

Judith McHale, the new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, delivered an address in Washington recently talking about the role of public diplomacy. You can read the full text of the "as delivered" transcript here.

As speeches go it was a well written and coherent presentation on a subject of keen interest to some and not much interest to many. Good intentions and good words can go only so far however, as we have seen in other contexts of late. It has become fashionable to say "global engagement" when one means "public diplomacy" or "strategic communications" or perhaps half a dozen other buzz words. But saying global engagement doesn't mean doing global engagement any more than saying public diplomacy means doing public diplomacy. The time for words joined with action is upon us. And, so far at least, it is the Congress and not the Administration that is putting action behind words.

How so you say? Well Senator Lugar's S.49 is one example but a more striking one is the report of the first authorization bill for the State Department in years. Yes, there are appropriation bills most every year except of course when Congress gets gridlocked; but authorization, now that is another story. Congress is usually reluctant to open up that can of worms so instead of re-authorizing it merely appropriates funds. The House passed HR 2410, The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011,"To authorize appropriations for the Department of State and the Peace Corps for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, to modernize the Foreign Service, to authorize democratic, economic, and social development assistance for Pakistan, to authorize security assistance for Pakistan, and for other purposes." There are some things in this authorization that are laudable, some less so but we shall have to wait until the Senate and reconciliation are finished to see what really emerges. Frankly a more dramatic change is needed than anything called for so far in the legislation. You can read HR 2410 here.

No Preconceptions

2009-05-28T13:30:00.000-07:00

The New Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Judith McHale Comes On Board with No Preconceptions About PD's Structure.

In a recent interview with VOA she had that to say about the future of PD's structure in the State Department. I welcome that willingness to look anew at the PD structure within State without any preconceptions. If Ms. McHale is as smart as her resume indicates then she will soon see how changes must be made to make PD and her role leading it more effective. Let's wait and see...

This is the text of the VOA News Story:

Public Diplomacy Chief Predicts Turnaround in US Standing Abroad
By David Gollust
Washington
27 May 2009

The U.S. State Department's new public diplomacy chief says she's confident America's image abroad can be rebuilt after sagging badly during the Bush administration. Former media executive Judith McHale spoke in an interview with VOA on her first full day as undersecretary of state for public diplomacy.

McHale is not predicting a miraculous rebound in America's standing abroad, which opinion polls suggest hit historic lows under the past administration, whose foreign policy was perceived as unilateralist and overly militarized.

However, the new undersecretary does say the Obama administration has already made some headway in restoring the U.S. global image, starting with the election and inauguration of the new president, who has family ties to Kenya and spent formative years in Indonesia.

"His election clearly helped our image in the world in a number of ways. Certainly his roots in Africa, the time that he lived in Indonesia. He and I actually had a conversation about the fact we both lived overseas when we were younger. I think that does give you a different world-view. So yes, I think the world right now is very willing to re-engage with the country. He, in his inauguration, made an important point of talking about reaching out his hand and I think there are lots of people who want to reach out to us now," she said.

McHale said the president's June 4 policy address in Cairo, in which he is expected to urge reconciliation with Muslim states, will be a critically important event in U.S. public diplomacy and an effort to reach out to those countries as partners.

McHale, who for 20 years headed the cable TV combine Discovery Communications, said she developed her interest in foreign and particularly African affairs as the daughter of a U.S. diplomat in apartheid-era South Africa.

She spent much of the last two years traveling in Africa to launch a mutual fund specializing in investments in African companies, and as such said she rejects the notion that her lack of traditional foreign policy experience will be a liability in her new job.

McHale, whose company operated in some 170 countries around the world, said the key to America reaching foreign populations and particularly youthful audiences is through new media - not only cable television but cellular communications and Internet social networking.

"We have to understand what's working. What are the things that are most relevant to help us reach and connect with billions of people around the world. There's no other way of doing that unless we employ new media in appropriate circumstances. When you look at the demographics of all the regions that we're trying to reach and you see that in many cases where the population is under 25 or under 20 and you have a younger demographic, they rely and use new technologies increasingly around the world," she said.

McHale oversees a $1 billion a year array of State Department communications, cultural, educational and exchange programs.

She promised a top-to-bottom review of U.S. public diplomacy efforts but said she enters the post with no preconceived notions about structural changes, though there are abundant study-commission reform recommendations.

My PD Blog: A Nostalgic Visit

2009-05-28T07:45:00.000-07:00

My PD Blog: A Nostalgic Visit

A Nostalgic Visit

2009-05-28T07:27:00.000-07:00

We recently made an all-too-short visit to Prague. it was our first trip there in nearly 10 years, over twenty years since we lived there (1983-1986) and it was nearly 40 years since our first visit there in August 1969. We saw a number of old and dear friends and missed others. We will stay longer next time! It was a nostalgic visit and one which restored our hope in the future of Prague and Central Europe.

There were many poignant moments, perhaps none quite so as this surprise visit to a monument arranged by Jazz Section leader Karel Srp.

The plaque (seen above) commemorates the planting of trees in the 1980s by several visiting writers to Prague (Kurt Vonnegut, John Updike, Gordon Skilling) and lists Jazz Section supporters at the Embassy in Prague, including the author of this blog and John Brown, Madeleine Albright, Wendy Luers and Sam Westgate. The trees--like the Jazz Section--and Democracy in Prague-- are still alive and thriving despite changes and the pace of history.

One step taken, more to come

2009-05-08T08:45:00.000-07:00

The two pieces of legislation I wrote about earlier have passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--an important step but the legislation has more hurdles to jump so let's continue to be supportive of this important public diplomacy legislation. Senator Lugar's May 5, 2009 release on the passage is reprinted below.

As yet to be introduced is the kind of legislation that will mark a major change in American Public Diplomacy. This would be a agency for Public Diplomacy within the State Department which could centralize authority over personnel and financial resources in a single place. I've written about this in earlier posts and I was delighted to see Tom Pickering support this concept at a recent CSIS symposium. [ Ambassador Thomas Pickering argued persuasively for a “stand alone agency within the State Department” for public diplomacy. He said that such a structure would keep public diplomacy closely engaged with policymakers and allow the United States to develop and maintain a corps of experienced public diplomacy professionals. "Smart Power in the Obama Administration: The Role of International Education and Exchange", May 6, 2009 ].

Science Envoy, Public Diplomacy Bills Clear Committee

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee today unanimously passed S.838, U.S. Sen. Dick Lugar’s bill establishing “United States Science Envoys.” The bill would highlight our nation’s commitment to scientific research and education, as well as our willingness to collaborate with other countries to promote advancements in these fields throughout the world. Science Envoys will serve not only as good-will ambassadors, but help reinforce links between U.S. academic and scientific institutions and their international counterparts.

The United States has produced more Nobel Laureates than any other nation in Chemistry, Physics, Medicine and Economics. Recognition of U.S. expertise in these fields is reflected in consistent international opinion polls that show even those nations that disagree with the United States on certain foreign policy issues, admire the United States for our leadership in education, science and technology.

Scientific cooperation served as a means to engage with the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s and 80s and with the People’s Republic of China before official diplomatic ties were fully established.

Lugar’s legislation establishes the Science Envoy program and directs that it be run by the Department of State through its Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Envoys will be selected by the Secretary of State.

Lugar’s S. Res. 49, a resolution to express the sense of the Senate regarding the importance of public diplomacy, also passed the Committee. It calls for the Secretary of State to initiate a reexamination of the public diplomacy platform strategy of the United States with a goal of reestablishing publicly accessible American Centers, and consider placing United States public diplomacy facilities at locations conducive to maximizing their use, consistent with the authority given to the Secretary in the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act.

For more information on S. Res. 49, visit http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/diplomacy.html.

Dick Lugar is the Lone Ranger

2009-05-06T16:32:00.000-07:00

Nick Cull recently wrote about "Dick Lugar to the Rescue" concerning the Indiana Senator's two excellent pieces of legislation S.R. 49 (on the recreation of American Cultural Centers--about which I wrote in an earlier post) and S.R. 838 on the creation of Science Attaches (which I haven't yet discussed). Nick covered the territory pretty well but I cannot resist a few comments of my own on this legislation.

As I noted, I have already commented favorably in S.R. 49, so it is time to address the second of these pieces of legislation because it is likely to come up for a vote soon. It is yet another inspired idea from the Senator who would have made a great Secretary of State if he could be convinced to leave the Senate where even in the minority he has a good deal of influence.

Science attaches of the past were essentially travel agents for members of the U.S. scientific community abroad because while they ostensibly served in the Office of Science and Technology in the State Department where, as FS generalists who would not know an amoeba from an electron, worked mainly to smooth the travel of scientists from the National Academy of Science and a host of other agencies to international scientific conferences and the like. Perhaps it made good cover for intelligence professionals but it did little to serve either science or diplomacy. Thanks to Senator Lugar's sagacity, by placing the new science attaches in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs they now have a home that fits the purpose ---scientific and technical exchanges. S&T exchanges--like arts exchanges, or indeed any educational exchange have a vital purpose--the same purpose--mutual understanding. So it makes eminent good sense to lodge this function with the folks who do an outstanding job in all of the other exchanges of persons programs that they handle from youth exchanges to Fulbright professors, from professional exchanges like the IV Program to university to university exchanges-- all in the interest of mutual understanding.

The only down side of this story is that Dick Lugar, like that other fellow who came to the rescue, is the "Lone Ranger" it seems. Where are the other 99 (well 98 pending Minnesota) Senators--where are their ideas to rescue American public diplomacy from its current moribund state? The Obama Administration is woefully slow off the starting blocks on Public Diplomacy so perhaps the Legislative Branch can step in, as Senator Lugar has done, to fill in the blanks and come up with some creative ideas.

Finally...

2009-04-14T19:36:00.000-07:00

Well at last it has happened. The Obama Administration has finally nominated the long-rumored favorite for the post of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale.

The White House put out this release:

Judith A. McHale, Nominee for Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Department of State

Ms. McHale is a leading media and communications executive whose career has been devoted to building companies and non-profit organizations dedicated to reaching out to and connecting people around the world. She is the former President and Chief Executive Officer of Discovery Communications. From 1987 to 2006, McHale helped build the parent company of the Discovery Channel into one of the world's most extensive media enterprises, with more than 100 channels telecast in over 170 countries and 35 languages to more than 1 billion subscribers. In the 1990s, McHale launched the non-profit Discovery Channel Global Education Partnership, which supplies free educational video programming to more than half a million students across Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. After two decades at Discovery, McHale extended her commitment to helping build opportunity for people in Africa. With the Global Environment Fund, a private equity firm, she worked to launch the GEF/Africa Growth Fund, an investment vehicle intending to focus on supplying expansion capital to small and medium-sized businesses that provide consumer goods and services in emerging African markets. McHale's commitment to global outreach efforts also includes her service on the boards of the Africa Society of the National Summit on Africa, the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, the National Democratic Institute, and Vital Voices. She previously served on the board of Africare. The daughter of a U.S. Foreign Service Officer, McHale was born in New York City and grew up in Britain and apartheid-era South Africa. Before joining Discovery, McHale served as General Counsel for MTV Networks and helped guide the company's international expansion.

Well, I wish Ms. McHale the best of luck in her new position, assuming of course that she is confirmed by the Senate. There is no doubt that she is a talented and experienced person, with a strong background in media and development. But her qualifications are not the determining factor in a successful term as Under Secretary.

Previous PD Under Secretaries (known as "R" in Foggy Bottom) were no less talented or experienced in their own ways. But each of them was stymied by the organizational box into which they were thrust. No matter their good intentions or their connections to power, they each failed to accomplish anything of real substance because they were given a job with great responsibility but without much real authority. You see, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has no line authority over the hundreds of public diplomacy officers and locally engaged staff at the Embassies and Consulates around the world that actually engage in public diplomacy. Nor has the position any real authority over the funds that are spent for public diplomacy abroad.

At best, the job can be said to be a member of "the corporate board" of the State Department with some limited power over two bureaus at State (IIP-International Information Programs and ECA-Educational and Cultural Affairs), the third Bureau under "R", PA-Public Affairs has rarely paid much attention to the Under Secretary and, if rumor is correct, the Office of the Spokesman--the most important and visible part of PA -- will be assigned directly to Secretary Clinton's office in the near future. This is a logical and sensible move which only recognizes the reality that PA works for the Secretary's image domestically; not the U.S. image abroad. If Ms. McHale is to be successful, she will have to convince Secretary Clinton that the Department and the Secretary herself will be best served if "R" is given a far more independent and direct role in the conduct of public diplomacy by bringing all personnel and financial resources devoted to public diplomacy under her authority. If PD were given the same level of cohesiveness and autonomy within State that USAID now enjoys, there is a chance that Judith McHale will go down in history as the most successful Under Secretary for PD and PA. If not, she will likely join the ranks of the previous five Under Secretaries who expended their time and talent in a fruitless quest for an impossible dream.

S. 49 Finally some common sense legislation on PD

2009-03-22T16:15:00.000-07:00

I urge you to read this and if you agree, contact your Senators and anyone else who will listen and gather support for this legislation. Of course it is only a start. And the next step must be to put the pieces of Public Diplomacy back together again, either as a separate entity under the Secretary of State similar to USAID today or as an independent agency. The latter may be a couple of years away but the former can be done legislatively very easily and at NO repeat NO additional cost to the tax payer.

Here is S. 49: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:sr49is.txt.pdf

Good Ideas Sometimes Come in Unexpected Places

2009-03-22T15:56:00.000-07:00

I just came across this article in the on-line edition of The American Interest and I wanted to share the relevant excepts about public diplomacy with this Blog's readers. Of course the article is brilliant mainly because it mirrors the thrust of my own opinions (see Humpty Dumpty Redux etc.) but doesn't have the burden of being written by an ex-USIA officer and public diplomacy professional.

Here it is:
Excerpt from: http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=536&MId=23

The American Interest On Line

Nation-Building in America

INTELLIGENT DESIGN 
HOW TO CHANGE AMERICA

 William A. Galston

(Begin excepts)
Deconsolidation. Other institutional changes President Obama could adopt are less momentous but could still significantly improve government performance at modest cost. Reversing unsuccessful consolidations would be a good place to start.
When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created, Congress and the Bush Administration cast a wide net. Indeed, they cast it too wide—much wider than suggested by the initial expert proposals for a such a Department. Including the Federal Emergency Management Agency in DHS, for example, made more sense in bureaucratic flow charts than in the real world. To be sure, FEMA has raised its game since the Hurricane Katrina fiasco. But as long as this agency remains buried in a department whose principle mission is fighting terrorism, it will not command top-quality management or adequate resources. As the Kennedy School’s Elaine Kamarck has argued, the best and simplest remedy is to restore the status quo ante—namely, an independent FEMA, an arrangement which performed well during the Clinton Administration.
Our nation’s public diplomacy institutions mark another instance of a failed consolidation. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued last year that, in waging and winning the Cold War, institutions mattered as much as people and policies. In the wake of the Cold War, we weakened not only our military and intelligence capabilities, but also the institutions of “soft power” that enabled us to communicate effectively with other parts of the world. The fault was bipartisan. During the 1990s, arch-conservative Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) applied relentless pressure to abolish the U.S. Information Agency. He found partners in two successive Secretaries of State interested in bringing public diplomacy under State Department control, and in a White House eager to demonstrate that it was reinventing government. By 1999, as Secretary Gates put it, “the U.S. Information Agency was abolished as an independent entity, split into pieces, and many of its capabilities folded into a small corner of the State Department.”1
Today, the United States finds itself engaged in new ideological struggles against authoritarian populism and Islamist radicalism. Opinion surveys show that we are on the defensive and losing ground. While inherently unpopular policies are largely responsible, our failure to build bridges to other peoples has made matters worse. What we are doing is not working. Simply recreating the institutions of the past is unlikely to make matters better, but neither will simply adding people and money to today’s flawed structures.
Our public diplomacy will remain weak as long as it is subordinated to the State Department’s traditional concerns—a fact that leading conservatives are readier to acknowledge than are most liberals. To give public diplomacy the clout it needs, we should create a new cabinet-level Department of Global Information and Communications (DGIC) and back it with the resources it would need to succeed. Its functions would include: training public diplomacy officers for embassies and consulates around the world; offering media and communications training for State Department officials and those other agencies that represent the United States abroad; jump-starting the study of critical foreign languages through a new National Security Languages Initiative; bolstering area studies, including creating new interdisciplinary centers and convening high-level conferences; sponsoring and conducting ongoing survey research on public opinion abroad; assuming responsibility for international broadcasting beyond pure news; expanding vital people-to-people programs, including exchanges of scholars, students and cultural institutions, expert American speakers abroad and English-language teaching; and launching a massive new translation program, the “American Knowledge Library Initiative”, designed to make the best of our thought and culture available abroad in critical foreign languages.
The DGIC would assume a significant role within the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy. For example, its representative would be at the table during interagency deputies’ meetings, articulating the consequences of policy options for our standing in the world. As the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Muslim and Arab World argued in 2003,
while the United States cannot and should not simply change its policies to suit public opinion abroad, we must use the tools of public diplomacy to assess the likely effectiveness of particular policies. Without such assessment, our policies could produce unintended consequences that do not serve our interests.

In addition, a senior official of the DGIC would chair an interagency Policy Coordination Council on public diplomacy, with representation from the State Department, USAID, Defense and Commerce, among others.
(End Excerpts)

1. Gates, Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, November 26, 2007.

About the Author:
William A. Galston is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he holds the Ezra Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies.

My PD Blog: Two Hopeful Signs

2009-02-27T14:28:00.000-08:00

My PD Blog: Two Hopeful Signs

Two Hopeful Signs

2009-02-27T14:17:00.000-08:00

Two Hopeful Signs Among All the Gloom Over Public Diplomacy

In the past couple of days two hopeful harbingers of better times ahead for public diplomacy took my eye. The first was Senator Lugar’s wonderfully lucid and much needed statement on the importance of American Cultural and Information Centers as a means to engage the world in a meaningful dialogue. If you have not read Senator Lugar Foreign Policy piece you should. Here is a link: http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/26/to_win_hearts_and_minds_get_back_in_the_game

The other hopeful words were expressed by one of America’s finest diplomats, Career Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering,. In a statement before a Congressional Committee, Pickering called for a doubling of funding for America’s exchange programs and with good reason—they work! Even more important perhaps, his assertion that we either “pay now or pay later” for the rebuilding of our diplomatic corps was supported by both Chairwoman Nita Lowey (D-NY) and Ranking Member Kay Granger (R-TX).

Imagine—a legendary U.S. Senator with expertise in foreign affairs and a long-time much-admired State Department diplomat come forward in the same week with well thought out, logical and important statements on how we can help to restore American public diplomacy to make it an effective component of American national security. My head is spinning! Perhaps now someone famous might just propose that we resurrect USIA or its 21st century equivalent to make the picture complete. Perhaps there is hope for “change we can believe in” after all.

My PD Blog: THE WHITE OAK RECOMMENDATIONS ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

2009-02-24T11:59:00.000-08:00

My PD Blog: THE WHITE OAK RECOMMENDATIONS ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

THE WHITE OAK RECOMMENDATIONS ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

2009-02-24T10:58:00.000-08:00

If you haven't read the White Oak Recommendations, you should do so at an early opportunity. I've appended a link below to the Recommendations and a list of those individuals who generated them. Most of the members of the White Oak group are known to me and they are serious people committed to improving American public diplomacy. Indeed we agree on 90 percent or more of what is recommended.

The recommendations are not exactly a great surprise or a departure from conventional wisdom and with the seventy or so people gathered around "the White Oak table", so to speak, it would be remarkable to gain an agreement on anything but the conventional. And while I do agree with nearly all of what was listed in the recommendations (after all, a quick reading of them might strike anyone as a perfectly reasonable approach) I do get the feeling that there was an element of group think at play here.

Nearly all of the participants are on record as solid Obama supporters, politically center-left and avowed Democrats. Nothing wrong with that although I think that any conversation about public diplomacy benefits from a diversity of political or ideological views as well as a diversity of organizational backgrounds. But because of this political uniformity it may have been more important to the participants to show unity rather than risk creativity which might have caused some to go in different directions and produce a messier set of recommendations to the administration and the Congress.

On the recommendations, there are two elements with which I do not agree. Indeed it will come as no surprise to those who are familiar with my writings that I would take issue with two of the recommendations. The first begins with the "self-evident truth" that "Re-fighting old battles over the consolidation of public diplomacy is neither feasible nor productive at this time." If not now, when? Other than the State Department and perhaps the ghost of Jessie Helms, is there anyone who would fight to keep public diplomacy in the Department where it has been so disfunctional for the past decade? People have used the lame excuse that restructuring public diplomacy is in the "too hard to do" box or have claimed that it would distract from the urgent business of doing public diplomacy. When this argument is seen for what it is, then budget is raised as though a return to an independent public diplomacy agency would somehow cost more than the bloated bureaucracy of State or DoD. When USIA thrived it had a lean and non-partisan structure and there is no reason why a lean and non-partisan structure cannot be put in place today.

The second point of disagreement between my colleagues at White Oak and this commentator is over the coordination of public diplomacy. As the White Oak group acknowledges, it is unlikely that an Under Secretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy could serve as the "coordinator" for public diplomacy among the many forces within and outside the government that have an input into American public diplomacy. Their "solution" is to create another Senior Director position at the National Security Council on a permanent or temporary basis to "fix" the coordination problem. Public Diplomacy is a highly operational profession and I question why the NSC should be placed in the middle of operations--the last time that happened we had the Iran-Contra scandal.

There is a better way to operate public diplomacy and a better way to coordinate public diplomacy in my view. If you want to know more, see the link below to an article I wrote on these issues in March 2008. Kudos to the White Oak group--they got it 90 percent right.

Links: http://mountainrunner.us/files/whiteoak/The_White_Oak_Recommendations_onPublc_Diplomacy.pdf

http://mountainrunner.us/files/whiteoak/The_White_Oak_Recommendations_Endorsement_List.pdf

http://www.pdworldwide.com/Services.html

State Department Reorganization

2009-01-28T20:07:00.000-08:00

Reorganization of the Public Diplomacy function at the State Department is a necessary first step and something that can be done immediately without legislation. But make no mistake--it is not enough to remedy the situation. Public Diplomacy needs centralized coordination, a new operational agency and a reenergized mission with the funding commensurate to its importance to our national security and foreign policy goals. The following proposal by four retired USIA officers is just this sort of first step on the road to reforming our Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century. The next steps will involve both the Administration and the Congress as the future must be grounded in legislation to bring a central role to public diplomacy with interagency coordination within the Office of the Presidency and a new independent operational agency, including the broadcasting elements. The outline of that plan may be seen in my article "Humpty Dumpty Redux." In the meantime read the following proposal for reorganization of PD in State:

MAKING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFECTIVE

Crippled State Department Public Diplomacy Must be Restructured

Introduction: Recent overseas polls show that support for the United States is continues low and that our once high credibility is badly tarnished. American values are misunderstood and we seem to have lost the moorings by which we were formerly judged and envied. Public diplomacy (PD ) which is not public relations is based on dialogue, listening, learning and then intelligent discussion and hopefully, persuasion. We have allowed our outreach instrument of PD to loose effectiveness. Best practices of the former USIA have been set aside. Restructuring the instrument within State is essential.

Summary: Public Diplomacy (PD), a key instrument of foreign policy, can promote a favorable climate of public opinion in important countries if it is credible, flexible, adequately resourced and proactive. Disagreement with US foreign policy, actions and military engagements hurts is severely with overseas audiences. Yet a robust PD activity can build credibility in individual countries and continued support for the essence of America. Most PD discussion today ignores a basic obstacle which is the fragmented PD structure within State. Today, due to its illogical configuration, it is far from being an effective instrument of foreign affairs. Some field initiatives are acted upon by Washington PD components while others may languish or depend on the fading “old boy network” for response. Reallocation of resources is slow or not acted upon.

Communication with country audiences, both field-driven and Washington-driven, must be supported by a Washington process that is clearly defined and responsive, providing up-and-down linkage to the field from the Under Secretary for PD & PA (R) to the PAOs and may involve International Information Programs (IIP) and Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). Five Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R) have been critically hobbled by the PD organization although the penultimate one tweaked it somewhat but did not address the core problem. The latest one has made little impact.

Foreign policy control and PD input should remain in the regional bureaus and be responsive to their requirements while overseeing policy application to PD activities. Recognizing this, recommended restructuring includes establishing an A/S for Field PD-Coordinator along with adequate geographic, executive, administrative staffs. This position would answer to the Under Secretary -R- to oversee and coordinate the PD process related to the field. A new geographic staff, largely drawn from the existing PD units in the regional bureaus, would possess country expertise and advise on and provide support to all programming - what will work, cultural barriers, etc. The “nuts and bolts” of PD program support would fall to these new “desk” officers removing this responsibility from the regional bureaus. One or more senior PD officers would remain in each regional bureau to provide policy coordination and input. R through the new A/S should have input into PD training, assignments and field programs.

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PAO evaluations, now done by chiefs of missions, should have contributions by the new A/S input from the PD officer(s) in the regional bureaus. End Summary

Public Diplomacy (PD), appropriately funded and pulsed by a synergy of components directed by experienced PD officers, can be a powerful and important instrument in gaining understanding if not support for America’s objectives, domestic and foreign. To be effective, PD should be proactive in activity planning, nimble, and flexible with its resources. It must avoid getting mired in State’s hierarchical, reactive environment but shaped by individual country objectives – herein is an oil and water cultural contrast. PD leadership must be acutely tuned to and supportive of PD initiatives, both field and Washington, and provide overall guidance, direction and resource support.

Core philosophy of effective PD is based on communication dialogue (not

monologue) with foreign opinion leaders. (This is a major difference between PD and PR.) Listening and learning (in the local language) followed by convincing discussion are essential. The climate of public opinion can only be influenced if the PD conveyors in the field have achieved credibility. Field posts are essential to our communication..

PD Field posts and PAOs are directed by the US ambassadors while supplied with policy guidance from Washington as they were by USIA. To be successful, support from Washington for field initiatives must be rapid and coordinated with appropriate PD components in the Department. All PD officers in the field and in Washington should have a clear understanding of which Washington offices and officers are responsible for supporting each field program. All must have an open channel to the top PD leadership in the Department. Geographic and country expertise must be instantly available to advise PD leadership (R) which initiatives will work and won’t work and to make program recommendations. Adjusting resources and budget re-allocations must become more flexible and faster in application.

Several self-imposed conditions now restrict successful PD.

Funding and outreach. Current funding and outreach of PD field programs severely limit effectiveness of our PD efforts country by country and especially in the crucial geographic areas spotlighted in the aftermath of 9/11. Shortage of resources to re-open high tech libraries/information centers, branch posts, pursue other outreach programs and restore appropriate country levels of PD personnel prove crippling. Even if budgets and PD personnel are significantly increased, there is wide recognition that the machinery of our current PD operations within the State Department requires transformation. President Bush and Congressional leaders have asked, “Why are our messages not convincing?” Central to this problem is the PD structure within State.

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Foreign Policy. Assistant secretaries in the regional bureaus must control policy

in their areas. This is a given. PD activities both in Washington and the

field lead from this policy and should be positioned to contribute to policy creation and application. When USIA was merged into State, it was expected that by placing the former “Area Offices” of USIA into the regional bureaus, policy and geographic

expertise would meld into efficient support for field initiatives and strengthen Washington-driven initiatives. Unfortunately, this expectation did not materialize appropriately, even after more than eight years of effort and experience.

In 1999, Congress assigned overall PD responsibility to a new position, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R). However, this mandate did not provide corresponding specific authority to manage all PD within the Department and PD field operations. R encounters obstacles to effective PD support which include (a) chain of command down to and up from the field and (b) “authority” to support that responsibility. R lacks authority over most PD personnel, resources and field programs.

1. PD field initiatives are sent to the Department for support and program guidance. Frequently, the communications end up in the regional bureaus and may or may not be assigned to the PD officers in those bureaus for action. Sometimes those field

requests are lost in the bureaucracy. Or after being vetted by a “DAS,” who may or may not know genuine PD, those field requests are specifically assigned to the PD officers within the regional bureaus who work to support them but must resort to the “old boy network” of former USIA colleagues in other PD components to fulfill them. Dealings with the PD field posts by regional PD officers are sometimes “ad hoc.” Confusion and frustration by PD officers in the field and in the regional bureaus may arise due to vague lines of responsibility. Older officers with USIA experience know that a more efficient and workable process is doable. Bottom line – Current structure limits PD effectiveness.

2. At the same time, PD officers in the regional bureaus do not control field programs (although they provide some resources) and have little authority over PD officers in the field. Direct linkage coupled with authority is not there.

3. Field PD officers have no defined and direct linkage to R who theoretically is their director. In reality they must deal and negotiate with the PD officers in the regional bureaus, the International Information Programs (IIP), the Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and other Department components. There is no overall coordinator for PD field programs.

4. R’s position as Under Secretary precludes this officer from having a geographic staff to advise what PD efforts will work in a specific cultural environment, to monitor field initiatives and to provide program suggestions. Nor does s/he have the support of executive and administrative staffs to control all PD resources with flexibility and to move them where needed even though R has been assigned PD “earmarks”

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allocations by the Congress. An effective PD activity must be able to reallocate resources rapidly throughout the system. Department hierarchy dictates that only assistant secretaries can control programs, most of the resources and be operational. Currently the geographic expertise R so obviously needs is within the regional bureaus and is not immediately responsive to R. Missing also is direct linkage (read support to and control of field operations. Some limited efforts have been made to address these shortcomings, but the basic problems remain. Efficient use of the PD instrument is sharply curtailed if R does not have the authority and direct linkage to support and guide PD programs worldwide.

Recommendations:

1. Foreign policy oversight of PD operations must be continued by the regional assistant secretaries and their bureaus. A senior PD officer within those bureaus should advise and provide input into policy creation and execution. At the same time a realignment of the regional PD personnel to the Under Secretary “R” is required. See following:

A. Establish an Assistant Secretary - (Coordinator) for PD field Operations.

This officer is the sorely needed direct linkage between field posts and R, up and down. Provide that position with sufficient staff (formerly with the bureaus) - geographic, executive, administrative - to enable the incumbent to support and coordinate PD programs initiated by the Department and the field. Assist/advise R with his/her responsibilities.

B. Within each regional bureau combine both PD and PA into an Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, headed by a senior PD officer.

Each office director would have a deputy for PA (with necessary staff) to handle PA requirements. Both PD director and PA deputy would participate in policy formulation and application under the direction of the regional A/S and DAS’s. Concomitantly, the PD office director would be responsible for coordinating policy guidance with their counterparts in the new PD geographic offices, IIP and ECA.

The above reorganization recommends transferring most of the PD geographic officers from the regional bureaus and International Organizations (IO) and forming counterpart geographic offices, each under an Area PD office director who reports to the new A/S for PD Field Operations - (Coordinator). Those officers would in fact be “PD desk officers” and relieve regional bureau PD officers from the many details of both field and Washington PD activities. They would provide the all-important “missing link” to the field and to R while providing R and other PD elements the geographic expertise now absent. The regional PD officers and deputies, representing the regional Assistant Secretaries, would oversee policy implementation with the other PD components.

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Comment: “Tinkering” with the present PD operations within State side-steps addressing the major reform required. Making a PD officer within each regional bureau a DAS for PD is not the solution. Such evades the linkage and field support issues. PD must be accepted within the Department as a valuable foreign policy instrument and make the important changes to its operation as recommended above. The eight year experiment is chugging along, once an eight cylinder machine but now operating on four. Painting the car and attaching catchy (PR) bumper stickers may seem important. That is “tweaking”. But essential to improving the engine (PD process) is to re-connect all of the vital spark plugs.

There are other areas within the Department requiring important PD leadership from R and adjustments should follow. If the Department truly wants a more effective

PD operation, it must be prepared to support R in all responsibilities. They include PD training, PD assignments, budget control and support to the A/S for PD Field Operations - (Coordinator). The first big advance to promote more effective PD in our overseas outreach is to reconnect the PD machinery within the Department of State.

Recently, even more harmful to an effective PD process is the current movement within State to embed the PD professionals into State’s desk offices. This will dilute the PD process even more.

Double-hatting a DAS within each regional bureau to oversee PD activities and answer to R will only make field support more layered The all important field posts require a clear structure in Washington to support field initiatives in all aspects of PD operations. A DAS would only have a dotted line relationship with the field posts as well as PD components in Washington. PAOs require direct connections with R via an Assistant Secretary for PD Field Operations.

Compiled and edited by:

Fred A. Coffey, Jr. /FSO (Ret.) 703-827-2254

Ambassador William Rugh /FSO (Ret.) 301-929-5141

Stan Silverman/Former Comptroller of USIA 703-536-7332

William Maurer /FSO (Ret.)703-250-1801

In consultation with many professional Foreign Service Officers and ambassadors

January 23, 2009

Comment: Kudos to these four dedicated professionals for putting this proposal "out there". As I said in the introduction to this posting, this is a necessary first step. These proposals could be put in place within a few weeks and would lead to an almost immediate and substantive improvement in how we conduct public diplomacy. But the four authors must know as I do that this initial reform must also lead to the kind of major changes--legislative changes--that I and others who study this issue have called for and which will require a bipartisan approach and well crafted language to ensure the intent of the Congress is carried out by the new operational agency and the White House coordination entity that has been proposed in "Humpty Dumpty Redux."

John Updike RIP

2009-01-28T19:41:00.000-08:00

I was saddened to learn of the death this week of one of America's greatest contemporary writers, John Updike. Indeed it can be argued that he captured mid and late 20th century America better than anyone. Our paths crossed a couple of times overseas--twice in Czechoslovakia in the mid 1980s (from which the autographed photo at left originates) and again later in that decade in Finland. During the Czech visits John Updike was able to advance Czech-American cultural relations in a variety of ways both official and not so official--more about this in a future post perhaps--and in Finland our meeting was rather serendipitous as he was on a promotion tour for a new book. I regret that I only had a limited time to get to know this gifted writer and observer of humanity. He used every bit of that observational skill in blending with his great imagination to create vivid depictions of very real yet fictional characters. Among the several things we had in common was his PA Dutch Country roots. Updike grew up in Shillington just outside Reading, PA while my childhood was spent in Lancaster County just a few miles to the south. He was besides being a remarkable writer, a genuine and warm human being with great strengths of humanity and compassion and a single-minded dedication to his art. He was also a fun and interesting companion on our travels around Czechoslovakia under the communists and in Finland's capital city. He will be missed.

Smith-Mundt Symposium Panel Three

2009-01-24T17:19:00.001-08:00

Check out the transcript of Panel Three at the following site:

http://mountainrunner.us/symposium/transcripts/0113-smithmundtsymposium-panel3.pdf

Comments are welcome.